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ABSTRACT 
DECISION-MAKING AND IDJTIHAD IN ISLAMIC ENVIRONMENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PAKISTAN, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
This Ph. D. seeks to contribute further to the field of knowledge about Islam and 
'Islamic' societies, specifically through examination of the processes and techniques of 
decision-making in different Islamic environments. Through the medium of fieldwork- 
interviews, the thesis compares Muslim minority communities' experiences in the U. K. 
with those of Singapore - and explores decision-making within 'modernising' Muslim- 
majority countries in which 'i jtihacf is applied to varying degrees - such as Malaysia and 
Pakistan. Research focuses upon how contemporary Muslim communities are interpreting 
'Islam', to meet the challenges of'modern' issues - including aspects of leadership, politics, 
law, and technology. 
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1 Introduction 
I. I. Preamble 
The present study is an investigation into decision-making processes within 
Islamic environments, and the challenges faced by communities and individuals 
endeavouring to reconcile or balance - if they feel it necessary or relevant - the 
practice of Islamic beliefs, and living within contemporary societies. The main 
objectives of the study would be as follows: 
1) To examine the emphases of Islamic sources - including the Kur'än, 
Sunna, Had. th, Fikh and Shari-'a - within decision-making processes in 
different 'Islamic environments'. 
2) To examine the nature of authority within selected Islamic contexts, and 
to consider the wide impact of decision-making processes in such areas 
as personal law, economics, technology, education, and medicine. 
3) To examine the various decision-making processes related to idUtihäd, the 
relevance (or not) of which having been a topic of considerable debate by 
both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
4) To examine and compare selected issues of 'Islamic values' in a U. K. 
context with related issues in Pakistani, Malaysian and Singaporean 
Islamic environments. 
I 
5) To examine how Muslims reconcile the dynamics of varied Islamic 
beliefs with life in secularising and/or modernising societies, and to what 
extent 'extra-Islamic' socio-political and religious interests aid or abet the 
decision-making processes. 
The present study incorporates a dialogue on interpretations of Islam, based 
on extensive fieldwork, between different Muslim authorities and individuals, 
within variations of Sunni and - to a lesser extent - Sh. t `a frameworks. An 
underlying theme is an interpretation of the Kur'än, which suggests that there can 
be no separation of religious and secular concerns, and that solutions for all issues 
can be located in the Kur'än: 
" 
... 
And no question do they bring to thee but We reveal to thee the truth 
and the best explanation (thereof). " ' 
What are the questions being brought for 'the best explanation' within 
contemporary Islamic environments? How do Islamic 'authorities' approach 'new' 
issues of practical concern to Muslims? Who is qualified to make a decision or 
provide an opinion, based upon interpretation of Islamic sources? Can these 
sources be utilised to tackle the different pressures of contemporary Islamic 
societies? 
Exploration of these questions within this study may be of practical value to 
non-Muslims in the U. K. seeking to comprehend Islam more fully, and to 
2 
Muslims in the U. K. interested in alternate approaches towards the practical 
concerns of living life as a Muslim in the U. K. - however that is defined. One 
intention is to provide in this study a wide-ranging discussion document, in an 
attempt to represent some of the diverse Islamic approaches to decision-making 
processes on issues relevant to Muslims in the U. K. 
The multi-disciplinary nature of a broad-ranging study such as this has been 
influenced by diverse existing research in numerous fields. As such, the study 
does not draw from a single 'school' or body of literature. Whilst existing 
research in related areas is discussed or referred to in the relevant chapters, it is 
useful to review additional related work that influenced the perspective of the 
present study. 
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1.2. Typologies of Research 
Extensive literature exists on what could be described as the 'mechanics' of 
decision-making processes within Islam. Discussion on the nature of authority 
and decision-making processes dates back to the earliest post-Kur'änic Islamic 
sources, and existed not only in literary forms, but through oral transmission; for 
example, through the preservation and compilation of the Kur'an and (separately) 
the various collections of Hadth. Islamic written sources range from the Kur'än 
to collections of Sunna and Had, & Sara biographies of the Prophet Muhammad; 
works attributed to different Madhhab; Fikh, Shari-'a, and Tafsnr sources; and 
works of individual scholarship from a variety of Muslim perspectives. 
Several English-language translations of the meaning of the Kur'an, and other 
translated Islamic 'primary' sources, have informed this thesis and the researcher's 
earlier studies. The emphasis in this research is less upon the semantic and 
lexicographic nuances of Islamic terminologies - although aspects of selected key 
terms are incorporated in the discussion; instead, the focus is upon how Islamic 
understanding can have a direct impact upon people 'at ground floor level'. Given 
the divergence of opinions on meaning and understanding of sources within 
academic contexts and/or the Islamic spectrum, the researcher was interested in 
what key terms associated with Islamic decision-making processes meant to 
interviewees, and how they were applied (if at all) in varied contemporary Islamic 
contexts? 
Research was informed by existing studies on Islamic terminologies and 
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concepts relating to Islamic decision-making in contemporary contexts. The work 
of Kemal A. Faruki provided an introduction to, and working definition of, 
'itihäd, which he described as: 
it ... exerting oneself to the utmost degree to understand share `a through 
disciplined judgement 
... " 
2 
In terms of initial reference points regarding terminologies, surveying the work 
of Ignaz Goldziher, 3 Joseph Schacht 4 and Noel J. Coulson 5 was useful because 
of their influence upon other (Muslim and non-Muslim) theoretical studies in this 
area - although inevitably some of their conclusions (especially regarding 
iLtihJd) have been superseded or disputed by later studies. Other studies 
influential in this thesis include: Georges F. Hourani's discussion of the role of 
iLma ` in decision-making; 6 Mohammad Hashim Kamali's introduction tofikh 
complexities; ' Juma Mikadi Oman Mputah's discussion on the concept of al- 
Masalih al-Mursalah 'public interest' in Islam. 8 The scholarly debate on i tihäd 
received impetus in the 1980s through the studies of Wael B. Hallaq, in his 
challenge of the frequently-expressed notion that the gate of itihäd' was closed. 
Hallaq's initial Ph. D. thesis on this subject has been further developed in his later 
work, and provided a pivotal reference point for this current research. 9 
In terms of work emerging from a specific `pro-icitihid Islamic perspective, 
a number of sources were surveyed, useful because of their association with 
institutions in which some of the later fieldwork was undertaken: Ahmad Hasan 
introduced a detailed analysis on kiyäs and the development of fikh; 1 ° Imran 
5 
Ahsan Khan Nyazee provided a recent perspective on the theoretical role of usül 
ul fikh in the'Islamic legal system'. '' Inspired by earlier work by Fazur Rahman'2 
and Ismd il Rdj al Fa-rüg-1 ", Tähä J. al` Alwäni explored aspects of i tihäd in 
terms of "a methodology of thought, "" relevant in'modernising' Islamic societies. 
The research was informed by other academic sources, which contribute 
through presenting different understandings of aspects of Islamic interpretation: 
Bernard G. Weiss raised important aspects of Islamic interpretative mechanisms, 
in terms of approaches towards the reconciliation of Islamic primary source 
material. " Kate Zebiri's study of ulamä', and the implications of Islamic 
'modernising' decision-making on power structures in Egypt, demonstrated that 
there is some correlation of themes between differing Islamic contexts. 16 Said 
Amir Arjomand provided a perspective on the influential Islamic interpretative 
archetype of post-Revolutionary Iran: although this thesis does not focus upon 
Shl `a Islam, Iranian developments have made an impression upon many Sunni 
Muslims, in terms of providing an archetypal contemporary 'Islamic state. ' 17 
The question of so-called 'modernisation' and 'reform' of Islam is a 
contentious one, occupying an extensive corpus of literature. In terms of the 
perspective(s) of this study, the examination by Seyyed Hossein Nasr on the 
validity of categories such as 'traditional', 'fundamentalism', and 'modern' in the 
context of Islam was initially useful in distinguishing 'Islam' from the 'Islamic 
world', ' 8 although this paradigm has been extended further by other writers to 
provide various so-called 'Islamisms', which sought to avoid the reductive 
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tendencies of many interpretations. 
These tendencies are discussed by Aziz al-Azmeh, who believes that the 
fragmented realities of Islamic understanding and expression are transformed and 
(mis)represented as " ... a cohesive, homogenous and invariant force": 19 
"With the Rushdie affair, a number of Muslim internationalist 
infrastructures of an educational, welfare and propaganda nature 
(beholden to networks controlled by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani 
jamaat-i Islam-i) were put into high gear and conjured up the notion of an 
'Islamic community' as a distinctive and identifiable entity. But it must not 
be assumed that in these and cognate phenomena are in any sort of 
continuity, direct or indirect, with the Muslim 'culture' of origin, for there 
is no culture at origin, and the trans-Islamism we witness is highly 
recherche, and specific to the present and the very recent past, as well as 
to Britain and to political interests articulated here in the name of 
Islam. "20 
This approach towards Islam and Islamic issues, by no means unique to al- 
Azmeh, forms an important reference point in examination of 'Islamic' decision- 
making processes. Trends relating to specific environments can be approached, 
but are not perceived as necessarily relating to every Muslim or every community. 
There may be an element of consensus on arkän ul-Islam, but even here there can 
be distinct variations in what al-Azmeh describes as 'Islamisms'. 21 
Ernest Geilner finds it necessary to distinguish between modernism in Islam, 
and modernisation in Islamic society. Gellner views the latter as " ... the 
key to 
wealth and power... " involving " ... a 
denial of the local identity and a recognition 
of the authority of an alien model. "" There is a relationship between 
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modernisation and so-called Islamic 'modernism', but there is also a symbiotic 
relationship between modernisation and a 'return' to the fundamentals of Islam. 
The encouragement of modernisation in certain Islamic societies, especially 
during colonial ascendency, led to a shift in values as some Muslims emulated 
perceived 'Western thought' and methodology as a means towards matching or 
reproducing colonial cultural and materialistic 'success'. This modernist 
approach, frequently accompanied by a compromise in the prevalent 
interpretative 'values' of Islam, often changed to disillusion when idealistic 
ambitions were not realised. Defining Islam(s) plays an important role in 
understanding decision-making processes made in 'Muslim' communities, and 
directly challenges the language and understanding of commentators. 
The issues facing Muslim majority societies globally have been extensively 
surveyed as a component of The Fundamentalism Project's publications. 23 The 
term 'fundamentalism' is inherently problematic, but the diverse perspectives on 
Islamic issues presented in the publications of The Fundamentalism Project at 
times confront the monolithic stereotypes of Islam presented in certain 'Western' 
sources, and demonstrate the complexity of decision-making processes in Islamic 
environments. Decision-making also forms part of the 'postmodernist' equation 
on globalisation, and the impact of the juxtaposition of Islam and modern 
contexts and technologies. Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan discussed the 
potential effects of a postmodernist perspective upon Islamic studies, and ask 
whether it would influence the methodology behind studying Islam? 24 There is 
no intention of engaging here in the semantics of postmodernism and its validity, 
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although it may be true that elements of this postmodernist interest - in their 
wider sense - fall within this study's remit. For example, the effects of mass- 
migrations on Islamic understandings, determining which elements of knowledge 
and cultural values are introduced to a new environment, form an important 
subtext to the present study. In a more general sense, the fact that this study was 
produced during the 'post-modernist' era, utilising a variety of sources and 
disciplines, inevitably influences the outcome of the research, and it could be said 
that postmodernism has affected the methodology of the present 'Islamic Studies' 
study. Ahmed and Donnan noted that: 
" 
... 
it is a critical moment in Islamic studies. We are at a cusp. It is time 
to point out the different features on the landscape - to point out where we 
were in the past and where we are heading for in the future. " 25 
The features on the landscape for Muslims in the U. K. are changing rapidly. 
In a sense, these include what Edward Said has described as: 
it 
... new alignments made across 
borders, types, nations and essences 
[which] are rapidly coming into view, and it is those new alignments that 
now provoke and challenge the fundamentally static notion of identity 
that has been the core of cultural thought during the era of imperialism. " 2b 
These new alignments form a component of any discussion on reform-centred or 
modernising Muslim individuals. The degree to which their analyses has had an 
impact on the identity of Muslims in the U. K. is a contentious issue, depending 
greatly on whether the assessment is within the short-, medium-, or long-term. 
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For example, with greater hindsight, it may be possible to judge the medium- or 
long-term effect (or accuracy) in the U. K. of publications by individuals such as 
Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdüdi, 2' Fazhur Rahman, Ismä'il Räji al Färügi, Shabbir 
Akhtar, 28 and Ziauddin Sardar 29 - and the activities of their related institutions in 
the U. K. Their effect might be compared with the efforts of so-called 
'traditionalists', quietist movements, and/or overtly political organisations. 
The U. K. has a lengthy history of contacts with Islamic communities - not all 
of them peaceful or favourable to Muslims. There have been Islamic communities 
in the U. K. for at least one hundred years, and the U. K. now may have a Muslim 
population estimated at over one million people, the majority having ancestral 
links with the Indian sub-continent. History and current affairs demonstrate that 
there is an overwhelming need in the U. K. for an improved understanding of 
Islam and Muslim communities. Academic research, undertaken by Muslims and 
non-Muslims in the U. K., is one possible contribution in improving 
comprehension of international and local issues connected to Islam. 
There are a wide range of sources produced about Muslims in the U. K. to 
date - of Muslim and non-Muslim origin: certain examples incorporate an'Asian- 
centric' understanding of Islam, stereotypes of Muslim behaviour, and confusion 
as to defining 'the West' - betraying religious-cultural filters of 'knowledge'. 
30 The 
concept and nature of 'objectivity' is perhaps a nebulous one, as all observers 
bring their own specific concepts of understanding to any dialogue. This, of 
course, fits into the long-standing discussion on perceptions from 'the West' of 
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other cultures and belief-systems, informed in particular by the work of Albert 
Hourani 3' and Edward Said, '' and later writers who have updated and refined the 
discussion to fit contemporary circumstances and new contexts. 33 In the final 
analysis, especially in terms of discussing Islam, the matter of objectivity is 
probably best left to the individual reader to decide (applying their own cultural 
'baggage' in turn! ). The discussion on Islam in the U. K. is extensively covered 
on a number of academic disciplinary fronts, demonstrating the diverse issues 
faced by communities and individuals. This also forms part of a wider field, 
relating to Muslim communities in minority situations worldwide, for example 
in the United States of America, 34 and Western Europe. 35 The relationship 
between Islam and'the West' is one that has influenced Muslim communities in 
the U. K., and is discussed at length elsewhere. 'b 
The position of Muslims in the U. K. has been the subject of increased 
academic activity, in various disciplines, during the past thirty years: important 
early work included Verity Saifullah-Khan's Ph. D. on Muslims in Bradford 3' and 
Muhammad Anwar's studies of Pakistani-origin Muslims in the 1960's and 1970's 
- both of which explored the motivations behind Muslim migration and its 
economic and social repercussions. 38 The emergence of the Centre for the Study 
of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations (Selly Oak College, Birmingham), has 
contributed to this academic area through the production of a series of research 
reports and graduate work on areas associated with Muslims in the U. K. 31 
Several other institutions have made contributions to this field of knowledge, 
although frequently with a social science emphasis - for example the Centre for 
Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick, "' the Centre for the 
Study of Race Relations, University of Bradford, ' and the Department of 
Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds. 42 Researchers have been 
able to focus in and conduct field work on specific high-density Muslim 
environments in the U. K., noting the connections, developments, and changing 
nature of contacts between communities of ancestral origin and U. K. -based 
communities. " 
Researchers have also addressed issues relevant to Muslims in the U. K. 
through other publications: these have provided a forum for discussion on topics 
including identity, 44 media-coverage of Islamic issues, 45and The Satanic Verses. 46 
To a limited extent, a select group of Muslims have been given access to areas 
within the mass media in the U. K., providing a forum for discussion of issues 
relevant to Muslims in the U. K. (although the articles are not aimed directly at 
Muslims). " The development of a Muslim press, including magazines and 
newspapers, provides additional means for exploring Muslim issues. The 
material published and broadcast about Islam in the U. K. (from Muslim and non- 
Muslim sources) has had considerable repercussions for Muslims in the U. K. 
Discussion about these sources form a component of this study's exploration of 
contemporary issues in relation to decision-making processes. 
The multi- and/or inter-disciplinary requirements of a study such as this 
reflects the diverse influences of its origins. The avoidance of a rigid disciplinary 
framework has allowed access to sources which have provided new perspectives 
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and clarified issues that would otherwise have remained obscure, had insistence 
been upon staying within one 'discipline'. The work draws strongly on an interest 
in the history of knowledge arid ideas in relation to Islam, and how concepts were 
transmitted from generation-to-generation: 
" ... The significant events are often the obscure ones, and the significant 
utterances are often of those men withdrawn from the world and speaking 
to the very few. " 48 
Determining which will be the 'significant events for Muslims in the U. K., and 
who is really making the "significant utterances" amongst different Islamic 
communities, has formed a common theme in the analysis of fieldwork material. " 
The impact of Islam on individuals is documented within the field(s) of 
anthropology, and this study has been influenced by the methodology {not 
necessarily the results) of several recent works which fall within this area. In a 
discussion on the practical effects of decision-making within an Islamic 
environment (Morocco), Lawrence Rosen introduced the methodological 
possibilities of discussing decision-making practicalities at a 'grass-roots' level. 
So 
John Bowen examined the effects of 'modernism' on the Islamic practices and 
rituals in Sumatran Gayo Society, including the decision-making processes of 
idUtihäd and the nature of religious authority. 51 Michael Fisher and Mehdi Abedi 
compared Shl-`a Islamic practices in Iran and the United States of America, 
drawing on extensive fieldwork to present the beliefs and comments of the 
'ordinary' Muslim, including approaches to new issues and interpretations of 
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aspects of the Kur'än (and other core Muslim sources). Fisher and Abedi also 
discussed the psychology of Shl `a Muslims in the United States, and drew out the 
important distinction between those exiled from Iran and those who voluntarily 
migrated. 52 The present study does not attempt to provide a'psychology of Islam', 
an inherently reductive proposal that might be compared with the differing 
perspectives offered by approaches to psychology of religion. 53 However, 
psychology has some part to play in analyses of decision-making processes, and 
the pressures upon those physically and psychologically distanced from places of 
ancestral religious-cultural origin(s). 54 
Forms of dislocation, including enforced exile, provide a subtext for 
Bouthaina Shaaban's documentation of interviews with Muslim women, 
presenting detailed issues and allowing women in different locations to `speak for 
themselves' on topics, including the role of religious authority in their lives, the 
presumptions of gender roles, and the implications upon decision-making 
processes of catastrophic changes to society. 55 Donna Bowen and Evelyn Early 
demonstrate the diversity of Islamic expressions and Muslim identities within the 
'Middle East', presenting this in part through the documented actuality of day-to- 
day life. 56 As an example of Islam within a minority society, the day-to-day life 
and diversity of Muslims in America is presented by Steven Barboza - where 
decision-making processes on 'modern' issues include: Muslim responses to 
A. LD. S., and the relations of Sunni Muslims with members of Louis Farrakhan's 
'Nation of Islam'. 57 These works, allowing interviewees the opportunity to 'speak 
for themselves', provide fresh and dynamic angles for analysis of long-standing 
14 
issues of concern to Muslims, at several levels within different Muslim societies. 
Aspects of these approaches are utilised in this research, which seeks to 
contribute further to the field of knowledge about Islam and Islamic societies, 
specifically through examination of the processes and techniques of decision- 
making in different communities. 
15 
1.3. Theoretical Framework 
The term'Islamic' in this study refers to any influence - for example, cultural, 
social, textual, political, Divine - in which the primary sources of Islam's 
formation or interpretation have contributed towards an identity label. 'Islamic 
beliefs' are what an individual who describes him or herself as 'Muslim' 
undertakes in the name of Islam - whether that practice is approved by 
'authorities' or not. 
The term 'Islamic environment' does not refer to a specific delineated 
geographical, historical, or social entity: it is used here in the sense of a place 
where Islamic beliefs form an identity reference point (however marginal, 
'secular' or'religious'). For example, an'Islamic environment' could be a musLid, 
a house or street with 'Muslim' residents, or an individual's sense of place and 
practice. The rigid criteria defining 'who is a Muslim' applied by various sources 
and schools does not apply within this research. 
When discussing about Islam, care has to be taken to consider that there are 
many different interpretations of the concept of 'Islam'. Several of these 
perspectives are discussed within Annemarie Schimmel's phenomenology of 
Islam, which demonstrates the variance in symbols, sacred space, sacred time, 
sacred action, approaches to Islamic sources, and conceptions of God. 58 Critics 
of phenomenology - and perhaps Weber-ian forms of Sociology of Religion - 
indicate that it represents an attempt at reductive categorisation, being reductive 
in the sense of fitting the square pegs of the ineffable and transcendent into the 
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round holes of scientific archetypes of knowledge. Whether it would be fruitful 
in the future to produce a phenomenology of Islam in the U. K. is open to debate. 
Within this study, awareness of the variables described by Schimmel and 
others is useful, if there is equal consideration of those concepts that represent to 
many Muslims the universal factors in Islam: for example, the shahadah, which 
can be translated as: "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger 
of God", can be interpreted in different ways but is a universal' factor in Islam. 
Similarly, the Kur'an is theoretically constant and immutable, although it may be 
interpreted in different ways, reflecting diverse influences and a multiplicity of 
systems and frameworks of understanding. There can be considerable disparity 
between an individual's levels of understanding, belief and practice of Islam, and 
comprehension on - for example -a community, state, or political level. This 
will directly influence the different approaches to shared issues, reflected during 
fieldwork discussions. 
Awareness of this diversity has underpinned the research programme, which 
recognises that there is no homogenous Muslim community in the U. K., and that 
individuals and groups within communities in different 'Islamic environments' 
present many opinions and approaches - and bring varied personal experiences - 
towards what they define as 'Islam, 'Islamic', and 'Muslim'. Differing identities 
may be as much defined by cultural and traditional practices, or external 
influences, as by approaches towards Islam. It is also recognised that there are 
shared beliefs, platforms and interests - for individuals and for those operating on 
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specific agendas, which their advocates define as 'Islam', 'Islamic' and/or 
'Muslim'. Some of these platforms go beyond small communities, to form 
national networks, or operate under the aegis of educational and social welfare 
programmes. The pressures of external influences, including financial and 
ideological links from outside of the U. K., also play a role within communities 
and related networks. 
The study of the practicalities of decision-making processes can provide one 
key to determining how those within different frameworks of Islamic 
understanding approach issues which are not directly referred to within the Kur'än 
and - depending on the individual Muslim viewpoint - other primary sources of 
authority. It is one way of discovering what is shared, and how decisions are 
shaped. Different communities and individuals in the U. K. have different 
priorities. For some, the technicalities of decision-making processes and religious 
authority may be seen as unimportant compared with the actuality of survival as 
a minority in a frequently hostile non-Muslim environment. The advocacy of 
specific decisions, opinions and processes by a Muslim elite can - according to 
some critics - indicate that a disparate Islamic 'leadership' is out of touch with the 
majority of Muslims. Yet, as the world approaches the twenty-first century (in 
the Common Era), there is a fear amongst some Muslims in the U. K. that Islamic 
identities may be (further) eroded and values assimilated, if approaches to issues 
and the mechanisms of decision-making are not reassessed. 
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1.4. Methodological Framework 
This research focuses upon how contemporary Muslim communities are 
interpreting Islam, to meet the challenges of modern issues and questions. It 
compares Muslim minority communities' experiences in the U. K. with those of 
modernising Muslim-majority countries in which itihäd is applied to varying 
degrees, such as Malaysia and Pakistan. Pakistan was selected because of its 
close historical links to the U. K., and its connections with a significant proportion 
of Muslims in the U. K. Pakistan constitutionally defines itself as an 'Islamic 
Republic, ' and its macro-scale decision-making is theoretically influenced by 
'Islamic principles'. Within Pakistan, the influence of 'traditional' practices are 
believed by some to be in conflict with the 'modem' world. Over 90% of Pakistan 
is Muslim, in comparison with Malaysia - with a Muslim (largely Malay) 
population of over 50%. The Malaysian Federation projects itself as reconciling 
Muslim interests with the demands of a modernising, industrialising country, 
whilst balancing different Islamic and political interest groups with the interests 
of non-Muslim minorities. Decision-making on Islamic issues has played a 
significant role in Malaysian political and economic development. Malaysian 
Muslim responses to contemporary issues can be compared with those of the 
Muslim minority within adjacent Singapore, at state administrative and personal 
level. 
The question of objectivity is a valid one in any academic discipline, but is 
acutely sensitive in an area such as 'Islamic Studies'. Given the many 'schools' of 
thought within the 'ummah, and the disputes between some of these schools, the 
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notion of a Muslim automatically being received as an 'insider' is an erroneous 
one. Personal experiences (as well as historical trends) have demonstrated that 
many sectors of Muslim understandings are not in friendly communication with 
one another. Some interviewees would not have received Muslims from certain 
other 'schools', seen as being in opposition, or even as apostates or unbelievers 
(this is in addition to differences based on other issues and 'values' - such as 
ethnicity, cultural and traditional values, politics, social class, and/or nationality). 
Reactions to receiving a'white' non-Muslim researcher have - as anticipated - 
been varied: motivation has been questioned and suspicion generated; 
assumptions have been made regarding partiality, and agendas associated with a 
former colonial power. The concept of non-Muslims undertaking Islamic Studies 
in the U. K. has been challenged, the subject-banner of Islamic Studies being 
interpreted only as the domain of a potential `alim. The notion of Muslims having 
any decision-making processes and consultation has itself been dismissed. 
Discussions about the validity of research have been intense at times, but the 
experience of such dialogues has helped in the production of the final thesis. In 
some circles, interviewees took the opportunity of a non-Muslim audience to 
perform their Islamic duty of dawä, only occasionally focusing on the researcher's 
personal 'mission' of dialogue on Islamic issues. 11 The interviewer's relative 
'neutrality', and guaranteed anonymity of subjects, has also had a cathartic effect 
as some interviewees have felt free to discuss with a candour that they indicated 
may have been lacking had the interviewer been Muslim. Considerable 
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intellectual interest, and a certain amount oll humour and/or disgust, was shown 
when interviewees were informed of others' (non-attributed) responses to similar 
questions posed. The researcher's first-hand in-depth experience of several 
Islamic environments, and awareness of levels of Muslim scholarship, frequently 
helped 'break the ice'. 
Selection of interviewees has been based on a various criteria: several were 
selected on the basis of published work, academic reputation, or level of authority 
within respective communities. Others emerged during fieldwork as part of the 
networking process. Several sought the researcher out to ensure their view was 
incorporated into the analyses. Others were elusive or'otherwise engaged': jail, 
fear of imprisonment, or governmental crackdowns on certain organisations 
contributed to a lack of availability in some quarters. Effort was made by the 
researcher to meet people at 'ground floor level', to discuss issues and the 
practical effects of Islamic decision-making processes. Interviewees range from 
academics, judges, government ministers, and roams - to farmers, fishing people, 
schoolchildren, and a steamroller driver. Within Pakistan, largely because of 
purdah, it was difficult to arrange discussions with women. 
The concept of a'representational sample' is a contentious one in this study, 
and the choice of interviewees was frequently based on opportunity rather than 
demographics or social science methodology. At least one hundred and fifty 
interviewees have contributed to the fieldwork of this research. Their personal 
experiences illuminate the debate on how Islam affects the daily lives of 
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individuals, what subjects are important to individuals and communities, and how 
it is possible to respond to those topics through application of an 'Islamic' 
decision-making process. 
The majority of interviews - both formal and informal - were tape-recorded 
when permission was given by the interviewee. The desire for anonymity has 
been respected at all times: as a matter of personal security and integrity this was 
critical in some cases. Separate fieldwork transcripts and notes have been 
documented, and held securely with tapes. Interviewees were aware of the 
detailed nature of the research, having been facilitated with full information in 
advance by the researcher, the University of Wales, and also by those parties 
providing varying degrees of logistical support in Pakistan and Malaysia. As 
protocol varies from country to country, it was found particularly useful in 
Malaysia to provide a Malay-language statement of intent - whilst in Pakistan an 
English-language version stimulated discussion. Fieldwork in the United 
Kingdom and Singapore was conducted entirely in English - whilst in Pakistan 
and Malaysia the majority of interviews were conducted in English. Reliable 
translators were used in situations where interviewees did not speak English. 
(One interviewee spoke and wrote English well, but preferred to use Urdu in the 
interview setting. ) The majority of decision-makers and academic authorities 
consulted spoke English well: many write and publish in the English medium. 
Availability of interviewees was a key factor: in Pakistan, several potential 
interviewees became uneasy at the prospect of being interviewed, and cancelled 
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at the last minute. Within Pakistan, interviewees were generally more reluctant 
to be cited by name, whereas the opposite was generally true within Malaysia. 
The concept of the interview varied considerably during all stages of fieldwork, 
ranging from'starched' formality in an office (and a desire to know the questions 
twenty-four hours beforehand, so that answers could be prepared), to increasingly 
relaxed discussions in a madrasa over take-away haläl fried chicken, Pepsi Cola, 
and sweet tea. In some cases, dialogues took place over a period of several days, 
allowing detailed discussions and a greater awareness of specific Islamic 
environments. Efforts were made to travel throughout areas of Pakistan and 
Malaysia, to determine (albeit at a general level) regional, ethno-tribal, and other 
differences in understandings based on diverse factors - in both urban and rural 
settings. 
Fieldwork has been backed up by an extensive survey of other sources. 
Events concerning Islam in the U. K. have been monitored for several years, for 
previous academic work as well as for the present study. The Muslim press in the 
U. K. has been one indicator of opinion regarding issues discussed in this study. 
Close attention has been paid to events in Pakistan and Malaysia through their 
respective media; study of sectors within the Internet has also provided valuable 
opinions, through various discussion groups and news resources. During the past 
four years, time spent living in a predominantly Muslim area of East London has 
inevitably shaped this study. 
It is hoped that the synthesis of these varied sources and experiences 
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contributes to an understanding of decision-making processes in selected Islamic 
communities. Certain trends and commonalities emerge in terms of shared 
issues, although contexts can be radically different, not only between countries - 
but within them too. Evaluation does not necessarily provide hard facts and 
quantifiable data, which may be seen as inappropriate and reductive when 
discussing Islam, especially when it is seen by many as a 'way of life'. The 
concept of moving towards a single, informed conclusion regarding Islam is 
reductive, in terms of this study, in the sense that such a conclusion would not 
represent the diversity of opinions and approaches to decision-making processes. 
Instead, the underlying intention of the study is to engage the reader, through 
provision of original source materials, to formulate an opinion and contribute to 
the discussion. 
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1.5. Structure 
The concept of id tihäd is frequently referred to by a number of 'reform'- 
centred platforms, representing different theoretical perspectives within the 
'Islamic spectrum. ' This thesis seeks to discuss to what extent - if at all - iLtihäd 
has practical implications in contemporary Islamic environments? The 
methodology focuses on analysis of fieldwork interviews undertaken in four, very 
different, 'Islamic' contexts: 
Chapter Two considers the position of'Islamic' decision-making processes 
in Pakistan, including their historical contexts and legislative implications. An 
analysis of fieldwork interviews is provided, based upon detailed interviews with 
authorities and individuals in Lahore, Islamabad, and North West Frontier 
Province. The intention is to determine the various perspectives regarding the 
interpretation of Islam within the 'Islamic Republic' of Pakistan. The 
international influence of Pakistan on Islamic issues is referred to, including its 
ramifications for (aspects of) the Muslim communities in the United Kingdom. 
Examples of 'Islamic' decision-making on contemporary issues - including 
finance, medical ethics and technology - are introduced in terms of possible 
applications of icatihäd. 
Chapter Three discusses the historical position of 'Islamic` decision-making 
in the Malaysian Federation. Fieldwork interviews include representatives of 
institutional and other 'authorities' on Islam in Kuala Lumpur, Kedah, Kelantan, 
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Pinang, and Selangor. Approaches towards 'Islamic' decision-making are 
compared and contrasted. Examples of idjtihäcd, including in technological, legal, 
and political contexts, are explored. 
Chapter Four contrasts the position of Singapore's Muslim minority with 
other Islamic environments. Fieldwork interviews focus upon the government- 
linked institutions responsible for Islamic decision-making, who refer to ijtihäd 
and its role in a technologically-centred, economically-advanced republic. 
Chapter Five surveys some of the variety of Islamic decision-making agendas 
within the United Kingdom's Muslim communities, in terms of the approaches 
towards different priority-issues. Fieldwork interviews incorporate perspectives 
from several levels within different communities, in particular those seeking 
pragmatic interpretation of Islamic primary sources in the minority, secularising 
context of the U. K. 
Chapter Six draws together some of the "common threads" of Islamic 
understandings relating to decision-making processes within different contexts, 
and determines whether itihäd has a positive role to play in determining certain 
future Islamic agendas. 
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Z Pakistan 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan represents a major Islamic decision-making 
arena; the processes leading up to its foundation in 1947 incorporated a dialogue 
(or battle) between different Islamic ideological perspectives - some of which 
applied i ftihäd as part of a political-religious rhetoric. In the context of this 
thesis, Islamic decision-making in Pakistan has particular influence in the L. K. - 
which has a substantial Pakistani ancestral origin population. However, this 
influence is also prevalent in other Muslim minority and majority contexts. 
Several of the fieldwork interviewees in this thesis have contributed, either 
individually or through specific organisational frameworks, to this influence. 
Pakistan's estimated population in 1993 of 123 million within the four main 
provinces represents diversity on a number of levels. ' This includes complex and 
varied approaches towards interpretation of Islamic knowledge. The Islamic 
decision-making debate in Pakistan offers no simple answers. Different 'political' 
and/or 'Islamic' platforms in Pakistan incorporate a wide range of beliefs and 
theories. Fieldwork interviewees (separately) made reference to different forms 
of potential Islamic decision-making interventions, including: Divine Intercession 
and an imminent Final Day of Judgement; acquisition of political power 
(democratically or otherwise); the re-emergence of khalrfat; a redefinition of 
'ummah; relocation of conceptual notions of moral-religious authority; and/or 
implementation of mass-Islamic education. -' 
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Generalisations regarding the directions 'Islam' is taking in Pakistan are 
problematic. Islam as a concept may remain 'constant' in a wide number of core- 
beliefs, issues and principles. It could be more appropriate to explore which 
direction(s) 'interpretations' are following, and how these perspectives mark 
understanding of decision-making processes in relation to contemporary Pakistan, 
articulated primarily by an educated elite functioning in different fields of 
interest. 
Fieldwork and interviews undertaken in Pakistan during 1995 sought to 
examine selected Islamic decision-making contexts, within an 'Islamic' state, and 
to question to what extent 'Islamicization' has occurred. This required 
identification of the different conceptual frameworks of 'Islam', analysis of the 
extent to which varied madhhab3 contribute to the decision-making debate, and 
an understanding of how their differing agendas are reconciled or conflict on 
specific issues. 
During fieldwork in Pakistan, the researcher became increasingly aware of 
the question of 'flexibility' within Islamic interpretations, and the different 
priorities given towards specific 'Islamic' issues and agendas. The focus of 
fieldwork shifted from itihäd (and related methodologies) towards the 
'mechanics' and variety of approaches to decision-making agendas. Pakistan was 
often described as being 'in transition', striving towards various 'Islamic goals'. 
The utility of idjtihäd was low on many agendas, often because there was an 
understanding that 'core' beliefs and the decision-making frameworks were not 
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in place at individual, community or state levels. 
Fieldwork interviewees project alternative frameworks of 'rigidity' and 
'flexibility' within interpretation - and points in between - in Pakistan. 
Organisational and individual opinions indicate different emphases and priorities, 
relating to core, primary Islamic sources: for example, Kur n, Hadrth Sunna, 
fikh, share `a, i mä, and madhhab-related sources. Perspectives vary on aspects 
of these sources, and related rigidity and flexibility of interpretation - dependent 
on the subject under discussion and specific circumstances. The emphasis on 
aspects of 'Islamicization' varies within Pakistan. The opinions of quietist, `urf- 
centred belief frameworks also form part of the Pakistan decision-making 
equation. Groups, movements, and individuals that have chosen a 'non-aligned' 
path can influence Islamic decision-making and opinion-formation, particularly 
in rural 'grass-roots' level. Followers of Tablighi Jamaat, ' Deobandi, 5 Barelwi, 6' 
and other interests' can be insulated - through choice and control of their own 
institutions and agendas - from governmental Islamicization processes. 
8 
Pragmatic interpretation of 'new' issues can have less relevance to those 
interviewees seeking to establish an Islamic framework through 'perfecting' basic 
principles of Islam - for example relating to hud üd or, hukm. This can 
be 
compared to those interviewees whose agenda is centred around projecting into 
various 'futures' through implementation of 'new' interpretations and application 
of 'modern' concepts. There are also 'synthesist' reformers, modernisers, or 
renewers in Pakistan - selectively utilising aspects of tradition and 
'modernity'. 9 
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Interviewees frequently represented themselves within 'traditionalist', 'Islamist', 
'academic' 'reform' 'modernist' 'fundamentalist', 'secular', and/or other 
categories. 10 Their roles as Islamic decision-makers within Pakistan are closely 
associated with personal identities, operating in different socio-religious contexts 
and environments. 
Constructing paradigmatic models of Islamic interpretation on contemporary 
issues in Pakistan also raises difficulties, except in the general theoretical sense, 
because decisions are responsive towards specific issues and circumstances. 
Certain interviewees are seen to look forward, in the creation of 'new' 
interpretations of (aspects of) primary sources on specific issues: the same 
interviewees are seen to consult past-sources and frames of reference on other 
specific issues. A different interpretative 'model' may be necessary for every 
specific decision and issue. 
The extent to which the state mechanisms of Pakistan has had a positive 
impact upon matters of Islamic understandings and interpretations - beyond the 
spheres of Islamic personal law and hudüd ordinances - is questioned by some 
interviewees. Whilst not denying that power is exerted through the funding of 
institutions and control of political mechanisms, there was the suggestion of high 
degrees of independence from governmental or state control, and resentment of 
certain decisions that had been made on Islamic issues. Several interviewees 
(including some associated with national institutions) indicated - with varying 
degrees of candour -a dissatisfaction with the 'Islamic' nature of various 
Pakistan 
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administrations. 
The impact of state and national networks at local levels was also questioned: 
in rural and urban settings, individuals and families may consult exclusively with 
local 'authorities - for example a müfti and/or pnr - on questions of personal 
'Islamic' decision-making (centred around understanding existing interpretations, 
rather than making itihäd). Tradition offers one widely-understood, 'Islamic' 
reference point dominant in rural and urban contexts: phis can be prestigious, 
have honour, and at local level may be a dominant authority. During fieldwork, 
several examples of the impact of local level authorities on Islamic decision- 
making were observed. " Whilst broad conclusions cannot be drawn from brief 
episodes, the impact of 'other influences' and agendas on decision-making 
frameworks cannot be ignored. 12 
A fieldwork seminar in Lahore for postgraduates (on the researcher's U. K. 
findings) was significant in introducing a microcosm of Pakistan's primary 
decision-making issues. 13 Concerns were expressed by participants as to whether 
'change' and 'progress' were necessary within interpretations of Islam, when Islam 
as practised in Pakistan was understood (by some seminar participants) to be a 
'perfect way of life' whose interpretation(s) required no modification, adaptation, 
or challenge. There was awareness amongst the group (if not an acceptance) of 
the diverse interpretations and readings of 'Islam' and 'Islamic life', in Pakistan 
and elsewhere. Deciding which elements - if any - of interpretation were to be 
challenged was seen to be the domain of the specialist scholars. However, some 
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of these were described as being 'out of touch' with the realities of modern 
Pakistan. 
The seminar participants strongly identified with their personal beliefs and 
relationship to Allah, expressed ritually and through `äda/`urf. " Identification 
with decision-making processes was strongly linked to political agendas and 
processes. Some resented the concept of a religious elite enforcing practices and 
beliefs upon the population, or steering people away from `urf, which to them 
represented an important component of Islamic understanding - even though 
certain leaders condemned it as bid a. There was disagreement - and confusion - 
from within the group as to the existence of a division between 'Islam' and 
'politics'. There was no conclusion as to whether the implementation and policy- 
making should come from 'political' or 'Islamic' bodies, or a combination (i. e. 
through political parties with primarily Islamic agendas, or those promoting 
varying degrees of 'Islamic values'). Participants recognised that, for a 
combination of logistical and political reasons, only selective 'safe' aspects of 
Islamicization - primarily promoting the fulfilment of huhu and hudnd of Allah - 
had been introduced at state level in Pakistan. These aspects included: zakät 
collection, Islamic banking and elimination of ribä, Islamic personal law, Islamic 
broadcasts, and Islamic public holidays. These and other aspects were described 
by the group as marking Pakistan as an 'Islamic' state, through representation of 
visible Islamic values. 
Some participants sought further 'Islamicization' in Pakistan, in particular at 
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the political representative level, and on aspects of decision-making that 
incorporated 'flexible' aspects of interpretation. Certain participants believed that 
promotion of'Islamicization' in 'flexible' aspects reinforced the 'rigidity' of core- 
beliefs: priority topics for participants included In Vitro Fertilization, 
implementation of new technologies, gender-roles, and relations with non- 
Muslims. 
During this seminar, there was a consensus and idealised recognition of a 
personal focus of belief in Islam, although the means towards this ideal varied. 
Some participants believed fulfilment of this goal was based on 'looking forward' 
to providing Pakistan with sound 'modern' economic frameworks and security, 
based upon what were described as 'Islamic values'. Others believed the correct 
frame of reference was 'looking backwards' to the model of Madina. These ideals 
and goals are not simple or straightforward. The seminar concluded with the 
opinion that - whilst common ground was found in a synthesis of these ideals, and 
limited agreement on the 'problems' - there was no consensus on provision of a 
solid framework for 'solutions'. 
The motivation behind changing Pakistan society's approaches towards 
Islamic decision-making, reflected by interviewees (about themselves and others), 
were not necessarily entirely altruistic in terms of improving the situation for the 
masses in Pakistan. However, rhetorically, Islamicization was understood to 
improve Pakistani society, develop the 'ummah, educate the majority, combat 
'Westernisation', and/or improve the legal system. Islamic political agendas 
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promoted specific interpretations of Islam, whether for dm or other reasons. 15 
Interviewees made several references to the events leading to Partition in 
1947, in which Islamicization played a significant motivating role for different 
factions - both for and against the creation of Pakistan. 16 After Partition, 
Pakistan governments have responded to changing pressures and interests relating 
to Islam. " Ta'limat-i-Islami, an Advisory Board of Islamic Teaching, fulfilled 
aspects of the 1956 Pakistan Constitution, abrogated in 1958 by General Ayub 
Khan. The 1962 Constitution included provision for the Advisory Islamic 
Ideology Council (renamed the Islamic Ideology Council [LI. C. ] in 1973). '8 The 
extent to which the I. I. C. 's constitutional duty has been fulfilled was challenged 
by several fieldwork interviewees. According to one, the I. I. C. failed: 
" ... to open the 
flood-gates of idjtihäd after a thousand years of 
intellectual inertia on the part of Muslim scholars ... " 
19 
It can be interpreted that there linkage between the promoting Islam's core values 
and ijtihäd. However, the above criticism may suggest expectations beyond the 
constitutional scope of the I. I. C., and represents a commonly-expressed 
dissatisfaction with the speed of 'transition' towards Pakistan's Islamicization. 
Early I. I. C. priorities included: education of Islamic principles, observance of 
'Islamic moral standards' and ritual practices, zakät collection, and mosque 
organisation. Rather than replacing the existing law system, the I. I. C. sought to 
facilitate interpretation of existing laws, with an Islamic emphasis. 
40 
This process has continued, with varied interpretations, through different 
Pakistan state administrational agendas. For example, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
promoted an interpretation of Islamic values through utilising Islamic imagery in 
the 1970 election campaign. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (P. P. P. ) emphasised 
aspects of secularisation and socialism, with what was promoted as an 'Islamic' 
basis. State-controlled media and education systems were provided with 
increased assistance to promote ritualistic Islamic core-values - whilst links with 
other 'Muslim' nations were encouraged. Bhutto's opponents attributed 
governmental failures - especially the loss of East Pakistan after the 1971 civil 
war - to God's displeasure at a lack of rapid Islamicization in Pakistan. 20 
Pressure from 'Islamicist' platforms influenced an increased P. P. P. identification 
with 'wider' Islamic agendas. 
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's 1977 coup d'etat altered the momentum 
within the Islamicization process. 21 Punishments based around interpretation of 
share `a were introduced, and the I. I. C. 's role was expanded in an attempt to bring 
the legal system into line with interpretations of the Kur'än and Sunna. 22 Islamic 
symbolism and ritual practices were stressed by Zia. 23 After Zia's death, various 
political campaigns utilised Islamic imagery and rhetoric, including those of the 
Benazir Bhutto's P. P. P. Aspects of so-called 'Islamicization' receive criticism 
from some quarters, because they are believed to be oppressive, especially 
towards 'marginalised' or 'suppressed' groups within Pakistan's population: 
"Unfortunately in Pakistan, not only has religion been politicised, but 
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religious sentiments and feelings are exploited to perpetuate un-Islamic 
laws, practices and laws. During the Islamisation process, no legislation 
was passed on the pressing issues, such as corruption, inefficient and 
inadequate law enforcement, lack of legal redress, delay in deciding cases 
and lack of public facilities. t124 
The criticism that Islam and'un-Islamic laws' were used to repress people, whilst 
those seeking Islarnicization do nothing to solve the problems of Pakistan society, 
is perhaps a sweeping generalisation. However, it does represent a commonly 
expressed opinion amongst interviewees, tempered with the realisation that 
criticism of'mis-interpretation' of Islamic sources was - according to some parties 
- tantamount to an attack on Islam itself 
Although representing a polarity of opinions, several interviewees saw their 
platform as 'the middle way': 
"You should walk in the middle. Islam is 'al-sirat al-mustagnn, ' 'the 
middle way' [sic]. And the middle way is always a straight one, the 
shortest possible line between two points. "25 
On certain issues, diversions from ideals of al-drat al-mustagnn 26 were 
considered an essential component of Islamic expression, represented in Islamic 
history, especially in the Indian subcontinent: 
"History of Islam represents diversity with common thread. "27 
Through holding onto this common thread, despite (or because of) variations 
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in interpretation, the majority of interviewees believe Islam possesses a capacity 
to provide solutions to specific problems experienced by different generations and 
levels of Pakistan society. This requires (re-)interpretation of Islamic primary 
sources: 
" 
... al-Kur'än says it [Islam] is a remedy - ash-shifa - and I used to say it 
was a spiritual remedy, but my son who studies economics in Islamabad 
says it has another meaning too: any system which functions without 
Islamic guidance is ill ... and unless you try that system in the light of the 
principles of the Holy Kur'än and explanation of the Holy Prophet, then 
this isn't O. K. " 28 
Exactly how Pakistan can function effectively with Islamic guidance is the 
key issue for those seeking to determine Islamic frameworks of interpretation and 
understanding. Several interviewees believed Pakistan was 'sick', and that the 
reason behind a commonly perceived sense of 'stagnation' within Pakistan was 
linked to an absence of specific Islamic interpretations and frameworks. This was 
particularly true of interviewees within academic and political fields, seeking 
'reform' of Islamic interpretation in Pakistan. Others expressed optimism 
regarding Pakistan's future, and considered that contemporary concerns regarding 
changing frameworks and agendas were groundless, as the mechanisms for 
'progress' were already in place - linked to 'inherent appeal' of Kur'än and Sunna. 
This would 'positively' influence political shifts in Pakistan, linked to the on- 
going development of a new academic 'supremacy' within Islamic sciences and 
interpretations in Pakistan. 29 
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Further visions of Pakistan's future emerged from a'literalist' perspective of 
Kur'An interpretation and understanding. This projected the'Kur'an-ic' invocation 
of Islamic global domination in the long-term, prior to Doomsday. This concept 
is well-represented within the Kuran, and in itself could be seen as a component 
of the belief-framework shared with other Muslims. 30 
Israr Ahmed extended this, to suggest that the world's imminent Divine 
Punishment was the responsibility of Arab Muslims: 
" 
... their 
betrayal of the Muslims is the biggest crime, because the word 
of Allah is there in their own language, they have it: of all the Muslims 
about 200 million are Arabs and the rest, you know, nearly one billion 
they are not Arabs ... 
" 
... so they 
have the word of God in their own language, and they have 
turned their backs to the Message, to the system of the Kur'än. So just as 
the Jews have been punished through history [the Arab Muslims will be 
punished too] ... 
" 
.. * to whomsoever 
Alläh gives his book, if they don't do as Alläh says, 
they are bigger criminals than those who don't believe. " 31 
Ahmed also attributed blame for imminent Divine Punishment on Pakistani 
Muslims, and the bloodshed of Partition: 
"I was fifteen years of age at the time and saw everything at my own eyes 
[sic], I have experienced it ... that was all 
done in the name of Islam, and 
what we have done here about Islam everybody knows, actually we are 
criminals in the eyes of Allah. And maybe we got the first instalment of 
our punishment in 1971 [i. e. Pakistan losing the civil war] ... 
"... but these things are transitory in nature, Islam will triumph: there have 
been parallels in history ... " 
32 
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Personal experience has a key role within interpretation processes. It is interesting 
to note the attribution of crime 'in the name of Islam', and the belief that - in the 
Final Reckoning - the 'criminals' will be punished. Ahmed himself has faced 
accusations that he has misapplied 'the name of Islam' in pronouncements on the 
Islamic State and other subjects. 
The dynamic of rhetoric, and the attribution of blame, are points to consider 
in discussions of interpretation processes, especially when those who do not 
agree with a perspective are attributed with the term 'käfir' (unbeliever) or 
condemned as 'criminals'. There is inherent inflexibility within certain platforms 
of interpretation and understanding, not just around the focus of hudüd or hukm. 
Some interviewees express superiority in their interpretation, especially through 
their determination that - within the general population of Pakistan - there is 'a 
wide scale ignorance of Islam'. The question is raised of whether this 'ignorance' 
is defined as no practice of Islam (in whatever belief-framework i. e. `urf-/pfr- 
Isufi-centred) or 'ignorance' based around not following a particular interpretation, 
madhhab, organisation, and/or leader: 
"Here in Pakistan there are 120 million Muslims, and it is my humble 
opinion that 95% of them don't know 'bi'smilläh' l-rahm än' l-rahnn". They 
don't know Islam. Islam in theoretical form is, in practical form, the 
lifestyle of the Prophet. The Muslims don't know the Holy Kur'än, they 
don't know the lifestyle of the Holy Prophet, and then they say 'we are 
Muslim'. How can they be Muslim when they have not studied the actual 
quotes in the actual book - the Kur'än and Sunna? 95% don't know the 
Holy Kur'än and Sunna. i33 
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This model of Islamic understanding, in which (certain) interpretations of Islam 
are equated with 'ignorance'. The 'ignorance' has links with access to 'education' - 
both general education and specific 'Islamic' education. Saeed Ullah Qazi 
presents the ideal of education and 'educated' leadership at local levels being 
centred on the Kurän and Sunna models of interpretation: the role of urf is at 
best secondary. 
However, `urf-centred individuals may have a high level of understanding and 
'education' within their own frames of references, which include knowledge of: 
how networks function, local customs, special prayers, 'medicine', and specific 
interpretations of Islamic sources - including the Kur'än and Sunna. This could 
be indicative of the 'flexible' aspects of interpretation in Pakistan, whilst retaining 
'rigidity' in other areas. Determining validity of these belief-frameworks is an 
inherent value judgement, frequently made by interviewees. There can be 
conflict between the agendas of those seeking to establish national and trans- 
national interpretative frameworks, and those operating in `urf-centred Islamic 
environments. 
All parties claim validity of interpretation. The notions of Pakistan Islamic 
I revival'(s) may not be appropriate, especially on local levels, when determining 
'real faith' is open to varied interpretations: 
"... unless we can have a revival of faith, of real faith, of living faith, 
without that we cannot have any advance in Islamisation or establishment 
of Islam or all of these slogans which are very common in the Muslim 
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world today. So that is the diagnosis ... 
"'' 
An `urf-centred individual might feel that their 'faith' is 'living', and promoting an 
advance of Islamicization - in the same way as Israr Ahmed promotes his 
'diagnosis' of 'revival'. Without customary aspects of Islamic interpretation, 
frequently interpreted as NO a by opponents, the polarised frames of Islamic 
reference at rural levels could become disoriented. 
The desire for 'revival' and 'progress' follows different agendas between 
different Pakistan platforms. This is reflected within the Pakistan political-Islamic 
frameworks, where there is emphasis on implementation of interpretation through 
promotion of legislation i. e. governmental interests such as I. I. C. and the Shari'ah 
Court, political parties, and non-governmental 'think tanks. 3' Governmental 
interests are also reflected in various Islamic institutions, which either receive 
funding or have the tacit approval/acceptance of government. Other Islamic 
institutions may receive funding from followers, or external sources. Certain 
levels of 'difference' in terms of implementation of Islamisation are accepted 
within these broad institutional frameworks, as stimulating and representing the 
debate: 36 
"... there are differences between sects, but the basic concepts must not be 
different. There are 'black sheep' in every area of life. There is room for 
different opinions, there should be a situation where people can sit together 
and have a mutual discussion. We have to sit together to deal with these 
differences 
... 
"37 
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No methodology was suggested as to how this discussion might be facilitated. 38 
Differences between 'Islamic' perspectives are provided with justification by 
interviewees. Maulana Abdur Rehman noted the unity of the Sunnl 'nnams' on the 
principles behind ham, even though some differentiation may occur within 
ritual. In contrast, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi stressed that even in areas where the 
Sunni 'nnäms' have agreed and reached consensus, there have been marked 
differences of opinion between prominent scholars. 39 Some platforms seek to 
stress similarities between madhhab on issues, whilst others place emphasis on 
differences between and within madhhab. 
Abdur Rehman interpreted difference as an opportunity which provided 
stimulus for debate and pragmatic interpretation of Islamic sources: 
"We Muslims we believe in God and our Prophet ... apart from those 
personalities we also believe in four spiritual leaders [the Sunnl-'nnäms] 
... all of the 
four spiritual leaders present their own thinkings [sic]. The 
point at which they differ provides a strong basis that there should be 
room for iLtihäd. 
"When the four don't have any dispute which each other, it means they are 
synchronised with each other. When they differ it means that our religion 
provides some room for i tihäd ... 
"40 
One point where this lack of synchronisation occurs in Pakistan is in dealing with 
issues that cannot be responded to directly through recourse to Islamic sources. 
Certain subject-areas where decisions or opinions are promulgated have no 
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immediate relevance to the majority in Pakistan. It is important to stress the 
'situational' qualities of Islamic interpretation, decision and opinion-making 
(whether described as 'ijtihäd, 'imä ", fatwa~. etc. ): 
" 
... you cannot pass a fatwä on theoretical grounds - you have to be told 
the situation and according to the situation make the judgement. 
Although some Muslims do not abide by this, it depends on the time and 
the place, so it changes. At some time it is acceptable, at other times it is 
not acceptable ... 
" 41 
The level of 'acceptability' clearly varies within Pakistan between (and within) 
different shades of opinion: e. g. from making no 'decisions' unless based on 
literalist interpretations (i. e. represented in different ways by Israr Ahmed); to 
adherence to a specific madhhab (Abdur Rehman); and/or interpretation centred 
around political-religious objectives (Abdul Malik). There may be common 
threads between these perspectives, as well as polarity. 
The emphasis on macdhhab is challenged by those seeking extension of 
Islamic decision-making beyond legal models or personal law, towards 
interpretation of all aspects of the contemporary world - using Islamic primary 
sources as the tool. Rather than responding to a particular situation after it has 
occurred, some interviewees sought anticipation of future developments, and 
answers to issues that had not been dealt with by 'authorities'. This does not 
necessarily mean that 'common threads' - including those referred to above - are 
discarded. Instead, they are integrated into a new understanding of Islamic 
interpretation, containing hudrld and hukm core/boundaries, and respect of Islamic 
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primary sources and ideals. Values acquired frone these principles are re-applied 
or utilised within the 'new' models. 
According to certain assessments, Pakistan is considered a 'third world' 
nation, which has not reached a high level of 'development'. However, issues and 
approaches concerning innovations in contemporary technology and science are 
actively considered by some Islamic scholars. This raises the issue of to what 
extent this demonstrate a forward-oriented flexibility in Islamic decision-making, 
or the priorities of Pakistan society: 
"... I see that it is gross mis-understanding to confine itihäd to a few 
legal matters, and that is where Islam becomes a ritual, Islam becomes 
something of the past; the real problems with Islam is that it addresses 
itself to every single issue, it wants a forward move that you apply such 
non-variables to evaluate the situation. The only non-variables are Kur'än 
and Sunna, but their meanings are always variable. Therefore also the 
Kur'än-ic statement cannot be revised, but its meaning can always be 
determined. X42 
The reference to 'variables' would only relate to specific issues, in that certain 
concepts and values are 'fixed'. Some of these 'fixed' areas may be more 'flexible' 
for other interpreters. 43 Within Pakistan contexts, cettain urf-centred 
interpretations would be difficult to change. The theoretical methodological 
frameworks may exist, but putting them into practice in Pakistan could be a long- 
term objective. 
The impact of academic theorisation may remain within an 'educated elite'. 
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The so-called 'transitory' phase requires the input of theorists, even if their impact 
is long-term or gradual. The impact of an influential educated class, with 
experience in non-Muslim 'western' societies as well as different Islamic 
environments in Pakistan and elsewhere, is difficult to quantify. Whilst several 
interviewees discuss the principles of interpreting Islamic primary sources within 
contemporary 'modernising' contexts in theory, provision of examples within 
Pakistan (beyond the confines of I. I. C. -Majlis legislation) is limited. This may 
represent the 'stagnation' referred to earlier, for example in terms of itihäd: 
"In application, you find some people who do not accept it. In principle, 
they would accept it. So it is well entrenched in our history, nobody 
would deny that at all, but when we come to case-by-case [issues] people 
differ. The principle is accepted by everybody, but some people would 
say 'no'. And they would not accept that there is enough change. " 44 
'Islamicization' becomes a slow-process on many issues, when there are so many 
conflicts of opinion and different agendas, and it does not provide the central 
focus for Pakistan state policy that some 'Islamic' platforms and frameworks 
would wish for - even within an 'Islamic Republic'. 
Whilst some platforms seek 'immediate' change, others represent what they 
describe as a pragmatic approach towards 'evolution' 45 in Islamic decision- 
making: 
"The living conduct has always played such a part in the acceptance by 
the community -a democratic process 
if you like. This is an evolving 
process, people may reject any opinions, they may accept them - nobody 
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can force them. That has happened for fourteen hundred years, and a lot 
of opinions have been thrown to rest, into the dustbin ... 
"... What we have to educate the Muslims that the real sources [are] the 
Kur'än and Sunna, and a lot of human efforts have been done over 
fourteen hundred years ... 
" 
... 
We should also give importance to what the earlier people have 
deducted, but we should also understand what was the Will of God. " 46 
Khurram Murad's level of 'acceptance' could be seen as idealistic, in the sense that 
societal pressures can 'force' acceptance of opinions, perhaps legislatively or 
through peer-pressure. The question could arise, in terms of Pakistan, whether 
such an opinion reflects 'realism' or 'theory'. Determining 'the Will of God', 
through the 'real' sources, is the foundation of i jmi`, Jlkh, and/or `urf followed 
by many Muslims in Pakistan today. 
The 'Islamic' authority to interpret the sources, and present 'opinions' or 
'decisions' within Pakistan is represented at a number of levels and interpretations 
- based around different forms of expertise. One model applied to 
determine the 
basis of authority is in terms of. 
°'... adab (the ideal of the educated man), shari'a (the ideal of legal man), 
and tariqa (the ideal of holy man) ... 
The first was least the ideal of the 
religious or piety-minded. The tariqa ideal stressed the transformation of 
a person from within. The shari'a ideal laid emphasis on rituals and 
formalities in order to mould man's moral attitude; the perfection of man 
in this system consisted of obedience to the revealed laws of God. The 
ideal of this system was a 'legal man' who mastered the knowledge of the 
rules of shari'a in order to live his life according to them. Moral authority 
may, in this same way, be defined in terms of the perfection of the ideal 
within each particular system: the more one achieves perfection, the more 
one becomes an authority in that system. " 
47 
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Forms of authority in Pakistan may contain these principles as a basis, but also 
extend to influence and knowledge in other domains: for example, political 
influence, technological training, and/or experience outside of Pakistan. Some 
of the interviewees consulted had not received 'training' in conventional Islamic 
science frameworks - such as al-Azhar University - but remained confident in 
expressing interpretations and opinions. The impact of these perspectives, 
pragmatically interpreting sources and making opinions on Islamic issues, needs 
to be considered. 
There can also be integration of 'political' and 'religious' objectives and 
agendas: for example, an `alim such as Abdul Malik working within an'Islamic' 
political party such as Jama`at-e Islami (itself founded by a former journalist and 
'interpreter' of Islamic sources). Similarly, individuals trained in technology, 
economics or engineering exert influence in Islamic decision-making, applying 
primary sources within their interpretations. Does this mean that the models of 
interpretation, the 'legal man', 48 the 'sjiari `a man', and the 'holy man' have to be 
re-evaluated? This depends on how holistic these models are, and on the notion 
of 'professional' Islamic leaders. Expertise in non-religious sciences has an 
plication, when discussing new issues relating to 'development' and decision- --. E, 
making. It is useful to consider the levels of interaction between the 'professional' 
Islamic decision-makers, such as certain 'authorities' trained in Islamic sciences, 
and other areas of 'expertise'. 
One of the key issues interviewees raised is determining the validity and 
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authority of Islamic interpreters and decision-makers. The 'conventional' training - 
within a madrasa - was described by many interviewees as appropriate for 
equipping an individual to respond to basic questions of share `a interpretation. 
Abdur Rehman described the study process for students as 'a very tedious job': 
" ... they have to study 85 books related to the religion of Islam. After 
reading those books they have to read analytically and they have an exam. 
They are given two degrees, Masters of Islamic Arts and Masters of 
Arabic. They step into the field of i tihäd or any area in which they are 
capable of making decisions ... 
" 
This capacity to make decisions is a key point, in traditional/conventional study 
processes for an `älim or müfti5'° The principles vary considerably between (and 
within) specific frameworks of Islam, for example within definitions of 
mutahid. s' Examples of the variations in 'qualification' can be found in 
Pakistan. 
Abdur Rehman presented a personal interpretation of mutahid status, and 
described Jama`at-e Islami's founder, Abul A`lä Mawdüdi, 52 as a exemplar: 
"A mutahid is a person who does itihäd, but it is next to being the 
Holy Prophet. A mutahid is a super leader of scholarship, and Maulana 
Mawdüdi was one of the most efficient. He had great learning, was very 
well read in many languages, had a vast understanding of all religions, 
and he integrated it in the most suited manner. A very easy interpretation 
of Islam is found by Maulana Mawdüdi. He was a great mu tahid of 
Islam ... i53 
This status is sharply contrasted in other fields of scholarship and interpretation, 
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where Islamic decision-making (in certain areas) is seen as the preserve of 
scholars fully trained in all the Islamic sciences: 
"Everybody cannot be a mudjtahid. Everybody cannot give a verdict in 
the court, because he is not a qualified lawyer or a qualified judge ... In the same way, everybody cannot interpret the rules of Islam. " " 
Pragmatic interpretation of Islamic primary sources has theoretically been 
extended to other areas of expertise, especially in subjects beyond hukm and 
hudUUd boundaries. In order to provide precedents for this in Pakistan, some 
academics have returned to Islamic historical precedents of 'mudjtahids', 
representing an interpretative methodology which is part of a wider, flexible and 
creative process: 
"Every single Muslim artist who was involved in architecture, painting, 
miniatures, handicrafts, for me was a mu jtahid because he knew the 
substance and he developed the form based upon a methodology ... 
"... I think every single architect who built all those masdjids from 
Morocco to Jakarta knew what they were doing, you have a very clear 
continuity of departure and that is what iitihäd is ... 
"... you see, you study the structures individually, there are certain 
universals. Within those universals and artist has made i jtihäd and he 
said 'what about having this arch more pointed? ', he says 'what about 
having a climbing arch? ' ... 
11 55 
In many ways, this marks a radical departure from other interviewees, in terms of 
notions of'interpretation'. The extent to which an analogy can be drawn from the 
artistic-architectural model is illustrated below, within discussion on specific 
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subjects for iitihäd. This approach extends the `äda (adab)ltä rlkha 
(tariga)/shad `a model, at least in determining a flexibility for opinion and 
decision-making by individuals not trained in Islamic sciences. 56 
The extent to which Anis Ahmed's model of iqLtih, ýid occurs in practice in 
Pakistan may be limited. The indication was not so much that farm could be 
given by lay-persons, rather that a forum for discussion and debate could be 
developed. It represents a view that Islam covers all aspects of human life, and 
therefore interpretation should be extended to 'other sciences' to attain Islamic 
principles and meanings within 'new' areas in the light of contemporary 
circumstances. This viewpoint also promotes incorporating 'Islamic' perspectives 
and principles within all educational areas. 
One interviewee, 'T. R. ', suggested, albeit in a massive generalisation, that the 
'Islamic sciences' do not attract 'high-calibre students' in Pakistan - and this was 
having an adverse effect on Islamic interpretation. T. R. stated that, if a student is 
'an ill-educated individual' or has less 'intelligence', Islamic sciences provide one 
popular avenue for study(! ). Religious scholarship was described as a 'low- 
ranking' option within the Pakistan education system - reflected in poor quality 
facilities and tutors. T. R. believed high-calibre students do not pursue a 'career' 
within Islamic sciences, which lack status, income, and relevance within Pakistan. 
As such, 'brighter' students were thought to be drawn away from Islam and 
Islamic sciences. 57 
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Such opinions introduce a key issue of Islamic interpretation in Pakistan -a 
perceived contrast in prestige and quality between 'Islamic sciences' and other 
disciplines. 58 Intelligentsia, trained in Pakistan and elsewhere, may also project 
an alienation towards religious scholarship (beyond certain cultural/`urf Islamic 
expectations). 59 However, introduction of Islamic components within other 
disciplines in Pakistan - combined with'traditional' curricular and extra-curricular 
education in Islam - may mean that although the emphasis or status of Islamic 
sciences may have shifted, continuity of concepts and principles amongst future 
decision-makers and opinion-formers continues in other forms. Good examples 
of this would be economists educated with an 'Islamic economics' module, or 
lawyers receiving 'share `a' training. These would seem to be in the minority in 
Pakistan: 
"... One of the problems is that religious education becomes very 
theoretical, and excluded from life, not only in Britain but in the whole 
Muslim world. And secular education since the colonial period becomes 
the education that caters about real life and real situations, in history, 
geography, sociology, economics. You have this dichotomy between 
religious education and secular education. 
"So you find very few people who can really combine theoretical 
knowledge with the actual situation. This is very few anywhere in the 
world. And many of them tend to rule according to the theoretical ... 
i6o 
This division demonstrates the difficulties in determining appropriate authority 
and 'status' of leaders. A number of respondents described themselves - or were 
described by others - as being a 'mujtahid. This 
illustrates that different 
definitions, expectations, and qualifications exist for a mujtahid in Pakistan (and 
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elsewhere). 
Some interviewees challenged the validity and authority of governmental 
bodies, to make 'Islamic' decisions - whether based on i jtihäd or other criteria. 
These criticisms are associated with the wider political debate, especially in the 
disagreement about mechanisms applied to 'implement' Islamic principles, and 
dissatisfaction with the speed of 'Islamicization'. These problems reflect the lack 
of continuity within governmental administrations, the inherent problems of 
obtaining broad consensus on issues (even within a state committee), and 
methodological difficulties in establishing decision-making frameworks. 
As discussed above, the emphasis of the I. I. C. was on approaching existing 
laws and 'Islamizing' them. Certain 'independent' scholars are also consulted by 
the state on determining Islamic approaches to law, and responses to other issues. 
Outside of the I. I. C. members, individual `alim such as Ahmad al-Assal may also 
be consulted: 
"There are cases, on the state level, concerning the economy; concerning 
the interest, concerning zakät, for example you can collect interest from 
individuals by law. There is a lot of itihäd in this area, because many 
of the forms of wealth were not known at the time of the Prophet. 
"So they ask some respected `ulamä, and take that ruling - which is what 
they did. So there is iLtihäd on the state level also: concerning Ramadän, 
concerning pilgrimage, concerning subjects which affect many, many 
people. " 61 
Within the Pakistan Parliamentary context, the consultative process for 
58 
determining 'Islamic' approaches to specific issues incorporates varied methods. 
Some consider idjtihäd has had a greater role in Pakistan's constitutional and legal 
development than has been attributed to it, particularly in its initial formative 
phase. Others refer to the concept of 'a transitional phase', in which an 'ideal' 
framework has yet to be installed: 
" 
... we always try to start with identification of the roles and objectives 
of Islam, not specific instructions. We also formulate 'what are the values 
and principles in institutions in Islam that we seek to establish? '. It is in 
the context of these that we receive specific injunctions ... 
" 
... you 
have to respect each and every injunction fully, but the real goal 
and import of that instruction has to be understood. Only in this 
contextual framework. (When) We are just trying to put in the injunction 
without the framework, then we are faced with a problem. It is not a 
problem of specific i tihäd, it is more a problem of change of the 
framework, change of the system... " 62 
Khurshid Ahmed believed that the changes in the framework sought by himself - 
and others in the Parliament of Pakistan, were difficult to achieve because of a 
inherent reluctance to compromise on the part of 'secularists' (his term) and 
'Islamists' (his term, incorporating Jama`at-e Islami). This intransigence is 
perhaps not surprising, given the intricacies and diversities within different 
platforms and agendas: 
" 
... the problem within 
the Pakistani context is that the two sides - the 
Islamists and the secularists - they are not ready to compromise. Both are 
sticking to their own positions, and unless there is a compromise ... 
I think 
that middle way could have been worked out. But within the Pakistan 
context it's not the willing position of both the parties, it's a matter of 
losing power really. " 63 
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The relative lack of electoral success of Jama`at-e Islami has to be 
considered within Khurshid Ahmed's analysis, 64 especially in his disenchantment 
of state-leadership: 65 
"I don't believe really, in my analysis of the Pakistani situation and 
society, that our leaders have never been interested in what will inform 
and improve the conditions of this country - they were always interested 
in their own personal benefits and interests. 
"Therefore the question of making idjtihAd is to follow the way the 
western scholars have expressed themselves on certain issues, without 
really thinking whether it will be suitable for the society in which these 
thoughts are being introduced. From my understanding, it would have 
been much better if the `ulamä and the modem educated sincere scholars 
could have sat together, and evolved some mechanism. 
" 
... 
I think the Islamic element will be more alienated, and therefore 
perhaps both the groups - the secularists and the Islamists - would be on 
the line of confrontation rather than any cooperation or coordination or 
understanding. " 66 
Confrontation would have serious implications for Pakistani infrastructural 
development, as well as impacting on the Islamicization processes. 'Threats' of 
confrontation have not changed the existing patterns of decision-making to date. 
The promotion of 'Islamic' interpretations based on the Jama`at-e Islami and 
other 'Islamist' models (which by no means form a 'common platform') face 
opposition from other political, governmental and state interests, which see their 
positions threatened: 
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"There's a group of people who have great influence in state institutions, 
whether it is law or military or civil service or judiciary, and the others are 
out of that circle. So they feel that if a compromise is worked out which 
would be based upon Islam, their actual position would be threatened, and 
therefore it is much better for them to stick to the old British framework 
and to live with that. i67 
State institutions promote an Islamic position which does not match the views 
(in many areas) of opposition groups, which in turn seek to enhance their own 
interests ('Islamic' and otherwise). 
Individuals within the Federal Shari'ah Court and I. I. C. privately also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the speed and levels of 'Islamicization' that took 
place. 68 'Limited' budgets were further restricted and eroded by the government 
for 'political' reasons, causing the processes of Islamicization to stall or 
fragment. 69 Adding to these complexities, some interviewees believed that 
'incorrect' interpretations of Islamic primary sources had been passed into 
legislation: 
"This problem becomes more acute because a lot of laws were passed 
based upon these incorrect opinions, especially the law of evidence, the 
law of injury or of accidental death, and other penal laws like the 
punishment of murder, fornication and so on. 
"Again, in the social areas, there is complete Muslim personal law which 
prevails - and the incorrect opinion in these areas has created large 
practical problems for many people. These need to be sorted out, and the 
correct opinions have to be presented. This is quite important. 170 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the 'accuracy' of these (and other) 
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subjective views. These perspectives indicate perceived specific theoretical 
problems, but cannot provide pragmatic methodological solutions, primarily 
because they do not represent the views of a political majority. 
Several interviewees, operating within different state or non-governmental 
frameworks, believed that the emphases promoted by governmental platforms on 
Islamic decision-making issues related to a'western conspiracy' against Pakistan 
and/or Islam. Their thesis was that, through diversion of attention towards 
technological and economic 'Islamicization', the 'real questions' facing 
interpretation of Islam in Pakistan were avoided or ignored. These included: 
'disregard' of turf neglect of specific madhhab perspectives; and erosion of 
'Pakistani' or ethnic identities. 'Positive'' urf-centred models of Islamic practice 
in Pakistan were presented, as an assertion of 'their viability' and 'influence' - 
particularly in rural frameworks. These views represent very different 
understandings of Islam and its interpretations, compared with those pro- 
Islamicization'modernising' parties. One interviewee from this perspective gave 
the model of Muhammad as 'an optimistic pragmatist', and asserted that: 
"... if Prophet Muhammad came back [today], he'd wear a suit(! ). "" 
The feasibility of reconciling such polarised views between Islamic frameworks 
in Pakistan illustrates the difficulties of locating cohesive, popularist, wide- 
reaching Islamicizing policies. 
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This dichotomy reflects different reactions towards 'model' Islamic societies. 
Within Pakistan (and elsewhere), approaches towards 'contemporary issues' and 
'modernity' are interpreted using varied 'Islamic' sources - to produce on occasions 
widely divergent viewpoints. Reactions to technological 'advancement' (itself 
open to varied definitions within the Islamic matrix) range from rejection to 
acceptance - depending on the technology. 'Advancement' can include weapons 
of mass-destruction: Pakistan's nuclear weapons were described as 'justifiable' on 
Islamic grounds by Abdur Rehman: 
"... the religion of Islam does not conflict with technological advancement 
"... the Kuran mentions that Muslims should always be ready to face 
attacks of non-Muslims or other forms of dangers. They must be ready in 
terms of weapons, morality, economy. Now the technological 
advancement is completely in accordance with the Kur'jn in every field. 
If we don't advance it is a sin. " 72 
This also provides an example of the application of analogy within interpretation, 
incorporating an understanding of a 'Kur'än-ic principle' and extending it to fit 
contemporary technology. 73 Whether this interpretation represents 'iLtihäd may 
be a semantic argument, although it was presented as such by this `älim. 
Rehman's opinion comes from an urban-centred perspective on a specific issue, 
where there is exposure to technological and 'modern' influences. The extent to 
which this opinion represents `ulamä who were dynamic and future oriented" 74 
is open to discussion. 
Islamic authorities in other contexts - for example mullahs in villages - are 
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not necessarily confronted with technological issues such as nuclear 
technology(! ). 'New' concepts can conflict with takhd or `urf-centred belief- 
frameworks. Difficulties in accommodating or accepting 'change' can emerge for 
interpretative reasons, as much as a loss of power and influence of a specific 
Islamic perspective. An example emerged during fieldwork in the city of 
Mingora, Swat: 
"There are a lot of educated youth in our society, particularly in Landinkas 
[Mingora suburb], there are some people who are Masters [i. e. M. A. 
degrees] in different subjects. But they always wander in roads and sit in 
the barber's shop, and are only talking about this and that. 
"So I thought that if we gather these educated people, they can help their 
society. We invited all the youths under thirty, and asked them that if they 
were co-operative, the nation has some rights on you - because you are 
more educated and more conscious: therefore you are more responsible 
than other people. They accepted our invitation, and we formed the'Youth 
Friends'. X75 
The intention was to remove the gap between generations and factions in 
Mingora, and to motivate young people. The initial programme included 
interpreting 'Islamic principles' to improve the local environment, and provide 
educational opportunities for Mingora's residents. Some local authorities and 
religious leaders felt threatened, especially from this alternate source of 'Islamic 
education' and interpretation. In this case, the disapproval reached its climax 
following the introduction of a Kur'än recitation competition: 
"So we started from our tiläwa 76 competition, recitation of the Holy 
Kur an, and the people were inspired by that programme.. But when it 
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became popular amongst the youths, so some religious people were afraid 
[that] these educated westernised people ['Youth Friends'] may get some 
advantages from these people, so they criticised us crushingly [sic]. " " 
This might be interpreted as the intrusion of an 'educated' 'westernised' elite into 
an <urf-centred Islamic environment - where for religious and political reasons, 
the introduction of the tiläwa competition was suppressed. The extent to which 
this competition represented 'innovation' or 'un-Islamic' practice is open to 
question. It would seem, from this example, that 'territorial' mosques or leaders 
who do not wish to see their influence, position, and/or income eroded may 
interfere - even if programmes potentially could lead to 'local improvement'. 
Within Mingora, there were also claims of political interference in processes 
of Islamicization: the conflicting agendas impacted on the vocational adult 
education programmes sought after by local rural inhabitants, who understood 
that the relative prosperity of Mingora's urban population was linked to the 
educational opportunities denied to much of the ruralised sector. Tablighi 
Jama`at and Jamb at-e Islami sought to promote vocational education (and 
related 'ideologies'), as an alternative to diminished local resources. 78 Education 
has become a political-religious issue in Mingora, programmes for rural people 
instigated by one political party being dismantled when rival parties acquired 
power. 
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Reconciliation of 'contemporary' concerns with Islamic decision-making 
processes remains high on several agendas in Pakistan. Whilst defined as an 
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'Islamic Republic', the interpretations of this Islamicity's validity vary 
considerably, especially in terms of frameworks for interpretation and decision- 
making in areas beyond hukm and hudüd. Priorities vary considerably between 
different interest groups, slowing down processes of'Islamicization': for example, 
the efforts to remove rzbä has been on the I. I. C. agenda since 1964. This seeks 
the development of: interest-free commercial banking and financial institutions; 
a state Islamic banking and monetary policy; and an Islamic methodology of 
governmental financial transactions. 8° Frustration was expressed by some 
interviewees as to the speed of these policies' implementation. Blame was placed 
on various administrations, a failure of legislative mechanisms, and/or external 
economic factors associated with the low status of Pakistan within the 'world 
economy'. The `urf-centred Islamic authorities were described by some 
interviewees as idealistic in their theories towards Islamic economics, resulting 
in disagreement between policy-makers, and processes of Islamicization being 
stalled. g' However, for the majority of the population, the Islamicization of the 
economy might be seen as a less-pressing issue than obtaining enough money for 
survival. 82 
Discussions regarding Islamic education, finance, and health-issues acquire 
different meaning from perspectives of poverty. Access to quality medical 
treatment is a key-issue within Pakistan, especially for those of limited-income. 
Islamic responses to health issues in Pakistan - including population planning, 
organ transplantation, and genetic-engineering - emerged as decision-making 
concerns during fieldwork. 
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Family-planning is a contentious issue in Pakistan, which has a natural 
population growth rate of 3.0%. 83 Large families represent, to many Pakistanis, 
economic benefits and a means of parental security in old age. There is resistance 
to the concept of smaller families: 
"We are spending 5% of national income on health, even less, so only 3% 
of this is on population planning programme in a country which would 
much benefit from this. Because you see China is a poor country like 
Pakistan, but China has introduced a co-ordinated, well-planned 
programme. They promote good policy data, 'one couple one child', so 
China is a big population, but they control it ... 
"The big problem is the population explosion ... 
Government is sincere, 
but can't fight tradition. Government cannot fight in Pathan areas, tribal 
areas... in Swat, NWFP, there are too many bad traditions. Government 
came in and convinced [people regarding family planning] that it is for 
the value of society. " 84 
The absence of a population planning programme in this rural area was linked to 
a lack of education and awareness, and resistance from 'traditional', 'tribal', and 
'religious' authorities. 
"But I think that the basic solution of population is education. If the 
people have not been greedy ... they think that more children means more 
fruit, so it is good to have more children. But even the uneducated 
women, they don't like many children ... 
"A lot of women, they have no institute, no health care, nowhere to go 
and beg some basic help, especially in mountainous areas. When a 
foreign researcher went there, all the women were asking her for help to 
stop having babies. So that was very sensitive, because the people there 
are very conservative and rigid people. So she was very careful, and said 
to the women that they should go to a lady doctor in [town] - because the 
men, they do not care, for the women it is a problem ... Because there 
is 
no education, local education is not available. " 85 
67 
The extent to which an `Islamic' decision- making process might form part of a 
Pakistan family planning programme is a contentious issue, where relatively large 
families - especially within rural areas - are seen as the 'norm'. The extent to 
which governmental health workers have been able to undertake work within a 
remote region is limited, because of the distance, tribal-traditional influences, 
security fears, and a lack of education amongst the rural population. 86 However, 
similar attitudes and approaches towards family size were found within urban 
environments too. 
Sources indicate many rural women would like to practice forms of family 
planning, because of the health difficulties presented in near-continual pregnancy, 
and related economic problems. Women were prevented access to contraceptives 
by their husbands, families, and communities - either directly, or indirectly 
through social pressures - although preventative measures were practised 
surreptitiously. " This has a profound effect on the status and role of rural women, 
and their reproductive rights, although attitudes may vary in different sectors of 
Pakistani society. 
Health issues related to 'family planning' provide indicators towards 'Islamic' 
decision-making processes within Pakistan. Abdur Rehman represents, on this 
issue, a 'traditional' viewpoint: 
"... Anything that is new, for the betterment of the people, which is 
innovative - it is valid? The issue of contraception: 
is it legal to 
contracept? If the life of the mother is in danger [yes], otherwise it is not 
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allowed. We are not binding in this principle, we are doing ijtihäd. 
Everything which is legitimate in Islam is permissible. " 88 
Any 'flexibility' within this interpretation is linked to obtaining medical advice. 
Another interviewee, within the Federal Shari'ah Council, determined that family 
planning represented a 'western conspiracy' to reduce Muslim populations. The 
thesis was that, in the event of a Muslim-Christian 'holy war', Muslim forces 
would be depleted. Contraception was acceptable for a woman with health 
difficulties: in other cases, the opinion was 'Allah will provide', and unborn 
children were not to be 'killed' through 'western rumours' generating fear of food 
shortages and economic difficulties caused by 'over-population'. 89 This stress 
upon population quantity emerged from a source within the state Islamic 
decision-making sector - and is perhaps a literalist reading of Islamic sources. The 
desire for smaller average family size was expressed privately by some 
interviewees. 90 
Family planning was regarded by several `ulamä' as one of the most difficult 
issues that they faced, alongside that of 'genetic engineering' and specifically 
'gender-selection'. This is in the light of developments in embryology and In 
Vitro Fertilization (I. V. F. ), which increase the chances of conception, with the 
possibility of selecting embryo-characteristics, including gender. In addition, 
foetal scanning can determine gender, and may result in gender abortion. Some 
scholars felt that scanning for the determination of gender was acceptable, but not 
if the result was abortion of a female foetus, which is against the Kur'an (with 
69 
certain exceptions). These issues introduce an interpretative and ethical debate, 
given that 'traditional Pakistani society' represents (in general terms) a preference 
for male over female offspring. The reasons for this are partly based around the 
economic pressures of marriage and dowry, the differentials between male and 
female economic/earning potential, and inheritance issues. The reasons may also 
be linked to an interpretation of Islamic sources, which indicates that males are 
'superior' to females. " 
Concerns were expressed by interviewees about the implications of genetic 
engineering in the areas of family and property rights, and in the guarantees of 
'legitimacy' of any conception. Certain areas of this technology were immediately 
determined to be 'forbidden', including the use of anonymously donated sperm or 
surrogate pregnancy. Interviewees' concerns were compounded by the feasibility 
of after-death conception, for example, a 'test tube baby' could be conceived after 
its father's death through sperm or embryo preservation. The impact of this upon 
an Islamic 'marriage contract' would be considerable. Although a marriage is 
'finished' on the death of either partner, the existence of a contractual pact or 
agreement stating that - for example - upon the husband's death, the wife would 
use preserved sperm to conceive a child raises questions of'legitimacy'. 92 
This issue provides an indicator of Islamic decision-making methodological 
processes, in which modern technology and Islamic 'interpretations' may have to 
be reconciled. Interviewee responses centred around the following fieldwork 
question: 
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"A husband has a sample of his sperm preserved', prior to medical 
treatment (which could render him impotent e. g. radiation treatment for 
cancer). Two years later he dies in an accident. Following this accident, his wife decides to have a baby through I. V. F. treatment. What is the 
appropriate Islamic response to this issue? " 
This issue provoked intensive discussions, prior to tentative responses being 
provided. The reaction of some interviewees was that they had absolutely no 
desire to ever face such a question(! ): 
"I don't like it in principle, the basic approach of modern secularists is if 
something can be done, it should be done ... 
If you do not have a child, it's 
just like not having money - it doesn't entitle you to go and break open the 
bank. If you can't have a child, because of blocked tubes or something, 
then you can do something about it. If it is beyond a certain point then it 
spins over into the sector of 'just because it can be done, it should be 
done'. This is not according to Islam. ' 93 
Several interviewees determined that, if faced with this issue in reality, 
consultation between authorities would be required - within a process associated 
with iatihäd - prior to any decision being made. 
Certain core principles, including examination of specific case details, were 
maintained by one `älim: 
"Irrespective of the detailed situations, the principle ... 
is that we should 
keep the principle [sic] that the children belong to the husband, and 
belong to their mother. This is something which is basic in Islam ... 
"But in your case, you are saying that the husband has died, or it [the 
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sperm] is frozen for some time, this could be so, although the bearing is 
such not to make a ruling outright... "" 
H. A. D. was asked how this alters the principle of a marital relationship 'ending' 
at the husband's death, if the wife subsequently conceives?: 
"We should ask a question before that? 'Why has it happened? ' For 
example without justification it should not be allowed in the first place. 
Why take the sperm and freeze it? There should be a good explanation of 
this process. You don't just do it for fun, or keeping an interval of two or 
three years. That is not a good justification. " 95 
One 'justification' was reiterated by the researcher: that the husband's radiation 
treatment has the potential side-effect of impotency: 
"That's good justification. But ... 
if the father is writing in his will that he 
accepts this process, again that is equivalent to a recognition that this 
process should take place even after his death. And again that his 
offspring would be acknowledged and recognised and there would be no 
problem for the child and no problem for his wife or his mother. Again it 
could be misused. 06 
"It's another possibility. She plays around, and then says [laughter] : 'This 
was kept from the sperm of the husband, nobody knows what happened. ' 
All these factors should be weighed together. But the objective of Islam 
is to keep the real children for their father and mother. This is the 
principle. " 
This issue represents the potential difficulties faced in maintaining various 
Islamic interests and principles, in the light of technological development. The 
principle objective was to keep "the real children for their father and mother", but 
other interests also have to be represented (i. e. desire for family, marital 
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contractual obligations, Islamic ethics and morality). 
One scholar believed - in this case - that the conception process was lawful, 
because the husband died through an 'unnatural' process of radiation therapy. 97 
The original justification for'freezing' the sperm was another key element; would 
the same response would have obtained if a man had his sperm preserved, and 
was then killed in an accident or in war? Clearly, according to H. A. D., each case 
is circumstantial. The researcher asked H. A. D. whether this was the kind of case 
in which iLtihäd had a role to play? The response was cautious: 
"Yes. But now you are asking a theoretical [question]. I would not give 
you a theoretical [answer] at all. It must be the case brought to him. This 
mother. This father. Specifics. That would be possible. I will see it and 
then make a ruling. But not on theoretical grounds like this. As if you are 
giving a general fatwa. In this case it should not be allowed. You have 
to know, this is the mother, this is her situation, and this is the father. And 
this is the case what is happening. And this it should pass idutihäd for a 
specific situation. Especially in delicate cases like this. "98 
Going beyond the response of the actual issues, H. A. D's response represents an 
example of theoretical implications surrounding Islamic decision-making 
processes - in particular the fact that 
it is a decision-making response to 
individual circumstances, whereas afatwä literally represents a general opinion 
to an issue. 
H. A. D. based his initial conclusion on hudrüd, in that the 'after-death 
conception' represented a transgression of the 
boundaries of Islam. H. A. D. 's 
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thesis demonstrates his priority, of adhering to (what he understood to be) Kur'an- 
is principles, whilst applying lateral thinking to deal with the different issues and 
possibilities arising out of a decision. These include projected reactions within 
Pakistan society, and the responses of subsequent generations [i. e. towards 
possible inheritance disputes]. H. A. D. 's methodology demanded the root-cause 
of an issue, and matched it to a primary Islamic principle i. e. why the sperm was 
being frozen, and whether this was a response to a medical issue, or for more 
'frivolous' reasons? H. A. D. then matched this to what he saw as primary 'Islamic' 
principles affecting the parties concerned, and of the wider society, notably the 
principle of attributing parenthood: 
"Again we should weigh all these consequences. And when he [H. A. D. ] 
passes itihäd, he should pass it according to this. It's going to cause 
havoc in the balance of society. Again he may disallow it because of this 
n 99 
Within Pakistan, this has to be seen in the light of society demands, including 
turf and state law relating to inheritance (which may or may not - depending on 
the perspective - have been 'Islamicized'). A Federal Shari'ah Court source, 'Z. X. ', 
believed that I. V. F. issues raised intense difficulties regarding property right 
mutation, because I. V. F. was 'against nature' and offered 'no certainty' that 
preserved sperm comes from 'the legitimate father'. This opinion, based on an 
initial reading of the fieldwork question, represents Z. X. 's first exposure to this 
specific issue, which he accepted could play a prominent part in future 
interpretative agendas. Emphasis was on what were seen as clear injunctions 
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within the Kur än to 'go with what God gives', in terms of the mubah permissible 
and makrüh non-permissible aspects. However, Z. X. determined I. V. F. could be 
appropriate, if it was '100% guaranteed' that the sperm and eggs 'definitely 
belonged' to individuals concerned. Z. X. believed no 'madhhab' within Pakistan 
had opposed I. V. F. or 'test-tube babies', when gender-selection was left 'in the 
hands of God'. 1' 
In contrast, Abdur Rehman had not been approached about 'gender selection' 
before, but indicated that it could be permissible. It was seen as being in the 
'public interest' ( maslaha al muslahah) - for example, when a couple had several 
girls, but no boys: 
"According to this point of view the gender-selection is not forbidden in 
Islam, because for instance if the person has five girls and he does not 
have a boy then our religion provides a chance to do it. If he can do, he 
can select gender before the birth of a child. And, for example, a person 
who has five boys and he wishes to have a girl - then he. can do that. 
Because it provides variations for him, and it is up to him. There is no 
harm 
... 
11 101 
This interpretation of the technology, in terms of 'public interest' and God's 
Will, is in contrast to that of other scholars: 
it... this is laughing at values: even in this Frontier Province, if a male 
child is born to you then people are very happy and most of the time they 
start firing [their guns], and a female is born to you and they are very 
unhappy. This is not Islamic. " 102 
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Other sources indicate that gender-selection was not permissible: 
" 
... I am not a well-read Muslim. Although we are not very much aware 
of this latest technology that selective babies [sic] can be produced, it is 
very clearly mentioned in the Holy Kur'än that whatever is in the womb 
is not known to the people, it is only known to Allah, except a few things 
that mankind can know. " 103 
Whilst the 'technology' is available within Pakistan, the questions surrounding its 
implications have not been tackled by all decision-makers. To some 
interviewees, gender-selection represents a case of breaching hukm, based around 
clear principles contained within the Kur'an. Z. X. understood the implications of 
a wider availability of I. V. F. (and related technology) in Pakistan, not just in 
terms of potential legal difficulties: the preference for male offspring could result 
in a disproportionate male: female balance in society (at least in those classes able 
to afford access to the technology). This view was supported by Anis Ahmed, 
described by some sources as 'progressive' towards technology and Islamic 
'advancement' of Pakistani society: 
"Don't you think that if this happens on a wide scale, it will change the 
composition of the human being? In Pakistan nobody would like a girl at 
all. Nobody. Even if he has ten boys, he will want eleven boys. Again 
that would be of very serious consequences. It's like these industrialists: 
years ago people didn't know about industry and smoke and now they 
realise the damage it does the environment. So if allowed it will cause 
havoc... " 104 
Ahmed's understanding was that this 'unnatural' technology would interfere with 
nature, and therefore was against God's creational judgement - especially gene 
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selection: 
"Perhaps I may be categorised as rather conservative when I say that 
[despite] all the knowledge of genetics that we have today, I still believe 
that Allah, creator of all humanity, has much more knowledge than all of 
our scientists because He has created us from nothing... 
"I think these experiments work for a while ... but we are not yet 
in a 
position to understand what was the wisdom when Allah created human 
beings by selecting one out of ten million genes to make successful 
fertilisation ... 
"So I think this plan to 'play God' is rather ambitious, and we are not yet 
in a position to ethically judge which of the genes I should permit to 
survive, and which gene I crucify. It is too much of a claim for a human 
being to make. " 105 
There can be reluctance to use I. V. F., even when it is affordable: 
"... Even I should mention that for the well-off this artificial insemination 
is now available in Pakistan. In my own large family the girl lost the baby 
and they don't turn to this, despite the very strong pressures like you 
mentioned ... we 
don't look upon modem technology as the answer to 
everything, and this is most notably shown in our attitude to death ... 
" 106 
This reluctance would have to be balanced - in other cases - with intense family 
pressures for the production of male children. In some environments, this might 
result in the husband seeking another wife, through divorce or polygamy. Several 
interviewees considered there had been a lack of consultation on such issues in 
Pakistan. These questions are only now appearing on decision-making agendas, 
and provide examples of a'new issue' not encountered directly within the Kur'än, 
and in which different forms of interpretation based have to be applied. Those 
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who require such innovations do not always seek the opinion of a religious 
authority, prior to utilising them. 
Other medical issues provide examples of'contemporary issues' that required 
Islamic responses in Pakistan. ' °' Despite opinions regarding preventing 'body- 
mutilation' after death, interviewees agreed that - according to all madlihab - 
organ transplantation was acceptable. The issues raised by this were not 
examined from a legal viewpoint, as the human body is seen as being 'owned' by 
God: 
"I think that when I am donating my eye, do I have authority? Do I own 
it? Is it mine? And [according to] the approach of Muslim scholars 
through the centuries, my body is owned by Allah and life is given by 
Allah as a trust. I am authorised to use it, but not to misuse it, I am 
authorised to use my body in a healthy, natural way - but if I commit 
offence against my body, then the Kur'än calls it 'zulm': injustice and 
exploitation. i108 
There was concern that an illegal trade in organs could emerge in Pakistan - as in 
certain South American states - which would be against public interest. Organ 
trade would have different implications (in terms of contractual obligations and 
morality) compared to organ donation. '09 
As an extension of the discussion about medical issues with implications for 
women, gender roles are a prominent concern in interpretative matters. 10 Male 
decision-makers make fundamental decisions for - or regarding - Pakistan's 
females. Several interviewees sought to promote an increased role for women (in 
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selected areas). Access to education for women - especially 'Islamic' education - 
was described as a key issue. Some madrasa - for example, Jamia A shrafia - run 
parallel high-level 'Islamic sciences' courses for male and female students, and 
claim: 
"Women also make an equal role in decision-making. About 400 women 
are studying in this Jamia Ashrafia, and they are also involved in this 
decision-making. They play important roles in this subject ... " 
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Unlike high-achieving male students at Jamia Ashrafia, female students cannot 
progress to higher institutions to attain qualifications for `älim status (access to 
higher education is an issue for many Pakistanis). 
For women, education may be restricted by family pressures to ensure a good 
marriage, which could be compromised by attendance at certain institutions. 
Opportunities for education after marriage are limited. Several sources believed 
the marriage contract's 'Kur'an-ic' nature was not generally observed in Pakistan, 
and that 'Islamicization' still had to make a positive impact in this area: ' - 
" 
... 
Here in Muslim countries, we read it but don't practice it [the Kur'än]. 
In Islam, a husband must provide food, shelter and dress to his wife, and 
it is a contract between two equals: two independent persons. 
"And whenever they cannot stay to this contract, there are ways out. She 
can have her property, can do business, she has a share in her husband's 
property. But in practice, no. 
"So these [are the] extremes: in the West she has been exploited in the 
name of 'freedom', and here in the Muslim countries, she is being 
exploited in the name of'Islam'. " 13 
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There was a widespread recognition that exploitation of women took place on a 
wide scale within Pakistan, and that reform of patriarchal, `urf-centred societal 
interpretations of Islamic sources was a key issue. 
Interviewees presented many idealised references to the role of women. 
Attention was drawn to the paradox of Pakistan having a female Prime Minister, 
whilst women's rights were in 'a poor condition'. Benazir Bhutto's position was 
frequently attributed to her family's power, particularly the status of her father, 
rather than as an indicator towards specific 'equal opportunities' or improved 
gender roles in Pakistan. There are still many long-standing problems within 
Pakistan's urban and rural environments: 
"The biggest problem for our women is that they are now facing the 
traditional problems [sic] ... the traditional environment, which 
is 
different to British society, where women have the rights to work for their 
job 
... the next 
hurdle is that the political system in this country does not 
care for the woman development problems [sic]. So these two problems 
are facing woman's society. 
"The third big problem is that our society is backward ... and there are too 
much [so many] women, and they have too much [so much] experience, 
working in the field of agriculture mostly; they work in household and 
industry, they are working much higher [harder? ] than men, but ... the 
government is not attending to their problems. And it does not know what 
to do for them. " 114 
If widespread women's repression is based upon interpretation on Islamic 
primary sources, then clearly decision-makers within Islamic frameworks could 
in theory make a contribution to improving the situation. In practice, a policy to 
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promote changes in attitudes - even with an Islamic basis - is unlikely to be 
implemented in the short-term. Certain Islamic interpretations - for example, 
those of Israr Aluned - seek to increase the limitations upon women in the public 
sphere. '' 5 
Within one rural community, 'I. W. A. ', an educationalist and activist, sought 
to increase governmental promotion of women's roles in society: 
"For most women, they are bearing the sheep, the poultry, in their house, 
they are extending the earning for their families ... 
but the government are 
not promoting the programme for the woman. 
"And you know that a woman Prime Minister is now in Pakistan ... the 
western media might think that women must have much progress in 
Bangladesh or Pakistan because they have women leaders, but I think the 
opposite is true. " 116 
I. W. A. has observed the results of various Islamic decision-making processes 
within Pakistan - including those made with the backing of (different) religious 
'authorities'. I. W. A. referred to how women in rural society have to contend with 
'Islamic authorities' promoting localised Islamic interpretations, which have 
detrimental implications for women - in the areas of reproduction rights, 
education, marriage contracts, and financial security. 
I. W. A. commented upon institutions that have been established to 'help' 
women, based on 'Islamic principles'. For example: the 'Woman's Bank' was 
intended to provide riba-free loans to establish income-generating schemes, and 
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to provide a secure place to deposit funds inaccessible to those men. who - whilst 
often not working themselves - squandered family income on leisure pursuits. 
Despite the founding Islamic principles, it was not always possible for women to 
obtain sympathetic assistance from the Woman's Bank: 
"In the first government of Benazir, she established a Woman's Bank, but 
all the officers, the managers, the staff were men. ""7 
This made access, within local understandings of male: female contact, very 
difficult for women. 
The level to which male-centred culture is confronted by women, even when 
based around institutions that are meant to represent and improve women's status 
is a key issue which - according to some sources - required re-evaluation of 
Islamic interpretations. "' For example, in terms of law and order, women 
frequently had problems gaining access to the predominantly male police force. 
There was a fear of police corruption, and a danger of being seen unchaperoned 
with a male officer - within a society where such an encounter could lead to 
ostracism (or death): 
"... In this government, she [Benazir] established women's police stations, 
one station in Hyderabad, one in Pindi, [Rawalpindi], one in Karachi. In 
Pindi and Karachi they are working, but in Hyderabad the society is not 
yet ready. 
"There was also a policy to establish one women police station in 
Peshawar, so there are enough unemployed and educated and needy 
women [to fill the posts], they all applied. But we heard nothing about 
what happened to that women's police station. ... 
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"Here I said there is a lot of opportunity for women, they are in need for 
women in law. If you provide law for women, they will resolve things 
[problems] 
... " 
'" 
I. V. A. believed it was 'un-Islamic' for Pakistan to claim to be an 'Islamic 
Republic', where over half the population has no access to basic avenues of law. 
Women police in major cities could not resolve the problem, but would provide 
one possible channel for women in difficulties. "' 
I. W. A. stated that, within her rural environment, the majority lacked basic 
education and health rights - as well as marriage rights, where early weddings 
were encouraged for daughters. These were all areas where I. W. A. believed re- 
evaluation of the Islamic basis of decision-making and opinion formation was 
necessary. I. W. A. expressed pessimism about the current `ulamä ' achieving this 
in Pakistan, and was unimpressed with a Lahore interviewee who had stated that 
men had to be educated first, and that women's education would have to come 
second(! ). '21 I. W. A. believed education provided one of the keys for women to 
improve their situation, especially within Pakistan's rural environments. 
Operating as an activist within such a male-centred environment, where 
oppression was justified' by specific Islamic interpretations, was in itself difficult 
for I. W. A. - with limited support-mechanisms available. 
In the context of potential avenues for Islamicization or Islamic decision- 
making, other issues raised by interviewees included those relating to technology 
and its impact upon interpretation. 122 Priorities referred to were the increased 
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roles of computers and global communications. Examples were raised by the 
researcher of computers being applied as teaching tools for Islam, including in the 
pronunciation and reading of the Kur'än. ' 2' The Internet, offering rapid global 
inter-personal communication and the wide dissemination of ideas, provoked 
some concerns - particularly accessibility to 'alternative' interpretations from other 
Islamic perspectives - and what agendas and interpretations these parties had. 
Comparisons were drawn with the influence of satellite television, which 
provides a wide variety of opinions and images, which some see as 'corrupting' 
or'un-Islamic' (from 'Western' and non-Western sources). 12' 
Others believed that new technology could fulfil an important role in 
broadening the resources of Islamic interpretation, with implications for the 
'global 'ummah' and Pakistan's decision-making processes: 
"The development of this technology is going to make itihäd much 
more easier for people. I don't have to look into this encyclopedia of law, 
or a book of comparative law, or go to a concordance of Kur'än and find 
out where in world ribä is used - how many times. I simply need to move 
to my keyboard and tap in the keyboard, and it is going to give me how 
many places it appears within the Kur'än, in Hadith, in Fikh books - and 
that is going to provide me with enormous material which can be 
analyzed. 
"Yet the poor human beings' mind cannot be disregarded. With all this 
technological help, if I keep my mind locked and I never use it properly, 
no iLtihäd. But I think modern gadgets make i/tihäd much easier - and 
with Internet it is going to be easier for me to verify my findings, with a 
scholar in my micro-micro area who lives in Tunis. I just use my e-mail 
and reach him, and verify from him and compare with him his 
observations and modify my views. This makes i jtihäd easier and not 
complex. " 125 
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Computerised Islamic resources are being established in Pakistan. For example, 
the Dawj' Academy at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, seeks to 
utilise networking opportunities - including inter-Muslim and inter-Faith 
dialogues. In comparison, a media-oriented source in Jama`at-e Islami did not 
seem concerned with the potential of the Internet or satellite television as a means 
of nationally or globally distributing their interpretation of Islam, or increasing 
the Islamicization processes. 126 
For a significant proportion of the population, technological considerations 
are unimportant compared with 'spiritual matters'. The relationship with Allah 
may be prevalent for all sources consulted in Pakistan. Priorities of interpretation 
varied: from those who sought to utilise Islamic sources within every aspect of 
life to 'Islarnicize' Pakistan; through to those unconcerned with the 'minor' matters 
of the mundane world, concentrating on Revelations within the Kur'an such as the 
predictions for Judgement Day. 
Decision-making and opinion-forming processes incorporate the acceptance, 
(re)interpretation, and rejection of different aspects of Islamic 'sources'. There 
may be consensus on 'rigid' core-principles, but in matters deemed 'flexible', there 
can be variation in opinion. This in itself should not be surprising or interpreted 
as 'un-Islamic', being representative of Pakistan's diversity, and illustrative of the 
varied methodologies utilised in interpreting Islam's sources within different 
Islamic environments. 
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Pakistan incorporates several parallel models of Islamic interpretation, not 
necessarily in synchronisation with one another. There was no consensus in 
Pakistan (from the sources consulted) on the utility of idjtihäd, within the 
different definitions and emphases of this term. The divergence of opinion 
represent some of the global Islamic debates on approaches to Islamic sources. 
The long-standing dialogue on interpretation, 'Islamicization', and implementation 
of 'Islamic' policies continues. The process of reconciling theoretical 
interpretative understandings with the practicalities of implementation occupies 
many authorities. 
The creation of a single Islamic decision-making model in Pakistan requires 
the kind of consensus on all Islamic issues that is perhaps idealistic. Within a 
Republic of such divergent interests and understandings, many interviewees 
indicated that achieving the ideal was impossible, impracticable, or undesirable. 
Dealing with the interpretation of contemporary issues and concerns - including 
examples of technology, finance, politics, education, and medicine discussed 
above - demonstrates the difficulties of reconciling varied Islamic interpretations. 
Apart from 'new' issues, within the area of personal law there is also difficulty in 
re-interpreting existing laws to fully accommodate all Islamic interests. 
Recognition and acceptance of interpretative diversity varied. 
The question of whether a radical new model of interpretation or a 
'conventional' model will be effective involves challenging and discussing notions 
and ideals of Islamic decision-making and opinion-formation. Such a dialogue 
86 
is not represented on a wide-scale, at either national or local levels in Pakistan. 
This may indicate contentment with the status quo, resignation to he current 
situation, or an inability or unwillingness of Islamic 'authorities' to dialogue. 
For the individual (especially at rural poverty level), the matters of state and 
religious authority in Islamic decision-making are of less concern compared with 
other issues - including economic survival, personal networks, and/or a personal 
relationship with Allah. For the majority of Muslims in Pakistan, these interests 
continue to form the basis of any interpretations, interest in, or understandings of 
Islamic primary sources. Awareness of interpretative nuances is superseded by 
basic principles of (aspects and interpretations of) hudud and hukm: authority, 
doubts, and decisions on Islamic matters are influenced through local authority 
networks. 
The impact of national or regional Islamic policies may filter down to these 
local levels, but their influence could be dissipated. The `ur, f-centred model, 
based on ancestral practices, pervade 'Islamic' understandings of daily life. The 
likelihood of this primary Pakistan paradigm changing in the short-term - or 
indeed whether it is desired or feasible - remains a dominant subject, at least for 
theoretical discussion, amongst Pakistan intelligentsia. 
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3 Malaysia 
Certain Islamic organisations and Muslim individuals in Malaysia maintain 
strong links with their Pakistani peers, and there is a mutual interest in their 
respective approaches towards Islamic issues. However, on a number of levels, 
this chapter will demonstrate that attitudes and approaches relating to Islamic 
decision-making vary considerably in Malaysia - indicative of diverse historical, 
political and other factors. Malaysian Muslim individuals interviewed for this 
thesis indicate some of this diversity, and radical differences in approaches to 
Islamic decision-making issues. This chapter incorporates fieldwork research 
undertaken in Malaysia during 1995,1 shortly after the 1995 General Election. ' 
The intention was to explore different approaches towards Islamic decision- 
making, within a Islamically-diverse and multi-faith, multi-ethnic setting. As an 
ASEAN country, with a federal policy emphasising economic development, the 
researcher sought to understand approaches towards Islamic interpretation in a 
technologically 'modernising' context, and observe some of the results of these 
interpretations 'in action'. This research was conducted immediately following 
fieldwork in Pakistan, and the researcher was made aware of the broadly different 
emphases between these two 'Islamic environments'. 
Within Malaysia, the researcher sought to examine the extent to which 
'i tihäd and related concepts are cited by different Islamic interest platforms as 
reference points, for decision-making and opinion-formation. The intention was 
to explore those issues that these platforms believed were (or had been) relevant 
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for Islamic decision-making, especially within the 'flexible' areas of 
interpretation. The extent to which these decisions had been ascertained as a 
'success' or not by respondents was also considered. The researcher conducted 
a broad range of interviews in urban and rural Islamic environments, from 'grass- 
roots' level upwards - although there was no 'scientific sampling' in choice of 
respondents. 
The Muslim population within Malaysia reflects a diversity of Islamic 
interpretations, with many adert 4 closely identified with being 'Malay' and being 
'Muslim'. Islamic interpretations in Malaysia represent - in some contexts - the 
changing values and aspirations of Malaysian society. 5 The Malay Muslim 
population has been exposed to varied approaches towards Islamic 
interpretations, as improved communications have made the world 'smaller'. The 
government has to balance Islamic rhetoric with practical realities, in a 
predominantly secularly-oriented global context. Selected Islamic systems and 
infrastructures will, after their implementation, only appeal to a proportion of 
Malaysia's population. Questions arise as to whether Malaysia's intended role as 
an economic super-power in the twenty-first century - one of the 'Asian Tigers' - 
can be fully reconciled with the demands by some parties for an'Islamic State': 
" 
... 
it is really the stark constituent realities of Malaysian society -a 
heterogeneous ethnic matrix, intra-ethnic disunity within all major ethnic- 
groups, the different socio-political culture of Sabah and Sarawak vis-a- 
vis peninsular Malaysia, and the secular-capitalist orientation of the whole 
country - which must suggest that the road ahead would 
indeed by 
arduous if pressures to see a much greater role for Islam in Malaysia were 
to escalate. " 6 
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Elements within the Malaysian Federation will apply - or continue to promote - 
aspects of an Islamicization process. Whilst Islam might permeate the personal 
life of many Malay Muslims - within the Federal sphere, compromise is made to 
balance interests of varied sectors within Malaysia's population. 
Recognition of the population diversity in the Malaysian Federation is 
significant, in terms of understanding issues relating to Islamic decision-making. ' 
The question of 'who is a Malay? ' is a fundamental one, because to many Malays. 
being 'Malay' is directly linked to Muslim identity. Long-established 'non-Malay' 
communities are not recognised as 'Malay' - but as 'Malaysian'. Inter-mixing 
between different ethnic groups has compounded issues surrounding Malay 
f 
identity. This impacts upon interpretations of Islam in Malaysia, on relations 
between and within Islamic interests in Malaysia - and on Malaysia's global 
relations with external Islamic interests. 
The emphasis upon dakwah 8 by Islamic interests in Malaysia - including 
Federal government departments - incorporates varied elements of Islamic and 
Malay identity, including specific pronouncements on Islamic sources. 
Interpretations can reflect 'rigid' aspects of Islam, with limited flexibility, 
confirming or promoting existing understandings. The requirements for 
interpretation of the 'flexible' aspects of Islamic sources in a rural Malaysian 
environment may be different to those of an urban environment, influencing the 
form of decisions or opinions made. The 'details of everyday life', remeh temeh, 
9 
can differ from Islamic issues dealt with on a governmental level. The action of 
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pragmatic understanding and interpretation of Islam, in reaction to specific issues 
and circumstances, may be considered more important than the actual labelling 
of the process. 
Compartmentalising 'reform' and 'tradition' can be interpreted as too rigid, as 
there can be interaction between these typologies. This is reflected within analysis 
of political groupings in Malaysia: individuals may attend meetings of (and join) 
several different Malay-Muslim interests. There can be links with dakwah 
movements, seeking to promote (interpretations of) Islam amongst Muslims and 
non-Muslims. '° Not all these groups have 'reform' or itihAd on their agenda. 
Others make compromises to acquire a degree of political leverage. 
Creation of state religious councils offers state administrations limited 
control over Islamic affairs, including: appointments of kädis and nnäms, 
implementation of share `a interpretations (primarily in matters of personal law), 
and in Islamic services' provision (i. e. ham organisation, and Islamic 
education). 12 There has been conflict between individual states' and Malaysian 
Federational interests, which has ramifications in interpretations of Islam. 13 
Reference towards 'ijtihäd -related concepts by various platforms 
indicates 
diversity in Islamic understandings, reflected within Malaysian political dialogues 
nationally and locally, particularly in areas of interpretation seen as 'flexible' 
rather than 'rigid'. Promoting 'idjtihäd comprises a component of U. M. N. O. 's 
strategy to islamicize aspects of Malaysian governmental activities, and to 
broadly appeal to different Islamic interests, and to other members of the 
103 
government coalition. '4 Areas of governmental Islarnicization interests include: 
finance, technology, education, and foreign policy. Syariah Courts 15 utilise 
Islamicization in cases requiring a new understanding of primary Islamic sources. 
The issuing of fatwä is promoted as providing 'expert opinions' on interpretative 
issues lacking 'clarity'. 16 
Rural leadership roles cannot be diminished, with their close proximity to 
specific regional interests, providing approaches towards issues requiring 
pragmatic Islamic interpretation. These responses could fall under interpretative 
categories of i tihäd or i mä, not necessarily in line with major players in 
Malaysian political-religious structures. In certain cases, local religious leadership I 
maintains higher prestige than state- or federal- authorities. Individuals may 
utilise decision-making and opinion-forming 'services' of diverse Islamic 
'authorities', whilst retaining other personal or community Islamic interests and 
loyalties. Islamic decision-making is also associated within the Malaysian 
Federation with the Sultan's role within each State - deemed to be the 'Head of 
Religion' or Ketua Ugama, 17 with the powers to appoint officials in the religious 
hierarchy. The power of Malaysia's Sultans has been open to abuses and criticism, 
perhaps indicative of a declining status for Malay royalty. 
Contemporary Islamic decision-making models in Malaysia reflect historical 
patterns of development: Malay peninsular affairs were dominated by European 
powers between the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Several states were under 
British patronage (between 1824 and 1957), 18 influencing approaches towards 
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authority and Islamic interpretation. " Long-standing contacts with Middle 
Eastern traders were an influential factor within the Malay peninsular. 20 'External' 
Islamic influences have been prominent in Islamic interpretations in South East 
Asia, especially when communications between the peninsular and the Middle 
East improved, through development of mass-steamship travel and the promotion 
of fulfilment of the ham. A secondary effect of this was exposure to ta did- 
centred Islam, and an increase in Malays studying in madrasas, particularly in 
Makkah and Cairo. 21 
In the early twentieth century, exposure to Islam in the Middle East 
accentuated differences between those promoting adat and taLdd. 22 Whilst 
r 
broad generalisations cannot be made, these differences often developed into 
conflicts between (and within) generations, and between urban and rural-centred 
interpretations of Islam. Different Malay Muslim factions that emerged were 
divided into 'Kaum Muda' ('young party') and 'Kaum Tua' ('old party'). 23 These 
divisions influence political and religious diversity within contemporary 
Malaysia, and were significant in the foundation of various political parties. The 
'reform-centred' Kaum Muda promoted ijtihäd, and sought a'return' to perceived 
values of 'classical' Islam, and utilisation of'Islamic' values, in an interaction with 
new social concepts and technologies introduced from outside the Malay states. 
Advocacy of iiLtihäd influenced understanding of Malay state legal systems, 
especially through interaction of customary law, share `a, and British-Malay 
statutory law. 24 The implications included increasing bureaucratization of 
religious affairs, gradually taken from the domain of village `ulama-' to the 
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departments of government. 25 
Malay Muslim organisations reflect differences within the spectrum of 
Islamic interpretation and understandings, especially regarding decision-making 
processes. For example, P. K. P. I. M. 26 expanded from a student base, into the 
kampungs27 during the 1970's. 28 Malay-Chinese riots in May 1969 were seen as 
a reaction to the prospect of a left-wing, Chinese-dominated government. A 
reassertion of Malay identity, 29 in an effort to retain political control, sought to 
bring Malay economic and educational aspirations in line with the majority of the 
Chinese population. 3° An increase in rural Malay attendance in urban universities 
stimulated reassertion of 'Islamic values': 
"Uprooted from the integrated life and security of their rural environments 
and thrust into modem westernized cities dominated by Chinese, many 
Malay youth at campuses like the prestigious University of Malaya and 
the kebangsaan (National) University turned to their Islamic heritage to 
preserve their sense of identity and to provide the context, language, and 
rationale for their reformism. " 31 
This influenced the foundation in 1971 of A. B. I. M, 32 which promoted a return 
to 'values' contained within Islamic sources. '3 In the late 1970's, A. B. 1. M. allied 
with the rural-centred, 'conservative' Parti P. A. S., indicating that it was not 'tied' 
to any specific political platform. 34 Within the spectrum of Malaysian Islamic 
understandings, outside of the governmental sphere, there are several different 
platforms promoting Islamic decision-making models. 35 Some have been seen as 
rivals by the government, such as Dar ul-Argam, 36 whilst others have a 'non- 
106 
political' quietist approach, such as Jamd'at-i-Tabligh. 37 
As a reaction, in part, to organisations with 'Islamic' agendas, after the 1982 
election, U. M. N. O. Prime Minister Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad promoted 
selective Islamic 'reform-centred' concepts in educational, economic, and 
broadcasting spheres. 38 A. B. I. M's co-founder, Anwar Ibrahim, was co-opted into 
the government in 1982, claiming he could implement Islamicization more 
effectively within 'the system'. 39 Islamicization processes within the Malay 
Federation have differing time-scales and emphases. Whilst there have been 
infrastructures in place for the administration of Muslim personal law, the 
political agendas of some parties represent demands for greater implementation 
I 
of shars `a, often going beyond the remit of the Federal Malaysian government. 40 
The U. M. N. O. selective implementation of Islamic principles continued through 
Mahathir Mohamad's economic and social policy plan Wawasan 2020 (Vision 
2020), with an emphasis on Malaysian identity within a fully industrialised 
economy. 
41 
The needs and requirements of Islamic decision-making in Malaysian Islamic 
environments contexts represent variations within and between different interest 
groups. The viability and demands for 'Islamicization' vary. The extent to which 
idjtihäd represents practical rather than rhetorical concepts contextually 
associated with Islamic decision-making and opinion-formation is open to 
question. The need to strike a balance between the realities of contemporary 
society and the idealisation of 'Islamic' interpretations provides a (idealised? ) 
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reference point within discussions on Malaysia Islamic issues: 
"This is the way of Malaysians. We don't go to extremes. We don't try to 
push something just because it is Islamic. We ask first whether it is 
practical, whether it can be applied, can it bring about success, can it 
bring about justice, can it bring about prosperity? " 42 
Interviewees made reference to itihäd as a mechanism for interpreting 
Islamic primary sources in the Malaysian Islamic environments, and sought to 
provide practical examples of its utility. There are conflict and dynamics between 
forms of adat, 'modernising' Islamicization, and 'conservative' Malaysian Islamic 
interpretations. Dialogue on interpretative issues frequently occurs as part of 
wider political debates, forming a key component on agendas, which may even ` 
refer or allude to 'idijtihäd. ' 
Malay Muslim definitions of i tihäd often draw upon classic filch 
understandings of the concepts surrounding the term, common in other Islamic 
environments. Malay sources emphasised how Islamic principles are interpreted 
and practised in their everyday life (remeh tehmeh) - and also how they related to 
Muslim identity in the Malaysian Federation. The democratic process in 
Malaysia means that proscription of adat can result in lost votes - given that the 
majority of the Muslim Malay electorate resides in rural, adat-dominated Islamic 
environments. The emphasis within Malaysia is on Islamic structures beyond 
adat, within common zones of Islamic interest and basic hukm, including creation 
of Islamic infrastructures within personal law, financial, and political spheres. 
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The advocation of idjtihäd at state and federal levels reflects concerns which do 
not seek to homogenise Malay Muslim diversity. Specific non-governmental 
organisations (N. G. O. ) or political-religious platforms may promote other 
agendas, whose pragmatism is not always linked to obtaining a majority vote in 
federal or state elections. The extent to which these agendas can be advocated 
may be limited, by governmental or society pressures. 
Islamic decision-making or opinion-forming authorities within Malaysia 
reflect different adat practices and Islamic value systems. For example, on an 
informal level, there is (theoretically) access to authorities within local mosques, 
including müftls and nnäms. On a rural level on the Peninsular, there is also the 
I 
option of consulting within the framework of kampungpenghulu systems. 43 On 
a more formal level, there are Syariah Courts, Fatwä Councils, and access to 
religious offices and authorities at local, state and federal level. information 
about opinions and decisions is promoted through various methods: a4 
"Normally, the civilian, when they want to know the i jtihäd, new hukm 
[sic], or new fatwä we have to refer to mufti - those who make the 
decision ... and sometimes we try to tell 
them when we have a new fatwa. 
"We directly tell them through the sermon or in Kelantan, for example, 
every mosque they have their talk by nnäm or by ustaz or member of 
parliament, the representative of the government. Every week they try to 
visit their area, so they tell them a new decision, a new fatwä. " 45 
Creation of clear, paradigmatic models of trans-Malaysian Islamic 
interpretation is restricted because of different approaches towards 
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understandings of idjtihäd. The multi-ethnic, multi-faith, multi-Islamic 
environments of Malaysia additionally influences decision-making frameworks. 
Questions can be raised as to the extent that different Islamic interpretative 
models promote tolerance between different interest groups: 
" ... 
If you just left things to the `ulamä ', they would see things differently; 
they have a very conservative way of looking at things, whether it's 
women or mixing with others [other faiths]. 
"At the social level, this is my fear: that very narrow ideas from whatever 
quarter ... will catch on, unless there is an attempt to consciously provide 
an alternative way of looking at things ... [for] the Muslim community here. 
"At a political level, I don't think [Parti] P. A. S. will ever come to power 
in this country, and I think it is good, in the sense that if Malaysia is going 
to offer anything to the world, I think ... they should try to show the 
world that: here you have a multi-ethnic society - 53%-54% Muslim - but 
a society in accordance with Islamic values; genuine universal 
compassionate Islamic values, through which we are able to create the 
sorts of efforts, that can sustain multi-religious understanding and respect 
n 46 
Different views emerge regarding decision-making in Malaysia Islamic 
environments. The emerging industrialising, urbanised environment has created 
many 'new' issues and situations that Muslim authorities respond to in different 
ways. Generalisations cannot be made regarding idjtihAd in all contexts, because 
the concept can represent a situational pro-active or reactive response. In many 
cases, questions raised can be dealt with in existing interpretations and 
understandings - guided by authorities. Radically different situations, with no 
direct basis in existing sources, may require exceptional Islamic interpretative 
i 
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responses - although the interpretative capacity varies between inactivity and 
striving to reach new understandings. 
The capacity to interpret is associated with Islamic education. In Malaysia, 
there are 'traditionally' educated `ulamä' actively involved in Islamic decision- 
making processes - and there are also people who do not possess this background 
applying what they describe as 'idftihäd. There is dialogue between differing 
areas of expertise, in order to interpret sources and situations. The capacity for 
Islamic authority and interpretation has been extended, although it is not 
universally recognised and accepted between and within the diverse Malaysian 
Islamic interpretative frameworks. 
` Ulamä ' represent different Islamic perspectives within Malaysia. Some 
actively promote i tihäd as a key Islamic decision-making response - either at 
individual or collective levels: 
" ... ijtihäd means we are using our capability of 
knowledge and our 
thinking and our effort - even our physical [effort] - just having to make 
people know what has to be done ... 
"What is our stand? Do we have people running away, and keeping 
yourself closed from this worldly life? This is not Islamic ... 
" 47 
The labelling of the decision-making process is crucial. Malaysian platforms 
interpret situations Islamically, but do not necessarily present their interpretation 
as fatwä or itihäd - even if the methodology is the same. 
Parti P. A. S. and 
I 
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U. M. N. O. committees both produce fatwä on issues. U. M. N. O. is represented 
through official state Fatwä committees in all Federation states - except Kelantan. 
The implications behind assertions of Islamic authority, 'confined' to a'politically 
allied' qualified elite, influences Malaysian Islamic decision-making frameworks. 
As a fatwä technically represents an opinion on a specific issue rather than 
legislature, an individual is not 'bound' to follow advice which may be 
inappropriate or situational. A. fatwä can clarify an Islamic line on a specific 
issue. Political allegiance can also influence which guidance an individual 
'chooses'. Fatwä Committee appointments (and decisions) have a political 
basis. 48 
I 
Within some perspectives, 'conservative' interpretations of Islamic sources 
are prevalent at state level. There is dissatisfaction with speed and levels of 
'Islamicization'. Concern is expressed questioning whether 'Islamicization' is 
related to 'modernism' or 'conservatism' within different Malaysian frameworks. 
Identifying Islamic factors can be associated with wider frames of reference, 
beyond Malaysia. External hifluences on interpretation can impact at different 
Malaysian levels - reinforcing existing patterns or creating new trends. The lines 
can be blurred between individuals projected as 'modern' within their own 
environment, but representing 'conservatism' within the Malaysian context. 49 
'Conservatism' can also represent adat, as projected in the disputes between 
Kuam Tua and Kaum Muda. Confrontation of traditional or conservative Islamic 
interpretations was a key factor for early A. B. I M developments. The "negative" 
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reaction of conservative `ulamä ", confronted by A. B. I. M. students "with long-hair 
and bell-bottomed jeans"" 50 in the early 1970s, represented the impact of new 
approaches towards Islamic interpretations of primary sources in 'flexible` areas. 
A. B. I. M. sought to break an interpretative "monopoly" - through making A. B. I. M 
id jtihW and analyses of Islam in Malaysia, without consulting the 'traditional' or 
'conservative" ulama-': 
"In Malaysia since independence, the religious scholar, in order to get 
legitimacy in terms of the authority, they have to go to al-Azhar. Then 
coming back they become the great `älim, even though they only 
understand things thüre, and they do not understand the reality - and 
people refer to them and ask for all sorts of fatwä, which they [the 
`ulamafl don't learn or they forget ... 
"... Now with the coming of A. B. LM- led by Anwar Ibrahim - secular, 
educated, young students - persons like me and others who don't have any 
formal religious background - of course, we have problems with the al- 
Azhari. They don't like [us]. They will ask: 
'You talk about Islam, where do you study? [laughter] Any formal 
religious education? ' 
'°I say: 
'None! But I learn through experience and mingling with my 
friends, they are knowledgeable. "' 51 
Ahmad Azam continues to utilise his understanding of i tihäd within 
contemporary contexts, reflecting creativity and new approaches towards 
interpretation within an urban Malaysian Islamic environment. Not only does this 
conflict with adat in some areas, but also with 'conservative' `ulama '- who 
interpret this as an attack upon their training, reputation, and status. Ahmad 
Azam believes his understanding of icLtihäd is a response to contemporary 
t 
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pressures within Malaysia's modernising environment - without contradicting 
'core-beliefs' and principles: 
"I think the environment forces us to be like that. Not because we are 
going to compromise our [Islamic] principles. No, the principles are still 
maintained, but we have to be creative on how to implement it. 
"I think most of the way we think, we used to refer to the earlier 
generation of `ulama'. And somehow - because of political stagnation, 
political problems - we have not produced great `ulam, ýi' in the modem 
century yet ... 
"This is the problem. People aren't creative any more, people are scared 
to perform i jtihäd, because the environment does not encourage such 
thinking. " 52 
t 
The discouragement of 'creative thinking` may even be reflected within 
A. B. LM. 's own environment, through parameters and restraints of interpretation. 
Razali Nawawi emphasised methodological constraints in the undertaking of 
i jtihäd - which have a familiar Islamic theoretical basis: 
"To me, everybody is free to exercise itihäd within the idjtihäd 
methodology. You are free to have itihäd but - of course - you must 
have your own methodology like the Muslim jurists of the past. They 
exercised i tihäd and they set up idjtihäd methodology -filch or legalistic 
methodology. Because of that legalistic methodology, they differ between 
different schools. 
"But they are free ... 
if you are going to criticise, don't criticise their 
opinion, criticise their methodology. If methodology is wrong, then your 
opinion is wrong. But if your methodology is right, you expect your 
opinion based upon your methodology that you are right. 
"So everybody is free to exercise iLtihäd, but they must have good 
methodology. Not to just show opinions without an academic basis ... 
" ... 
Of course, if I was to issue fatwä or certain legal decisions, this whole 
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question of 'what is the basis of my opinion? ' [arises]. And after [all] 
people will not accept my opinion [if its basis is unsound]. 
" ... I 
issue an opinion to solve a problem of that time ... 
" s3 
This would indicate that - within some sectors of A. B. I. M- 'conservative' 
interpretative values are respected. References tofikh, an 'academic basis' for an 
opinion, and an emphasis on methodology have parallels in 'conventional' 
interpretative frameworks. It would suggest that 'formal religious education" still 
had value, within' modernising' contexts. Those interpreters concentrating on the 
methodology, rather than the content, of the opinion have been criticised by some 
'modernisers' in Malaysia. 
I 
Ahmad Awang's consultative `ulamä' N. G. O. provides unofficial advisory 
'opinions' formulated through ting tangs: 5 
" 
... we are not talking much about 
idjtihäd but we do it. Every time we 
are confronted with these new contemporary issues, then people want to 
go back to the Islamic teaching: we go to the books, to the fikh, 
jurisprudence books. We have the principles there, but how to make it 
[them] applicable to this contemporary issue? 
"We are always getting together, and we have a ting tang to discuss all 
this ... two or three persons getting 
together, to discuss things ... this sort 
of issue, we as religious, knowledgeable people we know more about the 
principles of Islamic teaching, Islamic rulings - all these things - but how 
to make these things - with the realities. 
"Those people who are expert in the present, separate system, we consult 
and only then can we suggest this formula that we can practice and 
implement. So then, in our Association, not necessarily those who are 
expert and religious - who do religious studies only - 
but those who are 
well-versed in economic studies, social studies, and medical studies ... 
" 
55 
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Whilst concerned with methodology, this represents an approach towards Islamic 
interpretation which is pro-active and pre-emptive, although limited in terms of 
policy-formation rather than implementation. The results of consultations and 
dialogue may be published, or go forward to parliament or government, but not 
necessary be introduced as policy. The extent to which this approach influences 
Islamic 'ethics' may be in the long-term, through formulation of Islamic 
approaches to issues of concern. 
Such ting tangs can influence the Islamicization of federal legal processes. 
Malaysian law has an Islamic component for its Muslim citizens, largely within 
t 
the field of personal law. However, other 'Islamic values' have been introduced, 
because they also represent concepts generally not in conflict with other ethnic- 
religious interests. This represents value-systems that are shared between 
communities. Wide-scale federal Islamicization could be met with resistance 
(depending upon its interpretation) from Muslim and non-Muslim interests, 
perhaps fearing 'fundamentalist' law. On a state level, administrations have 
limited influence in matters of personal law. This is reflected in Kelantan, where 
the Parti P. A. S. local administration's attempts to introduce their interpretation 
of Islamic law (on Muslim and non-Muslims) has met with federal and local 
resistance. 
Within federal law, idatihäd has provided reference points for amending 
existing legislation, and responding to new situations in law. Understanding 
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Islamic interpretative processes is an integral component within the Malaysian 
legal system. All legal personnel, and Islamic law scholars, attend training on 
Malaysian Islamic procedure if they wish to practice within the Syariah Court. 
The Malaysian law system reflects a pre-Independence basis in English Common 
Law, with limited recourse to 'Islamic' personal law: 
"In law, the main problem was when the English came here they 
introduced English Common Law, brushed aside Islamic Law, the 
Syariah Court was put at the bottom of the list. Now we are slowly trying 
to pull up the Syariah Court on an equal footing ... 
"... For all matters relating to Muslim Law, when all parties are Muslims, 
they have to go to the Syariah Court. And our Constitution reminds us 
that if a case is presented in the Syariah Court, the civil courts have no 
jurisdiction. 
f 
"... the Syariah Court has a very small criminal jurisdiction. We don't 
deal with hudtüd cases. So, if you know criminal law and family law, we 
are dealing mainly with taz`ir cases, which is a special law regarding 
drinking. S6 A Muslim cannot drink alcohol. If he is found to be drinking 
it in public, he can be charged. If he does not attend the mosque on 
Fridays, he can be charged ... 
But normally criminal cases are dealt with 
in civil courts. X57 
The emphasis, from this perspective, has been on creating a legal framework for 
Islamic decision-making, and in expanding Islamic zones of legal reference 
within the Malaysian context. This goes beyond the sphere of personal law, such 
as cases involving marriage, divorce, and child-custody. Attempts are also made, 
institutionally, to apply 'Islamic values' within the civil courts through increased 
interaction between Islamic and non-Islamic legal spheres. Non-Islamic courts 
had become 'more Islamically inclined': 
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"We are trying to bring the judges of the Syariah Court into the High 
Court. Previously they were in separate worlds. Now we arrange 
meetings, so they are talking together. 
"And the civil court judges are very receptive, in fact ... we are going to have a course for Supreme Court judges on Islamic banking, because they 
have to deal with cases, so they are willing to learn. This is quite different 
to the attitude in the past, in the past they just ignored them. "" 
Adjustment of the Malaysian legal system, with reference to the Syariah Court, 
was interpreted as 'itihäd in action': 
"We are not talking about itihäd, but how to put it into action ... 
" 
... 
What we say in the modem times, it is very difficult to get a judge 
who is a mu tahid, and we have to accept his decision. He is not a 
mu tahid, but in his judgment he may give reasons for it. 
"Before we accept his decision, we must know why. It was different with 
judges in the past, who were really experts. They give their opinion 
bountifully. So this is how we have developed itihäd, although we say 
we should publish the reports. " 59 
Methodology has importance within Islamic legal interpretation. The extent to 
which adat is accounted for within this framework is open to discussion. b0 The 
increased role of the Syariah Court may diminish local Islamic authorities' 
influence, eroding traditional interpretations and authority frameworks. The 
Syariah Court becomes a tool through which specific Islamic interpretations are 
emphasised, to the detriment of others. This could lead to greater a Islamic 
cohesion in the Malaysian Federation, but could also stifle the 'creative' decision- 
making processes. The Islamicization of law in Malaysia is selective, in the 
absence of hudüd punishment. This had led to criticism by platforms seeking a 
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broader Islamic legal framework, who believe that Shari 'a must be extended 
towards other legal areas in Malaysia. The current programme of Islamicization 
is seen by some critics as tokenistic and limited. 
However, other sectors are reluctant to introduce rapid changes or 
innovations within legal and other Islamic frameworks: 
" 
... these people really are too scared to open new doors, to make a new 
innovation. Even worse, to make itihäd. Especially when they know 
that their counterparts in other countries don't do it. They are scared by 
themselves, maybe others cannot accept it, so 'I am scared to do the same 
step'. This is what happened in the traditional circle. " 61 
t 
This fear is represented in dialogues about Islamic interpretations. The 
motivation behind the fear could be a belief in the Divine Punishment that would 
result from incorrect interpretation; it could represent concerns over lost status 
and power in existing interpretative frameworks; it might indicate a narrow 
world-view or limited Islamic education. Different decision-making priorities 
and motivations exist. Adat. education, environment, and/or belief influence 
interpretation motives. 62 
One critical analysis was that various 'Islamic agendas' in Malaysia were 
largely impractical, except in their function as: 
... vote-catchers with 
bumiputera in kampungs. i63 11 
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This represents a view that Islamicization is simply 'lip-service' to ideals, with no 
benefit for the majority of Muslims in Malaysia. Within kampungs, adat is 
paramount. Therefore, implementing interpretations focused away from tradition 
is problematic. 
Another analysis, from 'D. K. ', states that the U. M. N. O. government 
infrastructure is corrupt, and Islam is manipulated as a political tool by all 
parties. 64 In terms of 'Islamicization', this critical thesis suggests that, at rural 
level, there has been little improvement in the quality of life: poor people were 
simply getting poorer. Islamicization was having no positive impact. 65 D. K. 
believed that this increasing poverty was caused by federal and state 
organisational detachment from the practicalities of everyday life. Islamicization 
programmes do not influence the Muslim majority, although Islamic practices are 
important to them individually. Mahathir Mohamad's Wawasan 2020 lacks 
feasibility and is un-Islamic - according to D. K. - because it is interpreted as 
promoting a'get rich quick` mentality at the expense of the majority-population. 
The desire to secure positions of status and authority resulted in reluctance to 
challenge the 'corrupt' Malaysian system. 66 
Whilst Malaysia's Islamic nature and 'superiority' are promoted, according 
to D. K. national deficiencies are ignored or not confronted. Action taken in the 
name of Islam represented hypocrisy: for example, the Malaysian government 
statements on global poverty are publicised - whilst there is a failure to observe 
or act on similar situations within Malaysia. D. K. believed that those 'qualified' 
i 
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to challenge were within the pockets of government - any challenge resulting in 
exclusion from positions of authority. The conclusion to D. K. 's analysis was that 
the next war in Malaysia would be between different Malay Muslim factions - if 
economic differentials between rich and poor intensify. 67 
Concepts surrounding Islamic decision-making have significant impact upon 
Malaysian society. The different models of interpretation may be irreconcilable. 
State and federal Islamic policies may appeal only to an influential, educated 
minority within Malaysian society. They can be separate from, and may not 
impact upon, individual adat-centred belief structures. The political implication 
of current policy may have a greater impact on the majority than the actual 
decisions made, especially if the irreconcilable agendas lead to conflict, social 
unrest, or economic damage. Vigorous industrialising policies have been 
criticised for ignoring basic Islamic values and public interest, damaging 
Malaysian Muslim society. 'Islamic gloss' upon these industrialising 'advances' 
is interpreted by critics as detrimental to Islam, and to Malay values. 
The 'divide' between different Malaysian classes and economic groups has 
significance within Islamic decision-making contexts. Re-evaluation of 
traditional approaches towards economic transactions, and of stereotypical 
assessments of other ethnic and religious communities, have been made by some 
entrepreneurs. 68 Emphasis was also made on how Islamic interpretations can 
accommodate the diverse environments and situations encountered within 
Malaysia, including economic differences, and that this was a strength. Adat 
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represented flexibility and fortitude. 69 
The dynamics between different Malaysian Islamic interpretative 'models' are 
not always reflected legislatively, or in national Islamic interpretative authorities. 
The extent to which adat is tolerated is linked to how it impinges upon authority 
activities. Priorities at national level are in establishing 'Islamic frameworks', and 
adapting Islamic requirements within a modernising, industrialising multi-faith 
society. 
One example offers insight into what was seen as reconciling 'Islamic 
requirements' with Malay Muslim society needs, utilising new technology and , 
production methods, without damaging 'Islamic values': this is the mechanised 
mass-production of haläl-labelled meat products. The Malaysian haläl label was 
described as representing 'Islam in action'. Mechanised mass-production was not 
an issue in Kur'än and Sunna, because: 
" 
... 
if you wanted to slaughter a chicken, you slaughtered your own ... 
" ... We came to the resolution on this 
issue, we had to set a new 
methodology. But you see, [during] this time of mud tahid ... they usually 
say that before we do i jtihäd we must have the source for this. There 
must be ahadith to indicate this, to make it [alright] or not. This is the 
methodology. 
"We cannot just all of a sudden [implement it], because it is good or we 
approve it [because] according to our people's opinion it is good. It is not 
the methodology... 
"... So now when we come to this, we find that there is also hadlth to 
indicate that. If you cannot catch the bird, you can stone it, you can arrow 
it [sic], and then if it fell down, you can cut [slaughter] as soon as 
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possible. If the bird is dead, and you have the intention to slaughter by 
stone, so it is also accountable. 
"So now we find that the methodology is intention, intention is the 
necessity: intention to cut - even if it is not cut properly, you have 
intention and the blood flows out. But maybe not totally, because the way 
of cutting is not like cutting by knife. So intention, and the second one is 
blood, it must be flowing. The means you use is not specified: you can use 
stone, knife, rock - to make the blood flow out ... 
" ... Because in this era they have an itihid to say that you [intend to] 
stone one [bird], and come across two [birds], or the bird comes down 
with the intention, then you can pick [take it]. 
"We relate all this to the new itihäd, and we come to the conclusion 
because we have intention to cut the throat and the blood is flowed, even 
if it is not directly by hand but it is by the tool, by this machine, so we 
come to the conclusion that it is halal. "'° 
This example demonstrates how a concept is isolated from a hadith source, in 
order to apply it within a contemporary context. 7 By analogy, the intention to 
cut the chicken's throat and make blood flow through use of a stone, arrow, or 
knife can be applied to cutting its throat by machine. This is seen to justify such 
mass-production within Malaysia. The benefits of hygienic mass production of 
food fulfilled maslaha criteria. These halal requirements had to be met by 
multinational fast food restaurants which had established chains in Malaysia, such 
as McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chicken. 72 Malaysia also sought to bring an 
international standards' marque to their haläl food production, for export purposes 
in Islamic markets, as well as for food deemed 'halal' produced abroad for the 
Malaysian market. In its hadlth basis, use of analogy, and maslaha focus - this 
represents Islamic justification through itihäd methodology for mass-meat 
production. 73 It also promotes 'Islamic' concern on the part of the government, in 
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a 'non-controversial' area, impacting on daily life. 
Islamicization is promoted on a pro-active basis in Malaysia on certain 
issues. For example, within the domains of Personal Law and personal problems, 
a number of 'Islamic' mechanisms have been introduced through governmental 
and N. G. G. agencies designed to solve problems or pre-empt situations 
developing further. " The Prime Minister's Office also suggested i tihäd had 
been utilised to clarify and enhance legal Islamic divorce procedures in Malaysia. 
Existing Islamic interpretations were described as not specific enough for current 
social conditions in Malaysia - especially on the number of pronouncements of 
divorce required. There was concern that divorce was too easy and spontaneous 
(" ... as easy as sneezing. 
"): 
"You can divorce your wife but the way is not mentioned - now the 
mudtahid here, they put it in a very systematic way, especially for Shäfi`i 
- if you pronounce three [times], it is three; if you pronounce once, it falls 
once. Sometimes when wife and husband work together, they have their 
own burdens, their own responsibilities ... so maybe they cannot control 
their home, so they call one another - sometimes it comes out quick, three 
times. 
"So according to this S'häf1 school, it is pronounced three [times], there 
is no way to go back. And let the wife marry again, and divorce again, 
and get back to you. But of course there are other schools ... 
"Now people in this time, they face this problem quite a lot. So can 
people shift from this way to another. They have their reasons why. They 
don't want the people to play with this. It is a serious matter. 
"To make this divorce controlled by good management, so we [Prime 
Minister's Office] produce procedure. So either the taläk divorce is like 
your sneezing, but you have to register, and you have to say again in front 
of the officer - but if you convince the officer that you 
have mentioned all 
of this. 
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""... You cannot play with it, but you have to be given a way out ... We have good intention - but now some Muslim scholars are rethinking. So 
now you sneeze many times [! ] ... " 
75 
This represents an adaptation or 'rationalisation' of specific Islamic legal 
principles regarding taläk, in order to deal with what was described as a 
'prominent' social problem within Malaysian Muslim society. State-Federal 
bodies now control divorce, having clarified a methodology for pronouncements, 
within an area which was previously 'unclear' (according to the government). 
Uncertainties and confusion regarding interpretations had to be dealt with, in 
order to deal with this'social problem'. The government's work in this area could 
make 'Islamic processes' of divorce clearer, although may impinge upon other I 
Islamic decision-making frameworks, as divorce pronouncements have to be 
made to a government officer. 76 
This policy, applying'idjtihV, is one example of'Islamicization' that has had 
considerable impact upon Malaysian Muslim society. Other policies, with wide- 
implications in Malaysian society, are those linked to 'Islamic financial systems', 
including 'Islamic' banking, insurance, pawn-broking, and share-markets. These 
have priority status at federal level: 
". the government is pushing the introduction of Islamic values in all 
aspects of life, and they have been particularly successful in the economic 
and financial field. We now have [the] Islamic Bank - we've had [the] 
Islamic Bank for some years, but now even the non-Muslim banks have 
decided to introduce Islamic banking. " 
" ... 
So in all aspects of economic life we have tried to introduce the 
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Islamic principles ... We are also 
introducing it in law. " 77 
Elimination of riba represents a priority - at least rhetorically - amongst Islamic 
financial 'reforms'. Although finance is interpreted as the key to 'overall Islamic 
reform', critics suggest that the personal agendas of 'reformers' and the 'politics 
of self-interest' preclude any progress. 78 Islamic decision-making frameworks are 
influenced by the multi-ethnic, multi-religious components in Malaysia: this has 
resulted in Islamic systems operating in parallel with other finance systems - 
customers being able (theoretically) to select which system they want for their 
own finances. Multi-national 'conventional' banks in Malaysia operate Islamic 
counters - i. e. Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong Bank, and CitiBank - as well F 
as Malaysian-based banks including as Bank Bumiputera and Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad - the latter credited with pioneering riba-free banking systems 
(Skim Perbankan Tana Faedah). 74 Islamic bank counters' were cited as an 
example of itihäd: 
"... For me it is iLtihäd, but it is not new iLtihäd. Because it is written 
already by the old mu jtahid, by Shäfi`l, Hangft and those who have 
followed him. For me, it is not new. " 80 
"There is an existing i tihäd. We have already the idtihäd, and we are 
just implementing it: and the matter is the new ijtihäd for the very 
contemporary issue. "" 
The Islamic financial systems are interpreted as implementing existing Islamic 
principles, rather than creating new concepts. The mechanisms to put this 
"icLtihäd into place could require forms of Islamic decision-making - including 
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aspects of idjtihäd. Existing fikh or share `a principles, representing, hukm or 
other core understandings, are being implemented within financial spheres. 
Defining whether it is 'new' or'old' 'ijtihäd does not seem such an issue as the 
policy's implementation. 
Technical complications emerge within this i jtihäd implementation. This 
includes establishing Islamic criterion and defining terminologies. One problem 
was the issue of'haläl' investment, where interest was not involved. Within this 
area, attempts had been made by scholars (frequently 'western'-educated, and 
lacking 'Islamic' education), to re-interpret and re-define ribä. 
r 
"So some say that niba is not just interest, anything with interest is ribs. 
Ribä is: you take the money from someone or you give the money for 
someone, and then in return you double it, or you force him to pay an 
amount that is a great burden to pay, but now with business we tend to say 
it is nothing. 
"Because he invests the money, with the return of 30%, but he has to pay 
only 10% for the bank. Now he has got 20% extra to profit. So can we 
say this level of interest is interest? 
"It is just like the hire purchase: you buy a taxi with the hire purchase 
company, they charge you 6-$%. You buy the taxi, you've got the money 
from the taxi. So can we say [this is] the real interest i. e. ribal, because 
they try to reinterpret 'what is the meaning'? They say that 'interest must 
have a limit, to make a burden, exploit' ... " 
82 
Defining rzbj is an issue that continues to be discussed, by financial concerns and 
Islamic scholars. There is a pragmatic element to this, as customers are free to 
choose the financial deal that suits them: a deal with a reduced burden, that 
compares favourably with 'non-Islamic' equivalents, is likely to be successful. 
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Customers are unwilling to lose out financially because of Islamic 'restraints'. 
Therefore, any financial/Islamic authority decision has to have practical, financial 
advantages - as well as fulfilling Islamic principles. 
A decision also has to be practical and beneficial for the financiers. Islamic 
finance schemes have has been introduced for commercial reasons, because they 
are 'profitable'. Decision-makers have had to determine what is an 'acceptable' 
'Islamically-correct' burden for financiers and customers. For example, a 
mortgage rate of 10% was described as 'an acceptable burden`, within an urban 
property market where house-prices doubled every ten years. 
x 
"... Everything is not free. God created you in this world not free, you 
have to pray for Him, you have to pray five times a day. You have to 
follow His orders, He is not free for you... " 83 
There are other indications regarding the semantic nature of Islamic decision- 
making within financial spheres. Some suggest that, because riba is interpreted 
as prohibited in Islam, it has now simply been re-named as 'profits' within 
governmental'Islamically-reformed' legislation, whilst the riba-principle remains: 
"I was in the committee ... 
because there is strong demand from the 
Muslims to abolish nibä ... so we changed 
the word 'interest' to 'profits'. 
"For the Chinese, for the new Muslim, you get profits - whatever ... you 
can exclude profit under interest ... 
"If you want to interpret the word 'profit' to exclude the word ribä, then 
that is your interest [sic]. So the word 'profit' has a wider meaning than 
the word 'interest', but the reason that the word is amended is because the 
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word 'interest' is given narrow meaning. 
"... So that non-Muslim accept it, a Muslim also accepts it, and both ... accept it in Parliament. " 84 
In order for legislation, with an Islamic basis, to be passed through legislative 
mechanisms a degree of flexibility and compromise was required. Financial 
legislation can have implications for the entire Malaysian population, and it was 
necessary to incorporate different ethnic and religious interests into the decision- 
making process, in order to make legislation effective. Therefore, an individual 
(Muslim or non-Muslim) can interpret the Malaysian law in this area of 
legislation as referring to 'interest' or to 'profit'. 
F 
Islamic opposition-platforms do not support the Federal position on all 
aspects of Islamicizing Malaysian financial systems. Whilst not necessarily 
disagreeing on principle, or methodological aspects regarding Islamic 
interpretations, for political, ideological and/or 'Islamic' reasons some 
interpretative policies were rejected: 
"Most Malaysian Muslims accept the Islamic banking in Malaysia, 
because Islamic banking in Malaysia is totally based on Islamic principles 
... 
for example you are the rich people [sic], and you give me your capital, 
and when I have used that capital as a merchant, I get profit and divide it 
between you and I. That is a form of Islamic banking in Malaysia ... 
i85 
"As our Ustaz says, since our Islamic bank now, still it is under the 
influence of the National Bank. This National Bank still applies the riba 
system, so there is no freedom for Islamic bank to move as it should be. 
"But the Federal Bank is quite prejudiced towards [the] Islamic system, 
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so the image of Islamic Bank is not quite good in the face of the people, 
compared with the normal bank. So the Islamic Bank is not very popular 
with people ... 
"Actually, if there is freedom, and given the right way, I think the Islamic 
Bank can overcome [this situation], especially [if it has] the chance to 
give the right service to the people. "" 
Defining the 'right service' is an on-going concern within Malaysian Islamic 
frameworks. g' 
Implementation of new financially-associated technologies and responses to 
new economic situations - at global and local levels - mean that the situation is 
still under constant review, by government and N. G. O. bodies. This review 
includes regular conferences, and ting tang for `ulamä'. A recent question had 
been the study of Islamic banking 'profitability': 
"... because here we have Malaysian Islamic Banking, and it is very 
similar to the conventional banking system, and also they opened up what 
they called the Islamic banking system - the system is the same ... the 
bank will buy one house, and will sell the house to the customer, and he 
will make profit - say 10% or 5% or more ... 
"We find that the Islamic banking system is getting more profit, compared 
to the other conventional banks ... once the customer realises 
this, he says 
'what? ', because in fact, the Islamic banking system is to remedy the 
problem of this interest... " 88 
Islamic finance systems require pragmatic decision-making, utilising Islamic 
sources and balancing these with public utility. 89 Within global contexts, there 
is a theoretical requirement to reconcile Islamic financial interaction with 'un- 
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Islamic' finance systems, a factor the Malaysian government has to balance with 
its desire for economic progress towards 2020. 
Medically-related issues represent other subject-areas in which i tihäd is 
seen as necessary in Malaysia. Dialogues between `ulamä ' and medical 
authorities represent the complexities of such Islamic interpretations. 
Technologically-aware, urban-centred and educated Muslims, in particular, seek 
Islamic opinions and responses to medical issues such as I. V. F. 9° Again, within 
the Malaysian context, the concerns of all population-sectors have to be 
considered. Medical issues raise questions of Islamic ethics, with implications 
beyond the confines of the surgery, influencing legal-interpretations and family 
structures. 
Within Malaysia, because of common Islamic principles, there are parallels 
with dialogues in other Islamic environments regarding I. V. F.: 
" 
... 
if in vitro fertilisation is between husband and wife, who are legally 
married, in principle we can accept it. On one condition, because Islam is 
very particular on guarantees that it is not mis-used, because from the 
husband is taken the sperm and from the wife is the ovum, make sure this 
is definitely from the husband and the wife. 
"Then we have at least two witnesses, and the doctor - we must have 
confidence that he is really doing the job, that he is responsible, not only 
to his patient or to his customer, but also responsible to the human being, 
to the religion. "91 
The Muslim doctor has a number of factors to consider here, but there are also 
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implications for non-Muslim doctors in Malaysia, treating Muslim patients. At 
this stage, the question is an ethical one, rather than a need to follow related 
legislation. A non-Muslim could not be punished under Syariah law in Malaysia 
on this issue, should legislation be introduced. Any legislation on this area would 
have to be introduced into national law, covering the interests of all Malaysians. 
'After-death fertilisation' is also an issue for decision-makers: 
"If the sperm taken from the husband and then is kept in the bank - the 
fridge - for one year. After one year, the husband dies. Then after six 
months the wife says 'yes ... now I want a baby, my husband's sperm is 
now in the bank'. 
" ... 
in Islam we don't accept, because we have a ruling there. If a husband 
and wife, either by dying or by divorcing, then the embryo, the baby, [is] 
no more legal [sic]. So we are not against [the technology], but only how 
you implement it. "" 
If there had been a pre-death contract, it was still considered unlikely that after- 
death fertilisation would be Islamically acceptable: 
"Even if they had a contract, they must look to the period in which the 
death [occurred], whether it is within ninety days [after the death] ... Islam 
says that the death of the husband, if it [pregnancy, proof of conception] 
is within ninety days, it is still within the possibilities [of acceptability] 
"Islam makes the three months, the time which is to be waited [sic], to 
make sure the woman's possibility of pregnancy is clear. If he dies this 
month, maybe she already carries a baby - that's why it happens normally 
after the death of the husband, six months, because the three months [the 
wife is] is already carrying the baby. So after three months, the practice 
[I. V. F. ] can be done to some degree... " 93 
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There seems an inherent contradiction within this statement, representing a 
formulative phase of opinion-making. The synthesis of these opinions is that, 
because there is a three-month period required by a widow prior to any re- 
marriage, that was the waiting period required prior to I. V. F. However, as the 
sperm 'belongs' to her husband, then in practical terms there would be no 
difference whether I. V. F. was applied within this three-month period or not - as 
long as its origins were assured. 94 Several commentators suggested that 
Malaysians (Muslim and non-Muslim) were 'very conservative' on matters such 
as I. V. F. 9s 
The Islamicization agenda includes formulation of Islamic responses to 
r 
issues connected with: drug-abuse, sexual-violence, child-abuse, and HIV- 
victims. 96 The current emphases are on political frameworks; the position of 
'Islamist' platforms including A. B. LM., Parti P. A. S , and 
Dar ulArqam, and their 
'Islamic' responses to adat. These are frequently discussed in relation to issues 
of Malaysian, Malay, and Muslim identities. The younger generation identified 
itself first as 'Malaysians', according to a non-Muslim commentator, whilst not 
forgetting racial or ethnic origins. Identification with difference was not seen as 
negative, when reference was also made to the collective identity: 
"Because, like it or not, we have been put together by history to stay here 
together, and if we don't think of the larger identity and the interests of 
that larger identity, then there could be a lot of problems. But then that 
does not mean that we get everybody to think one way in uniformity, 
which can be very dangerous. 
"Not just the question of singing the national anthem - but some people 
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think that unity can only be achieved if there is one voice, one of 
everything. If there is complete uniformity, then everybody must be on the 
same wavelength, which is frightening. " 97 
This was reiterated by a Malay Muslim, who suggested Malaysians were by 
nature 'moderate' (however that might be defined), because of historical, cultural 
and linguistic interaction, linked to Malaysia's place on trade routes. 98 
At kampung level, apenghulu provided his understanding of `Malay` identity: 
" 
... 
first you must convert to Muslim [belief], second you must speak in 
Malay, third you must follow Malay custom. If you do these three, then 
you are Malay, whether before you are Indian or Chinese ... 
"You too [gesturing to the author] can be Malay, if you convert to 
Muslim, speak Malay, and follow Malay custom. " 99 
This was acknowledged by the penghulu to be a theoretical construction, rather 
than the practical situation. Conversion from Islam to another religion was an 
(occasional) issue at grass-roots level: 
"All non-Malays, you convert to Muslim, you are accepted. You are 
among our brothers, you are Muslim. 
"The problem is Malay want to change their religion, wants to marry 
Chinese, he want to be a Buddha [sic, Buddhist] - this is a big problem. 
But among the Chinese and Indian, when the Chinese is still Buddhist and 
the Indian is Hindu. There is no problem, they can mix together. 
"But with the Malay, that is a big problem. When Malays want to change 
their religion, it is the big issue in Malaysia. " 100 
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There was no available data on such conversions within Malaysia. This view 
regarding converts reflects the Kur'n and other Islamic sources. Inter-marriage 
within Malaysian society is seen as more acceptable to Malay Muslims if a non- 
Muslim converts to Islam, but not vice versa. 
The concept of Malaysian moderation was reiterated in several interviews. 
A. B. I. M. members sought to represent themselves as the Islamic 'middle ground'. 
A. B. I. M. is not a political party. Members may support U. M. N. O. or Parti P. A. S., 
although social, cultural, and religious pressures - at local and national levels - 
can restrict this flexibility. That causes pressures on both sides of the equation: 
r 
" 
... 
We are a non-political organisation, but we have concern over the 
counselling of these political parties, so we always keep our 
views/opinions to the government party, the ruling party, and the 
opposition party. 
"But since part of our opinion may be sometimes in conformity with the 
views of the opposition party, so then sometimes the government says: 
'you belong to the opposition party', but actually we do not belong to any 
political party ... 
"lo' 
The A. B. IM hierarchy has regular sh u-ra in order to determine the approach to 
issues - especially whether to support U. M. N. O., Parti P. A. S., or non-aligned 
platforms. An example of this was on the government suppression of Dar ul 
Arqam: 
... should we support 
the government with their effort to break Arqam? 11 
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Yes, for sure. " 102 
Dar ul Arqam represented a contentious 'Islamic' value system to A. B. LM., 
especially in forms of adat, Sinfluences, and messianic invocations. On this 
issue, fieldwork indicated that the U. M. N. O. government was generally supported 
by A. B. I. M. and Parti P. A. S. 103 
It was widely felt that the most difficult issue A. B. I. M. membership has faced 
to date was the 'defection' of co-founder Anwar Ibrahim to U. M. N. O. in 1982. 
A typical question at this time was: 
i 
"Should we [A. B. I. M. membership] support U. M. N. O., or together with 
the masses who are ignorant to criticise him? Or should we send Anwar 
from A. B. I. M. 
, what shall we do? ""' 
It required more than a single sh urä for A. B. I. M. to solve this problem: 
"It cost us [A. B. I. M. ] ten years implementing this decision; there's a lot of 
problem in A. B. I. M.: 
"Some say: 'We disagree with the shn-r, 4: we back out, we join Parti 
P. A. S. !' 
"Some say: 'We must take over the leadership: throw away the 
leadership! ' 
"Some say: 'We must maintain and support Anwar! ' 
"Some say: 'No'. 
"There were a lot of problems. 
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"But after ten years, we realised our decision was right, just to let him go 
and support him ... for the sake of the greater maslaha in the 'ummah, we 
sacrificed the smaller one. We did that. It took us ten years. Only now are 
things back to normal. 
"Now we have to fight, we have to argue with them, people try to 
sabotage, people try to take over the leadership - but we fought back, and 
now all of them realise that the id tihäd was right. 
"By sending Anwar into U. M. N. O., it is good for Islam and for Malaysia: 
because Anwar portrays a liberal Muslim, a moderate Muslim, a person 
who is not going to provide injustices for anybody. A person who can 
provide moderate views, who is acceptable by everybody ... 
"When Anwar joined U. M. N. O., all the Islamic movements said that we 
set-out things in not the right way [sic], the right way is to fight the 
government, fight theähiliyya, and make Islam [prevail] over the rivals 
ofähiliyya. " '05 
This statement additionally demonstrates the application of 'itihäd within an 
organisational context - being the acceptance and support of Anwar Ibrahim. 
Resistance to Anwar Ibrahini's 'defection' probably would not have altered his 
decision. One critic, not associated with organisational political processes or 
membership, believe that after Anwar Ibrahim joined the U. M. N. O. 
administration, A. B. I. M. totally lost its emphasis. 'ob 
Contemporary A. B. I. M. was described, by one source, as centred around 
'ideals', without tackling. 'practicalities'. A. B. 1.. M academics patronised authorities 
to acquire power, jobs, and influence - whilst sacrificing objectivity. 
Governmental and academic research on Islamic issues and sciences is 
undertaken from this non-critical perspective. Those whom are deemed "too 
critical" are believed to "end up refrigerated. " Research promoted by non- 
I 
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governmental organisations such as A. B. I. M. was similarly described as providing 
a distorted picture. `o' 
Confusion within A. B. I M was seen as detrimental by insiders, which 
dissuaded younger people joining. Now, A. B. I. M. promotes itself as in a position 
of recovery: 
" ... there are many groups trying to topple A. B. I. M., but we are very 
strong, we are content with our position and our view and now people are 
coming back to the fold ... so we accept that, because people make 
mistakes. " ' 08 
A. B. I. M. makes certain demands upon members, although some of the'Islamic' 
requirements were more difficult than paying subscriptions: 
"... We have 50,000 members ... and countless supporters. When you join 
A. B. I M. 
, you must 
have `usrah; this is where we transform them [new 
members] in terms of knowledge and understanding of Islam - and then 
you have to pay one percent of your salary every month to support the 
movement. 
"With regard to paying this one percent, everybody can do it, but in regard 
to every week attending this 'usrah - trying to understand, and seeking 
dawa', and trying to memorise the Kur'än - not many people are willing 
to do it...,, 
" 
... 
But if you want to hold leadership position, you must choose either 
one [i. e. choose a political party or join A. B. I. M exclusively] ... 
if not, 
they [prospective leaders] will use A. B. I. M. for their political endeavours. 
"This has been our idatihäd, this has been our strength. Our idjtihäd of a 
previous generation, become a member, you can become [have] three or 
four membership, but leadership [of A. B. I. M]- only one [membership]. 
Whether A. B. I. M, or any other group you want to be [a member of]. 
That's it, there's no two ways about it. That's why Anwar joined 
U. M. N. O., he said 'I want to become leader of U. M. N. O. ' so you resign 
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from your presidency - he just become an ordinary member of 
A. B. I. M. º1109 
Membership of A. B. I. M. offers local and national social-networking possibilities 
for members, input into the 'decision-making' processes, and access to a 
modernising interpretation of Islam. Creating a membership structure represents 
an important 'idftihäd for leaders, in order that policies can have a stable basis. 
110 
There have been criticisms that A. B. I. M. has an urban-emphasis, but its 
agencies are becoming more active at 'grass-roots' level. In some regions, 
A. B. I M is active in protecting small, adat-centred, rural Malay communities 
against specific encroaching industrialisation seen as 'oppressive' and 'un-Islamic'. 
For example, in Sungei Petani, Kedah, community activists and A. B. I. M. 
representatives are active amongst kampung communities, campaigning against 
industrial pollution, and a proposed 'Disney-style' theme park within a rural area. 
The objections were not against industrialisation per se, but in industrialisation 
keeping with the local environment and population, with consultation at every 
stage. There were protests against the imposition of industrialisation without 
consultation or consideration of all the factors, which was seen to illustrate 'the 
rural-urban divide', and a 'get-rich quick' mentality. The industrialisation 
decision-making process was seen to lack an'Islamic' basis in keeping with Malay 
Muslim value systems, which have kampung life as a reference point. The 
A. B. I. M. response was described by one worker as illustrating "itihäd in action" 
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"For instance, these people who are living here [Mirbok, a kampung near 
Sungei Petani], most of them are in favour of so-called development, but 
they want development of their own kind. They have tried this experience 
of battling against development, that was towards their own goals ... their 
own aspirations. 
"That experience has hardened themselves to really talk to the 
government and say: 'This time, whatever so called development you are 
going to introduce, it should be consulted to us. ' There must be a 
continuous dialogue. It does not matter that it will take time, but that it 
most crucial, that you should ask them. " 111 
'Islamic' values, and decision-making processes, were being applied in the public 
interest on behalf of the rural minority in Mirbok, against interests seeking 
industrialisation without consideration of the many implications for traditional 
Malay kampungs. 12 A. B. I M. promotes Islamicization, whilst protecting many 
aspects of traditional values: 
"Our community work is aimed at ... 
[different] levels: one is what we 
call an integrated level, where once we do the community work, it should 
integrate the whole [rhythm] of the community life. 
"I mean, you talk about health, education, economy, youth development - 
you talk about the environment, it has to be in a wholesome way, a 
holistic way ... 
"... Everybody will be in a group, and they will be talking about their 
village. And the children will be talking about their aspect, and the 
womenfolk will give their own input, everyone starts planning things - so 
it is a multi-level thing. So nobody is excluded. So we start from children 
to youth to adults. Everyone: farmers, fishermen, in respect of whatever 
he does or she does. "1 3 
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This micro-level construction of Islamic rural-development models sought to test 
and develop A. B. LM. Malay-Islamic decision-making principles, which might be 
extended to national macro-levels, with governmental involvement and input 
adapting to each community's requirements. ' 4 
A. B. L M. seeks to challenge traditional attitudes towards authority, increasing 
rural 'activism' and levels of dialogue. This meant informing individuals about 
their rights, and how decision-making processes function, in order to avoid total 
dependence on governmental agencies or traditional authorities: 
"We don't want them to be trapped in that small world, they don't 
understand why this is happening to them. We've got a problem now, 
prices of food are on the increase ... people 
don't understand. 
"They [people in rural environments] say that the country is doing wrong 
and they say inflation is such and such, and they say: 'Why am I suffering, 
why do I have to pay more? ' So they couldn't understand, and when you 
can't understand things you can't see [there are problems]. ""' 
One of the policies was reconciling elements of 'modernism' with Malay 
Muslim adat principles (including religious factors). The traditional aspects 
promoted include approaches towards health-issues. There is a strong Malay 
rural-tradition for homeopathic medicines and traditional care, centred around 
rurally-produced products. 16 A. B. I. M. endorses women advocates on health 
issues, and emphasises values of 'traditional' medical care (in conjunction with 
'modern' medicine): one example is the promotion of the bidan, 
117 who were 
suffering discrimination from local health-care administrations. This represented 
a clash between 'modern' and 'traditional' values, when medical practitioners 
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trained exclusively in 'modern' medicine were denying that bidan could have a 
useful role in contemporary Malay society. 
Rural activists believe that there is a lack of awareness and knowledge 
amongst urban-based decision-makers on kampung-issues, and that the creation 
of an'Islamic environment' is compatible with rural-life. Considerable effort is 
made to promote Islamicization within a modernising framework, with concern 
about technological development and 'progress'. Less attention has been paid to 
'modernising progress' in Islamic rural environments: 
" 
... The policy makers, they think they know better. [They say] 'Rural 
people are supposed to know, but actually they don't. ' And I have been 
fighting this. There must be a stop of this encroachment, of urban to 
rural. It's devastating. 
"You have a situation where Malaysia has been able to preserve the rural 
areas, it can be productive, it can be sustainable, and it is really difficult 
to talk to them about these kinds of things, because they will see a land 
like this, [and the policy makers will say] it's not productive. " 18 
This grass-roots activism within rural Malaysia may be altruistic by nature, 
although it also has immeasurable value in terms of political, social, economic, 
and/or Islamic influence. 19 There are parallels with environmental activism 
elsewhere - albeit here with an Islamic focus. The degree of political influence 
such activities create, for Islamic platforms such as A. B. I. M, is difficult to 
quantify. 120 
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'Divisions' within decision-making processes occur not only between rural 
and urban environments, but between and within state and federal government. 
The relationship between U. M. N. O. and Parti P. A. S. in Kelantan has been 
sensitive: in 1995, Kelantan was the only state with a Parti P. A. S. 
administration. '' ' Kelantan's chief minister is Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat, who has a 
reputation in Kelantan (and from Parti P. A. S. supporters elsewhere in the 
Federation) as a Muslim scholar with a 'pragmatic' interpretation of Islam, 
currently centred around implementing hudi d laws in the state. 122 This has been 
criticised by U. M. N. O., who define Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat's interpretation as 'Parti 
P. A. S. hud& rather than hud id per se. Parti P. A. S. claims to seek alliance and 
consultation with all parties that accept Islam as dm - whilst seeking good 
f 
relations with non-Muslim interests. 123 Critics claim Parti P. A. S. represents a 
high level of political rhetoric, unable to bring ideals into action. However, 
Federal law prevents wide-scale state implementation of hudüd in Kelantan. 
The Parti P. A. S. construction of a 'model' 'modern' Islamic decision-making 
environment includes utilising and referring to 'itihäd. ' The Parti P. A. S. 
approach to Islamic decision-making is reflected in the their 'official' definition 
of itihäd, which follows a familiar methodology: 
"Firstly we do itihäd in the form ofamdat, in the form of one group 
of `ulamj' make a decision to a new thing. If something happened, 
currently they sit together and discuss [it]. 
"Another method of idUtihäd in Kelantan, our `ulama-' here sit together 
and study the opinions of Muslim madlihab, like Hanäf Mälikl, Hanball, 
Shäfi`l. We try to find the best opinion among them. That is the scope of 
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iLtihäd in Kelantan. In order not to go against Islam. "' 24 
Consensus after `ulamT discussion is integral to the Parti P. A. S. approach, 
iditihäd being undertaken by scholars trained in Islamic sciences. The input of 
other 'experts' does not form part of the process. The Parti P. A. S. agenda focuses 
around a desire to implement hudld in Kelantan. This controversial demand has 
been met by resistance. Many people - especially non-Muslims in Kelantan - are 
uncertain what hud rid really means, or whether it would apply to them. The 
extent to which this represents a specific interpretation of hudüd has been a 
subject of fierce debate between U. M. N. O. and Parti P. A. S.: 
... according to `ulama' 
jurists - Muslim jurists - there are two opinions it 
about this. One, they say hudüd also implement [sic] to non-Muslim. 
Not only the Muslim. 
"But they had another opinion: hudi d only for Muslims. Because we try 
to look, we select the hudrld, do not implement on the non-Muslim, 
because we try to look at the environment in Malaysia, there are sensitive 
issues, if we try to impose certain laws on non-Muslims. 
"Because there is room for the selection of opinions: the selection of 
opinions is based on maslaha - public interest - in order to protect our 
agenda ... 
if we impose 
hudtid law on non-Muslims, maybe something 
will happen. 
"So in order to protect the society in Malaysia, also to protect the religion, 
we will not impose hudld law on non-believers ... 
" 125 
Critics question the extent to which such statements allay the fears of non- 
Muslims in Kelantan, as well as Muslims who are uneasy about 'hudrid (which 
represented several different concept to various interviewees). 
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At this stage, the extent to which hudüd has been implemented is limited: 
"A draft hudi7d law has been passed by the Kelantan state assembly in 
respect of five crimes: Brigandage, Theft, zmä (Adultery and Fornication), 
kädäf (False accusation of zma-) and Consuming and dealing with 
alcoholic drinks. The bill has been remitted to the Federal government 
for approval by Dewan Rakyat, the Malaysian parliament. Criminal law 
is a federal subject under the Constitution. " 126 
Although this draft hud rid law has been passed by Kelantan's state assembly, it 
has not received federal approval or passed through Dewan Rakyat: as an 
extension of constitutional state powers, the Bill threatens decentralisation from 
Federal control and would set a precedent for other states, as well as causing other 
difficulties within the Federation. '27 
The state assembly has been able to undertake 'Islamic' decision-making on 
those areas which fall constitutionally under their remit. A prime example of the 
Parti P. A. S. administration's approach is related to alcohol consumption, '28 and 
whether taxation accrued from its sale is haräm money coming from an 'illicit' 
source: 
"This kind of tax, according to this country, this state, we take the tax of 
liquor because there are two opinions among the Muslim jurists. For 
example HanäfIe and Hanäbilite [madhhab]. They promise to Muslim 
states to take this liquor, so why the other jurists don't allow this kind of 
thing? 
"So we select this opinion, Hanäbilite and Hanäf because we have to 
look after them -non-Muslim - so how can we get money to support 
them? ... 
" 
I 
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" ... 
This does not mean that we originally wanted to take tax from those 
who sell liquor, but in order to support them, to look after them. So we 
need money to give facilities to them. Or we can use that money to build 
a road, to build a public toilet - and so on. So we can take [the tax]. 
"This is one example of practical itihäd in Kelantan. We have to 
practice itihäd, but in a scope, that is we try to select the opinion from 
the madhhab, so we select the better one, we select the easier one. 
"Because we understand that we are in hostage [sic], in the 
implementation of Islam, so maybe next time we move to another 
stage. " 29 
This example was presented as a pragmatic approach towards an issue, through 
the selection of an opinion which most suited the circumstances of the situation. 
The concept of maslaha, public interest, was preferred to a refusal to take the 
money on Karam grounds. However, there have been some restrictions within 
Kelantan on 'un-Islamic' activities - which have been seen as 'beneficial' to the 
public: 
" 
... 
It may not look that important to some people, but the mere banning 
of gambling, not licensing night-clubs, regulating the serving and taking 
of alcoholic drinks in public places, and discouraging mixing of sexes in 
public places has had an all round healthy effect. 
"The social policy did lose some revenue to the government, but the 
absence of such diversions have enriched the life of the people and their 
families. These measures have also diminished crime and given more 
security to people. What was lost in revenue was more than compensated 
by adding to the quality of people's life. " 130 
In order to promote these policies, Parti P. A. S. conducted "outreach" programmes 
in kampungs, as well as using other channels such as khutba and the media. 
These activities were designed to 'educate' Muslims in Islam - or according to 
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some critics, the 'Parti P. A. S. interpretation of Islam'. 
The issue was raised regarding issues described by some as 'Islamic', which 
other parties refer to as 'un-Islamic' bid a, associated with adat. The question was 
raised of the strategy Parti P. A. S. adopted towards those Muslims who sought to 
preserve an adat-focused 'Islamic' belief-framework, which conflicted with the 
Parti P. A. S. interpretations (in some aspects): 
"So that is why sometimes to reconcile those who believe formally the 
Islam [sic], and those who don't understand Islam. 
"Because we know the reason why some of them do not believe the 
share `a one hundred percent because they ignore their religion, so at this 
stage we use the khätib - you know those who give khutba at um`a 
prayer, we write the khutba and give [to] the kli&ib to tell the Muslims in 
the country. " 131 
According to this interpretation, Muslims who do not follow the Parti P. A. S. 
approach "don't understand Islam", or "ignore their religion". This is challenged 
by many bumputera in kampungs - who value their interpretations as 'correct' and 
'Islamic'. There were indications that the Parti P. A. S. khutba was not always 
favourably received in rural areas: 
"Normally, the Muslim in Kelantan will accept the sermon written by the 
religious council in this country. But there are a few people who reject it, 
such kind of sermon, because they don't understand. 
"That is why we don't fuss, that is why we continue to tell them because 
one time - in shä `alläh - they will accept the Islam [researcher's 
" 13' emphasis] ... 
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There was acceptance that customs or traditions conflict with Parli P. A. S. Islamic 
interpretations, as well as certain 'modernising' Islamic understandings: 
"Islam is not a custom or tradition, so we can defend that tradition or 
custom is not in Islam, not in the Kur'än or the Sunna. If we know the 
adat is against Islam, we try to correct it, to modify or correct ... 
"We don't accept innovations, biota ... according to uztaz [Muhammad 
Daud], Malay people, they do not believe adat if against Islam. Malay 
people in Kelantan, they will follow their leaders, whether they love their 
leader [or not] ... 
"I think this is not in Kelantan only, but in other countries. So therefore 
we try to find our leader here [Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat], [one of] those who 
understand Islam and practices Islam. So that is why we see in the last 
General Election most of the people select our leader. " 133 
Clearly, there is a divide between Federal government and Parti P. A. S. in 
Kelantan. One reason for this is because Islam represents the central core of Parti 
P. A. S., whereas U. N. M. O. has to consider non-Muslim, non-Malay interests: 
"We ask the people to support Islam, not our party. It's different from the 
Federal Government. The U. M. N. O., they ask the people to support them 
... for us we have the principle: 
to support Islam, Islam will give justice 
to society. " 
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The question was raised, regarding a comment from Mahathir Mohamad that 
in 
Kelantan (and elsewhere), Parti P. A. S. didn't want to implement Islamic law, but 
they wanted to implement "Parti P. A. S. law". This was interpreted as an 
U. M. N. O. political argument: 
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"If they [U. M. N. O. ] accept that law [hudrld], it means they also have to 
implement that law. 
"But in order to prolong the time not to implement the hudcld law ... so they invite the `ulamj': and the `ulamä ' advise him [Mahathir Mohamad] 
not to implement the [law on] unbelievers. 
"[U. M. N. O. says that] those who reject hudüd law in Kelantan, because 
this hud rid law [does] not belong to Islam, but belong to Parti P. A. S. 
"If they say that this hudld law come from Islam, that means all the 
Muslims have to support [the law] - including him [Mahathir]. " 135 
Naturally, the 'political rhetoric' is a two-way process. Critics have enquired 
whether the practicalities of implementing the Parti P. A. S. system have been 
researched thoroughly. Parti P. A. S. indicate that they are open to suggestions and 
change regarding their policy, although this 'flexibility' may have certain 
limitations: 
"Actually, we want to implement Islamic law. If U. M. N. O. want to do it, 
if there are some mistakes in our proposal, they can put it forward. We 
accept. 
"But they just misinform. But they themselves never produce the right 
way, and even now our leaders - our Parti P. A. S. leaders - anytime invite 
the U. M. N. O. leaders, the federal leaders, to have a muzakarah or 
discussion for the implementation of Islamic law, especially hudüd. "136 
Clearly, the focus of Islamicization within Kelantan decision-making is the 
'political', 'democratic' debate. There is disagreement between different Islamic 
interests. Non-Muslim Malaysians also have to be represented within dialogues 
on hudd in Kelantan. Apologists believe that many non-Muslims approve (or 
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will approve) current Parti P. A. S. policy: 
" 
... 
So if they understand hudrid law, I think the other races in Malaysia 
will accept the hudd law, because ... according to research done in Kelantan, there are many Chinese here, and they praise this Parti P. A. S. 
government. 
" 
... 
Because they [Chinese wives] say today we not afraid to our husband 
[sic], because before Parti P. A. S. ruled this country [state] our husband 
[found it] easy to get liquor from the shops around Kota Bharu. So they 
drink as much as they want. And when they go back to their house, they 
fight with the wife. 
"So now it is better. So they feel secure, because their husband cannot get 
liquor easily, and sometimes they do not drink the liquor, so their house 
is better than before. " 137 
t 
Whilst this may be a particular 'benefit', it does not necessarily imply acceptance 
by non-Muslims in Kelantan of all aspects of Parti P. A. S. 's hudüd platform. For 
example, non-Muslim women may not accept Parti P. A. S. interpretations 
regarding the 'Islamic' role of women. 
Within Malaysia's 'democratic' Federal system, the government may be 
limited in how it can deal with popular opposition groups such as Parti P. A. S. 
Some sources represent Parti P. A. S. as 'an acceptable face of Islamicization', 
noting that other 'opposition' groups with Islamic agendas (not necessarily 
political parties) have suffered government repression. One source 138 suggested 
that the equivalent of Parti P. A. S. would be "finished off' in many Middle 
ý39 Eastern Islamic environments. 
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PartiP. A. S. believe that Malaysian law's basis in English [Common] Law is 
essentially 'un-Islamic'. One source indicates that the practicalities of'Islamic law' 
in a contemporary context could be proven in Kelantan: 
"So at present I believe that, as a democracy, if we want to see it as an 
Islamic law for Kelantan, we hope the Federal Government will give us 
[permission] to implement Islamic law in Kelantan. For Muslims only ... It gives a chance for non-Muslims to see how good is Islamic law 
[sic]. it 140 
However, other scholars - including those associated with governmental agencies 
- believe the conditions for such experiments are not yet in place: 
i 
" 
... 
Well, I think that the view of our present government is that before 
we introduce hudrd laws, we must be sure to associate them with the 
social conditions in totality ... to 
be sure that everyone has a good income, 
that they have enough to eat, they don't have to steal to fend for 
themselves. 
"We base [this upon] the principle [that] at the time of famine, the 
punishment of death is postponed. So conditions here are not such that 
everyone does not need to steal. Of course, he knows that evidence or 
proof that anything - zmä - is very hard. 
" ... 
So the main cases are taz`ir [alcohol drinking offences]. We are 
punishing them. We are convinced that they cannot be punished under 
the penal code. My own view is that we cannot say there are secular 
courts, because the judges who are punishing them are Muslim. They are 
following the penal court, the penal court is like the Islamic Court. " 141 
This assertion that existing legal frameworks are 'Islamic' is often denied by 
government opponents. Other'Islamic interests' believe Parti P. A. S. places them 
in a difficult position, regarding hud üd. For example, A. B. I. M. -members 
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understood it endangered the status of their organisation, and the promotion of 
'Islamic values' in the Malaysian context: 
"If we say'no' [to hudUUd], people will blame us, [and] say we are against 
Islam and against the Kur'än, and we will lose this legitimacy as an 
Islamic movement. If we support [Parti P. A. S. ], we know that there are 
a lot of problems, so what do we do? 
"We convene and we discuss among our members. We say eyes' hudrüd is 
a must, but the question of timing and the question or readiness of the 
society [are important]'... " 
" 
... 
So we say we agree with the hudüd law, but the question of timing, 
the question of educating the masses, the question of readiness of the 
'ummah. " 142 
There was an indication that, at grass-roots level, there is wide-spread 
(in)comprehension about huü üd, amongst Muslims and non-Muslims: 
"The Chinese, they are so scared, even the Malay who don't understand 
[sic] are so scared: they start talking about: 
" -'How many hands will we chop off? ', 
" -'What shall we do with all those hands? ', 
" -'How many stones will be used to stone them to death?? ', 
" -'Will we end up importing stones from overseas? '. 
"So these kind of arguments are coming up. That shows that the society 
is ignorant and not ready for that yet, so we argue our case. That is why 
the government of Kelantan does not agree with us... " 143 
Whilst not disagreeing with the principle of hudr. ld, questions arose from critics 
regarding the appropriate time of implementation. The question arose of whether 
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the non-Muslim 'minorities' were useful to A. B. I. M. and U. M. N. O., providing an 
'excuse' to delay implementation of a 'full' Islamic agenda. Many sources 
opposed the concept of hudüd in Kelantan, or the Malaysian Federation, 
completely; some believed hud rid could be implemented first, and the appropriate 
'Islamic' infrastructures would develop around it; some disagreed with the 
interpretations of hudzld presented by Parti P. A. S. (and other Muslim platforms); 
others felt certain criteria had to be in place, prior to introduction of hudrld: 
"... Even though we used to be very close to Parti P. A. S., we have to be 
different on these issues, for the sake of the 'ummah, for the sake of 
society, for the sake of the image of Islam. 
"Because when the people are not ready, the religious scholar, those who 
want to implement it, even they are not ready. The idea of hudrüd is to 
provide justice, but the implementation will create injustice, and this is 
because of hudüd. 
"So we tell them: 'prepare the study, prepare all these religious officers, 
get the system ready and the government ready, then we implement'... 
"We agree with them, but you must be ready mentally, physically, 
psychologically. You cannot just blindly say that 'today I will implement 
hudrüd law', because it will make a mockery of it ... 
" ... So I am learning every 
day, and when there are big problems, I need 
to do iLtihäd, and consult according to the shura on this issue, then we 
make a decision and then I implement it. " 144 
Critics suggest that this 'stalling' represented reluctance to introduce or support 
hud rUd measures. 
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One of the extreme reactions to a form of Islamic interpretation and decision- 
making has been the government prohibition of Dar ul-Argam. "6 Dar ul-Argam 
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members were instructed to attend religious rehabilitation centres, for're-training', 
which can be interpreted as an attempt to forcibly alter individual and collective 
Islamic decision-making processes. 147 The reason is because of Dar ul-Argam's 
alleged 'un-Islamic' activities. 148 The extent to which this action against Dar ul- 
Arqam is successful or not will influence future Islamic decision-making 
processes in Malaysia, especially in development of alternative, 'creative', adat- 
linked models of Islamic understanding and interpretation. The reasoning behind 
the ban has been linked to political, security, religious, and/or economic factors. 
Islamic symbolism plays an important role within expressions of 'Islamicity' 
and Malaysian Muslim identity. Variations in Malaysian Islamic appearance- 
codes reflect ethnic, regional, organisational, and religious interests. As one 
assertion of affiliations and representation of Islamic decision-making processes, 
the example of women's clothing reflects pragmatic interpretation of Islamic 
sources in the light of the Malaysian Muslim environment and adat. One 
interviewee sought to demonstrate differences in approaches between Malaysian 
and other Muslim societies (although indicating a number of other generalisations 
and stereotypes): 
" ... 
for Arabs, the women cover the whole body, and they are very strict 
with it. When we go to the Kur än and hadith, we find the conclusion is 
what is agreeable for all - icLma-`. 
"Is that the question: 'That the women are to cover all the body, except for 
the face and hands'? Is this agreeable by the majority, what we can say is 
'the consensus of ijmä "? 
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"But in Malaysia, we are very strict on this. Why? Because you see the 
source is i jmä `, it is not clear from the Kur'än or the hadith. 
"It's i jmä `, it's i jtihäd - so our people ten years ago or twenty years ago, 
when they are staying or living in the religious area, pondok [religious 
school] ... even the people who 
live in the area, they do not cover 
constantly the hair. Not the face ... 
" ... Because we consider the nature of the people, it is very hot, and you 
will see if you go to the jungle. So the guru or the teacher there just say: 
'... [if] it's comfortable for you to use, better for you to use the 
cover - but if you go to the field, to plant, I think it is permissible 
to wear [what is appropriate] for your full comfort. ' 
"So according to this, we see the difference between the Muslim in 
Malaysia and the Muslim abroad. If you go to Arabia, the ladies are 
covered, and the women cannot drive a car [unlike Malaysia]. I cannot 
say, but people say [in Saudi Arabia] because there is tradition also. "49 
This example of pragmatic interpretation reflects the climatic environment, 
women's work-situations, and an Muslim Malaysian interpretation of 'Islamic 
demands' regarding dress. 
The strategy through which one mode of Islamic dress was introduced to 
Malaysian society was described as represented 'modern' fashion demands: 
" ... [in 1971] 
I said [regarding] Islamic dress: 'Introduce new designs 
comparable with Paris. If you want to use the cover [over the head], with 
Malay dress, they can look nice, right? Same colour, green, light green, 
co-ordinated. ' 
"They said, 'Oh, this is very nice'. 
"The stylists, [they] introduced new design, then later on, no matter what 
design it is when it is popular, [they say] 'Oh, this is Islamic dress! ' 
"After it is popular, everybody accepts it ... 
if it is complicated to wear the 
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chador, then wear the three piece suit. ""' 
By making the decision 'popular, rather than imposing 'restrictions', the 
introduction of this version of Islamic values became easier. 151 It could not be 
directly 'imposed'. 152 
The reaction of other Muslim states and organisations to the various 
Malaysian Islamic decision-making approaches has been mixed. For example, 
one interviewee stated that when some visitors came from Saudi Arabia, there 
was considerable conflict. Malaysia (and Malay Muslims) were described as 'anti- 
Islamic'. This reaction to this was: 
"One thing is, as far as we are concerned, we don't care what other people 
say ... this 
is our way to handle the problem, this is our way to Islamicise 
the situation ... 
"153 
Several Malaysian commentators supported this - albeit not as directly - and 
reinforced the importance of contextual environment on Islamic decision-making 
processes. 15' 
Within the dynamics of Islamic decision-making, different interpretations of 
Islamicization can be found in Malaysia. The level to which these are tolerated 
by federal and state governments is represented through the dialogues regarding 
U. M. N. 0. and Parti P. A. S. - and through approaches towards adat, 
hudrüd, 
share `a, i jtihäd, 'Islamicization' and 'modernisation'. I tihäd and associated 
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concepts provide reference points within Islamic decision-making processes, in 
Malaysian Muslim society, with repercussions on several levels. Malaysia does 
not represent itself as an'Islamic state' - however that might be defined. A number 
of different interests have to be balanced, from Malay Muslim'Islamicists' to non- 
Muslim Malaysians. 
Amongst the varied approaches towards Islamicization, Malaysia provides 
several models of decision-making processes from 'modernising' Islamic 
perspectives, in an industrialising, economically-progressive environment which 
retains strong links to adat-centred Islamic-Malaysian cultures and expressions. 
These models remain in transition. Future Islamicization remains dependent 
upon various factors, including economic circumstances and political 
developments. 
Questions arise whether there are elements within Malaysian Islamic 
decision-making processes that could cross the boundaries of culture, language, 
politics and 'Islamic environments'. Islamic frameworks are in the process of 
transition within the rapidly-changing Malaysian society, within which systems 
of decision-making attempt to adjust and develop 'flexible' elements of Islamic 
principles to accommodate the requirements of new urban-centred Muslim 
communities. 
Degrees of participation or practice of 'Islamic values' vary. Islamic 
expression or identity has different emphases within members of families, 
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communities, and societies. Core-beliefs may remain constant, whilst attitudes 
change in response to 'flexible' or'new' situations. The affiliation of ethnic-Malay 
identity with religious-Muslim identity continues to have a key role within the 
wider framework of Malaysian Islamic identities, and may remain one stability- 
factor within a society in transition. 
The Islamic decision-making models proposed by different interest groups 
form a spectrum of interpretation. These range from: those advocating radical 
shifts in Islamic interpretation; those seeking adjustment of Islamic values; and 
those seeking maintenance of the status quo. Malaysian Islamic societies 
demonstrate that different priorities and interest groups in varied Islamic 
environments develop diffuse interpretative models - whilst maintaining'common 
threads' recognisably affiliated with conceptualisations of 'Islam', representing 
shared core-values. Understandings of idjtihäd and associated concepts provide 
one interpretative key, discussed at several levels, and practised by `ulamä ' and 
other decision-makers as a means towards 'improving' Malaysian Islamic 
environments. In the context of an industrialised, 'modernising', technologically- 
proficient, Islamically-centred, urban Islamic framework within a multi-ethnic 
religious setting, Malaysia represents one example which those in similar settings 
may be able to learn from and exchange approaches. 
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References to 'Malaysia' relate to the contemporary Malaysian Federation. 
'Malay states' refers to pre-1948 entities. The 'Malay Peninsular' does not 
incorporate Sabah and Sarawak. Singapore shared many issues of 
nineteenth and twentieth century Malay history, and is discussed 
separately. 
2. For an analysis of Mahathir Mohamed's Barisan National coalition 
election victory, see: James Chin, "The 1995 Malaysian General Election: 
Mahathir's Last Triumph, " Asian Survey, XXXVI, No. 4, Apr. 1996, pp. 
393-409. 
3. Malaysia does not proclaim itself as 'an Islamic state', and the population 
diversity is very apparent within urban settings. As in discussions on 
Pakistan, the intention here is not to make value judgements determining 
which party or individual is more 'Islamic', 'Muslim', and/or representative 
of 'Islam'. 
4. Adat, taken from the Arabic word "`äda", is Bahasa Malay for "custom; 
customary law; customary behaviour". Haji Abdul Rahman bin Yusop, 
Collins Gem Malay Dictionary, 2nd ed. (London, HarperCollins, 1994), 
p. 2. Another Arabic equivalent for 'custom' would be transliterated as 
"`urf. Adat reflects continuity with pre-Islamic Malay peninsular 
religious beliefs. For a discussion on early links between the Malay 
peninsular and Islam, see: Ronald Provencher, "Islam in Malaysia and 
Thailand" chap. in R. Israeli (Ed. ), The Crescent in the East, (London: 
Curzon Press, 1982), pp. 140-53. Ismail bin Mat, Adat and Islam in 
Malaysia: A Study in Legal Conflict and Resolution, (Ph. D. diss., Temple 
University, USA, 1985), pp. 31-36. 
5. Malay Muslims are associated predominantly with Shafi'i madhdhab, 
whilst those of Indian sub-continent ancestry are linked with the Hanafi 
madhdhab. 
6. Hussin Mutalib, "Islamisation in Malaysia: Between Ideals and Realities", 
Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (Eds. ), Islam, Muslims, and the 
Modern State, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 169. 
7. The Malaysian Federation, according to the 1990 Census, has a 
population of 17.9 million, within an area of 130,000 square miles 
(including Sabah and Sarawak). This population consists of 56% Malay, 
33% Chinese-origin, 10.2% Indian, and 0.9% other minorities. 1990 
Malaysian Census, in: Wazir Jahan Karim, Women and Culture: Between 
Malay Adat and Islam, (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1992). p. xii. For 
a classification of population groups in Malaysia, see: Information 
Malaysia 1994 Yearbook, (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 
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1994), pp. 50-53. 
8. The Bahasa Malay word dakwah, taken from the Arabic word dawa-', has 
specific Malaysian social, religious and organisational connotations 
relating to the propagation and promotion of Islam (discussed below): 
" 
... 
Dakwah has become the all-embracing and all-meaning term, 
intuitively understood and experienced, but less often deeply analyzed, to 
cover the spectrum of deepened religious consciousness and culture now 
prevailing. Its Verstehend to participants clusters along the lines of 
'returning to the holy faith' (kembalikan ke agama suci) or'for the sake of 
God' (kerana Allah). " Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian 
Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1984), p. xx. 
Therefore, the Bahasa Malay word is preferred in this chapter. 
9. op. cit., Nagata, p. 30. 
10. Judith Nagata, "The Impact of Religious Revival (Dakwah) on the 
Religious Culture of Malaysia, " chap. in Bruce Matthews and Judith 
Nagata (Eds. ), Religion, Values and Development in Southeast Asia, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986). pp. 37-51. 
11. See: Manning Nash, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia" 
chap. in R. Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty (Eds. ), Fundamentalisms 
Observed, (Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
pp. 700-730. 
12. Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. x-xi, p. 31. 
13. Sabah and Sarawak, for example, with their considerably different ethnic 
compositions and substantial non-Muslim influences, have departed from 
government agendas on Islamic policies. Ibid, pp. 163-164. 
14. For a survey of U. N. M. O. 's policies and activities, see: Khoo Boo Teik, 
Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir 
Mohamad, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 375 & 
passim. 
15. The Bahasa Malay spelling 'syariah' is used within the legal framework, 
including for the court structures, and represents an equivalent of the 
Arabic transliterated as 'sharla'. 
r 
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16. The extent to which fatwä represent the results of icLtihäd is open to 
discussion. Reference to the concept may be more important than defining 
the methodology of application. 
17. The Bahasa Malay word'ketua' means "elder", whilst'ugama' is Malay for 
"religion". op. cit, bin Yusop, pp. 136 & 282. 
18. The British presence led to increased migration of workers from the 
Indian sub-continent and China, and coincided with the continued 
migration of Indonesian-Sumatran peoples to the Malay, peninsular - with 
whom Malays have ethnic, linguistic, ancestral, and socio-religious links. 
19. "The secularizing elements that the British injected into Malay society 
emphasized achievement rather than ascription, a system of authority 
legitimized by rulers rather than mere charisma and descent, a pragmatic 
rather than a magico-mystical view of life and a strict compliance with a 
distinct body of rules rather than blind obedience to individual chiefs. " 
Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, From Saints to Bureaucrats: A Study of the 
Development of Islam in the State of Kedah, Malaysia (Ph. D. diss., 
Cornell University, USA, 1985), p. 158. 
20. Hadhrami Arabs were prominent in the region, especially from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Hadhrami, from Yemen, inter-married 
with the local Muslim population, but maintained close ties with the 
Middle East - including Islamic practices uninfluenced by adat. This led 
to conflicts in Islamic interpretation. Willaim R. Roff, The Origins of 
Malay Nationalism, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
1967), p. 40. Mona Abaza, "Islam in South-east Asia: Varying Impact 
and Images of the Middle East", Chap. in: Mutalib & Hashmi (eds. ), 
op. cit., pp. 140-45. 
21. Promotion of'itihäd' in the Malay peninsular is linked to these changes, 
especially exposure to Egyptian 'reformers', including Jamal ad-din al- 
Afghani (1839-97) and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935). Foundation in 1906 
of Al-Imam, a Malay-language publication, demonstrates these influences 
- and promoted i tihäd. This was through advocation of 
Kur'Jn and 
Hadith as primary sources, for dealing with issues of concern to Malay 
Muslims. Al-Imam included translations of Arabic articles, together with 
readers' questions, and discussions onfatwah. op. cit., Roff, pp. 52-62. 
op. cit., Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, p. 256. 
22. This conflict was not unique to Malays, and there is correlation with 
approaches of Muslims in other parts of the world during this period, for 
example in the Indian sub-continent. 
161 
Endnotes 
3: Malaysia 
23. "Arguments about whether it was permissible for a Muslim to wear 
trousers and a tie, and whether taking interest from post office savings 
banks and rural cooperatives was lawful or not, divided people along the 
same lines as arguments about whether it was proper to pray at the local 
keramat (spirit shrine) or what was the correct interpretation of a verse of 
the Qur än ... To be 'Kaum Muda' was to espouse modernism in any form 
and go against tradition; to be 'Kaum Tua' was to be in favour of all that 
was familiar, unchanging, and secure. " op. cit., Roff, pp. 86-86. 
24. Ahmad bin Mohamed Ibrahim, "The Influence of Islam on Law in 
Malaysia" chap. in: Syed Othman Alhabshi & Syed Omar Syed Agil 
(eds. ), The Role and Influence of Religion in Society. (Kuala Lumpur: 
Institute of Islamic Understanding [I. K. I. M. ], 1994), pp. 81-96. 
25. op. cit., Nagata (1984), p. 10. 
26. P. K. P. I. M. is an acronym for Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar 
Islam Malaysia, National Organisation of Muslim Students, (founded in 
1961). It demonstrated Middle Eastern reform movement influences, 
taking as a model the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin. 
27. 'Kampung' means "village, homestead, house and garden. " op. cit., bin 
Yusop, pp. 115. 
28. P. K P. L M. activities were linked to dakwah movements, and provided 
impetus for'Islamicization' by later U. M. N. O. governments. For example, 
through promotion of ritualistic Islamic practices, mosque-building 
programmes, and Kur'än Reading Competitions. Tunku Abdur Rahman's 
U. M. N. O. government cited Pakistan as a model Islamic state. Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, Challenging Times imes (Selangor: Pelandu Publications, 
1987), p. 115, quoted in: op. cit. Mutalib, p. 159. Also see: op. cit., Nagata 
(1965), p. 59. 
29. For a discussion on the fears of different ethnic Muslim groups, and their 
responses to 'Islamization, see: Chung Kek Yoong, Mahathir 
Administration: Leadership and Chance in a Multiracial Society, 
(Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987), pp. 45-9. 
30. op. cit., Nash, p. 704. 
31. John L. Esposito, "Trailblazers of the Islamic Resurgence", Chap. in: The 
Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, ed. 
John L. Esposito, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, J. O. Voll, with Kathleen 
Moore and David Sawan, (Westport, Connecticut, USA: Greenwood 
Press: 1991), p. 47. 
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32. Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (A. B. I. M. ) principal founder was Anwar 
bin Haji Ibrahim (b. 1947), who subsequently played a significant role in 
the development of 'Islamic values' within the Malaysian Federation, as 
a co-opted member of U. M. N. O. A. B. I. M. rapidly expanded, mobilising 
support against the 'old guard' within the United Malay National 
Organisation government. A. B. I. M. emphasised its Islamic basis, as a 
means of asserting Muslim Malay rights - particularly in rural areas. 
A. B. I. M. promoted the study of Islam, and made available Malay 
translations from Arabic of the writings of Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb. 
Zainar Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the 
Students (Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1987), p. 13. Also 
see: Asiaweek, "A Springboard to Power? ", October 1994, p. 26. 
33. Malay students were also exposed to concepts from other Islamic 
environments, whilst attending European and U. S. A. universities. 
Islamic-Malay values were promoted abroad: for example, dakwah groups 
in Britain monitored students, and provided the 'security' of Malay 
Muslim values in a non-Muslim environment. A. B. I. M. 's increasing 
influence led to assertive Islamic expressions on campuses, including 
'Islamic dress-codes', and formation of usrah cells creating 'Islamic 
environments' together. 
34. Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (P. A. S. ) advocated an'Islamic State' in Malaysia, 
and the implementation of sharla. 
35. For an analysis of different 'Islamic' movements in Malaysia, see: Anne 
Sofie Roald, Tarbiya : Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in 
Jordan and Malaysia. (Lund: Lund Studies in History of Religions: 3, 
1994), pp. 252-305 & passim. 
36. Dar ul-Argam was founded by Ashaari Muhammad in 1968, promoting 
S ladat-focused Muslim Malay identity. Dar ul-Argam established 
economic enterprises, centred in Selangor, which funded educational and 
medical facilities for a wide-spread membership of over 100,000 people. 
In 1995, accusations were made that the movement were training guerillas 
in Thailand, in line with a messianic prophecy. Ul-Argam has Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Pakistan branches. Within Malaysia, it has a 
following amongst civil servants. Ul-Argam members have been 
described as 'Technological Ste' by members. Dar ul-Argam became a 
proscribed organisation in 1995: establishments were closed, and some 
members ordered to attend Islamic 're-training' sessions organised 
by the 
government. During the fieldwork period, there were indications that 
Ul- 
Arqam's business interests continue to function, but members were not 
accessible for interviLew. See: Karen Dabrowska, 
"The al-Argam of 
Malaysia", Dialogue, November 1994, p. 7. "Malaysian Technological 
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Sufis Await Islam Messiah", Reuters Press A encv July 13,1994. 
37. See Chap. 2, p. 39, regarding Jama`at-i-Tabligh (Tablighi Jama`at). 
38. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity, and 
Islam, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986), pp. 50-52. op. cit., 
Khoo Boo Teik, p. 205, p. 232. 
39. Divergent approaches towards Islamicization manifested within 
U. M. N. O. in the 1990 election, with a split in the U. M. N. O. leadership 
and the creation of separate platforms within the new opposition structure 
Gagasan Rakyat (Peoples' Might), under the aegis of U. M. N. O. 's Tengku 
Razaleigh. 
40. In Kelantan's local state elections, for example, Patti P. A. S. sought 
implementation of hud rid laws (even for non-Muslims) and sought advice 
from Islamic legal experts on related procedures. Parti P. A. S. has 
continued to criticise the U. M. N. O. government's 'reluctance' to 
implement a rapid Islamicization programme. 
41. op. cit., Khoo Boo Teik, pp. 327-338. 
42. Professor Ahmed bin Mohamed Ibrahim, Dean of Law, International 
Islamic University Malaysia, interview by researcher, 27 May 1995, tape 
recording, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. 
Ahmed bin Mohamed Ibrahim is a key figures in Malaysian governmental 
implementation of Islamic values within legal frameworks. As a judge 
and academic, he oversaw changes in the legal processes, particularly in 
relation to the Shari'ah Court. He has experience in English and Islamic 
legal frameworks, and responsibility for devising the programme for 
training court officials at all levels -including lawyers, judicial officers, 
clerks and judges - in court procedures. 
43. op. cit., Information Malaysia 1994 Yearbook, p. 432. 'Penghulu' is 
Bahasa Malay for. "the headman of a small district". op. cit., bin Yusop, 
p. 202. 
44. Information about 'Islamic' decisions is available through the media: for 
example, newspaper articles, television programmes, and radio "phone- 
ins' all disseminate information about approaches towards "Islamic" 
issues. N. G. O. s also promote Islamic decision-making frameworks - 
through service provision which may have an Islamic component. 
45. Shamsuddin Mat Daud, Parti P. A. S. official, interview by researcher, 13 
June 1995, tape recording, Kota Bharu. 
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46. Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, Director, Just World Trust, interview by author, 
3 June 1995, tape recording, Pinang. 
Chandra Muzaffar was active within Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National 
Consciousness Movement), which emphasised i jtihäd, and was 
influenced by Egyptian 'reformers' (including Abduh and al-Aghani). 
47. Hj. Ahmad Hj. Awang, interview by researcher, 28 June 1995, tape 
recording, Kuala Lumpur. 
48. Datu Sheikh Abd. Majid bin Mohd. Nou defined itihäd as a form of 
initiative based around the Kur'än, a process that was 'not for the common 
man'. Kedah has an U. M. N. O. state administration; its official Fatwä 
Committee provided guidance on a number of issues, including advice on 
divergent Parti P. A. S. and U. M. N. O. fatwä - promoting the latter opinion. 
Datu Sheikh Abd. Majid bin Mohd. Nou, Chairman of State Fatwa 
Committee, Kedah, interview by researcher, 6 May 1995, tape recording, 
Alor Setar. 
49. Yusuf Qadari was cited by Razali bin Hj. Nawawi as an example of a writer 
promoted as "a modem Muslim jurist", whose 1994 writings remained 
"conservative": "We are talking about 1994, this is talking about the year 
600! 
... they've 
lost touch ... 
Although there is an extraordinary inclination to 
exercise itihäd, but they still remain within the yolk of traditionalism and 
conservatism. " Dr Razali bin Hj. Nawawi, A. B. I. M., interview by researcher, 
22 May 1995, tape recording, Kuala Lumpur. 
50. Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, Secretary General, A. B. I. M, interview by 
researcher, 22 May 1995, tape recording, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. 
53. op. cit., Razali bin Hj. Nawawi 
54. The Bahasa Malay equivalent of "think tanks". 
55. op. cit., Ahmad Awang 
56. The Arabic word taz'ir technically refers to discretionary punishment by a 
kädl - not just for alcohol consumption. See: J. van 
Lent and H. U. Qureshi, 
ed. Glossary and Index of Technical Terms to Volumes I-VII and to the 
Supplement, fasc. 1-6, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p. 51. 
57. op. cit., Ahmed bin Mohamed Ibrahim (interview) 
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58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Idealisation of a golden age' of Islamic law in Malaysia may not recognise 
the historical extent of adat, or greater individual state Islamic legal powers 
within Malay states. Judges in the past may have had narrower demands, in 
terms of issues requiring Islamic legal interpretations. 
61. Hj. Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman, Director, Islamic Research Centre, 
Prime Minister's Department of Malaysia, interview by researcher, 26 May 
1995, tape recording, Kuala Lumpur. 
62. Chandra Muzaffar provided an example of an approach by `ulama' within 
Malaysia towards a 'problem' - and how the emphasis in this approach 
perhaps did not address all the issues 'correctly': during the mid-1970s, a 
mass movement of factory women emerged, and 'religious elements' became 
interested in their welfare. However, their sole concern was whether the 
women were meeting men, or whether a prostitution racket had developed. 
Muzaffar pointed out that the `ulamj' lacked sensitivity towards other issues 
facing these women, including the poor working conditions within the 
factories. 
63. 'R. Q. ', [pseud. ], interview by researcher, May 1995, transcript of notes. 
The Malay word 'bumiputera' means "patriots, sons of the soil. " op. cit., 
bin Yusop, pp. 36. 
64. 'D. K. ', [pseud. ], interview with researcher, May 1995, transcript of notes. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Ibid. 
68. For example, 'T. H. ' -a medical doctor - indicated that 
in order to be 
successful, Malays had to learn to communicate with Chinese entrepreneurs - 
who were believed to be more business and money-oriented. Urban Malays 
were now seen to be successful in this communication endeavour, whilst 
rural Malays were still impeded by insular, adat-centred attitudes. 'T. H. ' 
believed most Chinese Malaysians do not perceive Malays as dynamic, and 
as such did not see (his) understanding of the 'truth' about Islam. 'T. H. ', 
[pseud. ], interview by researcher, June 1995, tape recording. 
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69. 'B. R. ', a Pinang architect, suggested Malay'moderation' meant that all aspects 
of Islamic idealism and rigidity cannot be implemented, because Malays 
protected and cherished adat. 'B. R. ' believed individual effort was important, 
to interpret Islam, and that this effort naturally led to variations in 
interpretation. 'B. R. ' emphasised the urban-qualities associated with Islam's 
foundation, in the cities of Makka and Madina, amongst an enterprising 
society. To 'B. R. ', this meant that entrepreneurs - including early Islamic 
society - were open to meeting 'customer requirements', willing to understand 
and adapt, and profited from balance and moderation. 'B. R. ' developed this 
analogy: if a merchant opened a clothing shop in a new location, he did not force a customer to wear his merchandise - but adapted to the local 
requirements. 'B. R. ' was emphatic in the difference strengths of Malay urban 
and village life, represented in variations of Malay Muslim identity. In 
macrocosm, 'B. R. ' stressed the diversity of interpretations - with a common Islamic thread - represented during the ham. 'B. R. ', [pseud. ], interview by 
researcher, June 1995, tape recording, Georgetown, Pinang. 
70. op. cit., Hj. Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman. 
71. See: al-Muwatta, 'Book of Game', 25.1. for examples of hadith regarding this 
form of slaughter. Imam Malik Ibn Anas, al-Muwatta, trans. 'A'isha 
'Abdurahman at-Tarjumana & Ya'qub Johnson, (Norwich: Diwan Press, 
1982), p. 225. 
72. The 'Islamic' merits of these multi-nationals were not discussed. 
73. This would have less impact in rural settings, where local markets and 
household production is the norm. However, by provision of a standardised 
food marque, it provides an element of control over food production 
standards (the cost of obtaining the marque was not discussed). 
74. The types of issues dealt with by N. G. O. s (with an Islamic component) 
include: confidential counselling and support on 'family matters' and 
'marriage' (e. g. A. K. R. A. B., Kuala Lumpur), and consumer protection (e. g. 
C. A. P. Consumer Advice Penang). State agencies also provide marriage- 
counselling. 
75. op. cit., Hj. Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman. 
76. Whether this policy has influenced divorce-rates requires further research. 
The importance of intention in divorce was emphasised by government 
officers, especially within the issue of divorce, which is still being analyzed 
by scholars and authorities in Malaysia to prevent perceived 'abuses'. See: 
Singapore chapter for comparative approaches towards divorce. 
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77. op. cit., Ahmed bin Mohamed Ibrahim 
78. op. cit., 'D. K. ' 
79. Other banks introducing SPTF include: Oriental Bank Berhad, Malaysian 
Credit Finance Berhad, BSN Commercial Bank, and Bank Utama (M) Bhd. 
See: Salina A. Rahman, "Important role of IT in Islamic banking", New 
Straits Times, May 29,1995. 
80. Fauzan Nordin, postgraduate, Centre for Islamic Studies, University of 
Wales, Lampeter, interview by researcher, 26 May 1995, tape recording, 
Kuala Lumpur. (Fauzan Nordin participated in the discussions with Hj. 
Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman). 
81. op. cit., Hj. Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. 
e 
84. The example provided of revised legislation where this occurred was the 
1948 Property Act. op. cit., Razali bin Hj. Nawawi. 
85. Ustaz Muhammad Daud, Deputy Minister, Kelantan State Government 
(Parti P. A. S. Administration), interview by author, translation, 13 June 1995, 
tape recording, Kota Bharu. 
86. op. cit., Shamsuddin Mat Daud 
87. Opposition groups, such as Parti P. A. S., do use the Islamic banking system 
in Malaysia -although they felt it was a compromise in the absence of 
'Islamically correct' alternatives. Kelantan's Parti P. A. S. administration is 
legally required to use the federal banking system. 
88. op. cit., Hj. Ahmad Hj. Awang 
89. Islamic financial systems eliminating ribä can cause complex interpretative 
problems: a ribä-free government housing loan for Malaysian civil servants 
resulted in excessive demand. The government had to borrow from banks 
(at interest) to provide easy-payment interest-free loans to employees. 
90. See Chap. 2, pp. 70-81, regarding In Vitro Fertilisation (I. V. F. ) in Pakistan. 
91. op. cit., Hj. Ahmad Hj. Awang 
92. Ibid. 
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93. Ibid. Awang's position regarding I. V. F. is similar to that of Hj. Abdullah 
Fahim - which is not reproduced here. 
94. At the time of writing, there were no known published Malaysian fatwa on 
this subject. 
95. On the related issue of gender-selection, it was believed the pressures for 
male children in Malaysia were'less extreme' than pressures within Pakistan. 
The opinion of Ahmad Fahim was that technology was not "changing" the 
"gender" of the sperm - but matching the appropriate halal sperm "created by 
Allah". Parti P. A. S. opinions on this issue were unavailable. op. cit., Ahmad 
Fahim. 
96. These issues are emerging on Islamic agendas in Malaysia, and will require 
future research. 
97. Fan Yew Teng, Executive Director, Pusat Inisiatif Keamanan [Centre for 
Peace Initiatives], interview by researcher, 24 June 1995, transcript of notes, 
Petaling Jaya. 
98. op. cit., 'B. R. ' 
99. Mohd. Zohdi bin Ishak, Penghulu Mukim Derga, interview by researcher, 
translator Ahmad b. Kasim, 6 May 1995, tape recording, Kedah. 
100. 'S. l. ', [pseud. ], interview by researcher, June 1995, transcript of notes. 
101. op. cit., Hj. Ahmad Hj. Awang 
102. op. cit., Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman 
103. Dar ul Argam is discussed below. 
104. op. cit., Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman 
105. Ibid. 
106. 'U. W. ' [pseud. ], interview with researcher, June 1995, transcript of notes, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
107. op. cit., 'D. K. ' 
108. op. cit., Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman 
109. Ibid. 
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110. A. B. I. M. promotes Malay Muslim identity, and interpretations of Islam 
centred around 'returning' to Kur'än and Sunna: some aspects of adat are 
discouraged. The majority of members encountered in fieldwork were 
'middle-class' university-educated professionals, receptive to 
'modernising' Malay-focused Islamicization. 
111. Mohd. Azmi Abdul Hamid, Coordinator, Program Penyertaan 
Pembangunan Komuniti, A. B. I M., Kedah, interview by researcher, 6 June 
1995, tape recording, Mirbok. 
112. Does this represent a challenge to the paradigm that A. B. I. M. is anti-adat? 
A. B. I. M. promotes Malay-ness, in terms of those 'cultural' values which 
do not contradict 'Islamic' principles, or represent bida. 
113. op. cit., Mohd. Azmi Abdul Hamid 
114. Similar projects were introduced by A. B. I. M. within three urban areas - in 
Sungei Petani, Georgetown, and Alor Setar. The work has been in 
progress for four years, and has seen the development of networks for: 
paddy-planters, rubber-tappers, factory workers, students, 'fisher-folk', 
bidan, plantation-labourers, orang ash, youth, and women. 
115. op. cit., Mohd. Azmi Abdul Hamid 
116. In one kampung in Melaka, a travelling Indonesian saleswoman was 
selling factory-produced herbal medicines, advertised with an 'Islamic' 
label, and receiving an enthusiastic response from Malay villagers (and 
their urban-based relatives). Products promoted includes different pills 
and effusions to: 'increase fertility', 'make a woman beautiful', and 'make 
a man more virile'. Forms of traditional medicine are also available 
through (mainly) Chinese herbalists, drugstores, and chemists. Different 
shops represented different mixtures of 'traditional' products available. 
In Malaysia, homeopathic or herbalist medicine is not simply a rural 
phenomenon. 
117. In this context, bidan refers to a traditional 'midwife', which may 
function in a rural or urban setting. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they 
are used by all society-levels, from ministerial-families 'downwards'. 
Services provided include: ante- and post-natal massages, the application 
of special oils and herbal medicines, and special prayers and other 
'Islamic' practices. 
118. op. cit., Mohd. Azmi Abdul Hamid 
119. One example observed was the attendance, at a dakwah camp, of around 
30 young children, the daughters and sons of indigenous orang ash 
[lit. 
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"original people", non-Malay, primarily animistic/traditionally religious 
'indigenous' non-Muslim] peoples. Through games and teaching sessions, 
they were being educated in 'Islamic' value systems, in a rural setting 
away from their homes. The children were wearing 'Malay Islamic' dress. 
There is no doubt that many were enjoying the 'outing' (staying away from 
home), and the A. B. I. M workers had close rapport with the children. The 
parents (and presumably the children) had 'converted' to Islam, although 
one worker stated that this conversion might be 'flexible' - depending 
upon the 'material' and 'social benefits' accrued through conversion. He 
said that a number of orang ash had 'converted' several times, often by 
different groups working within the region. 'I. P. ', [pseud. ], interview by 
author, June 1995, tape recording, Kedah. 
120. In terms of 'outreach programmes', these may influence decision-making 
processes at all levels, from rural and legislative. Their effect was 
observed in some kampungs: for example, in a Kelantan kampung, where 
posters and illustrative materials indicated clear demarcation lines 
between U. M. N. O. and Parti P. A. S. supporters. One interviewee, a 
Kelantan steamroller driver, suggested that this rivalry - certainly prior to 
the 1995 election - had split some families and divided some 
communities. 'S. R. ' [pseud. ], interview by author, June 1995, transcript 
of notes, Kelantan. 
121. Kelantan has returned a Parti P. A. S. state-government since 1979. 
Several Malaysians, from other regions, stressed that Kelantan was 
'different' from the rest of the Federation: not just politically, but also in 
terms of dialect (deemed "impenetrable"), and in terms of cuisine. Several 
Malaysians from outside of Kelantan said that the state gives the 
impression of being "backward". The people are said by these sources to 
have a reputation for being stubborn and hard working - especially the 
women, who are known for their business sense. 
122. Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat was away from Kelantan during the fieldwork 
period. 
123. One example of the former is a Parti P. A. S. alliance with an U. M. N. O. 
breakaway faction, Semangat 46. 
124. op. cit., Ustaz Muhammad Daud 
125. Ibid. 
126. Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat, "In Kelantan we take a very broad view of 
governance, " Impact International, February 1995, p. 13. 
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127. The extent of State Governmental powers are described as follows: " ... the State Government has the right to enact Islamic law within the court 
provided by the Federal Constitution - the scope is limited, the power 
given is limited ... Not 
just [in] the personal sphere. Any case can be tried 
by the syariah court, syariah court at state level, punishable by not more 
than'3-6-5': three months, six [strokes? ], and five thousand dollar fine ... 
" 
... the state 
has no power for hudd, punishable by death or one hundred 
lashes or cutting off the hand ... 
it operates within certain confines, and 
the Parliament has no authority because the constitution provides that 
religion is within the authority of the State Government. In other words, 
Parliament has no authority to enact Islamic law at Parliament or Federal 
level, unless this provision is repealed or substituted by giving the power 
to the Federal government. This again, the state level, the Sultan is the 
only power the state has, the State Government is not prepared to give the 
power to the Federal Government. Federal Government has no power, 
State Government has no power. " 
op. cit. Razali bin Hj. Nawawi 
128. Alcohol is widely consumed and available in Malaysia. There are several 
multinational breweries operating in the Federation, including Guinness 
and Carlsburg. Alcohol is available in (non-Muslim) cafes, restaurants, 
and shops. Through observation, it was concluded that consumption is 
not 'limited' to non-Muslims. 
129. op. cit., Ustaz Muhammad Daud 
130. op. cit., Nik Abdul-Aziz Mat, p. 13. 
131. op. cit., Ustaz Muhammad Daud 
132. Ibid. 
133. Shamsuddin Mat Daud, Parti P. A. S. worker, interview by researcher, tape 
recording, Kota Bharu, 13 June 1995. 
134. Ibid. 
135. Op. Cit., Ustaz Muhammad Daud 
136. op. cit., Shamsuddin Mat Daud 
137. op. cit., Ustaz Muhammad Daud 
138. op. cit., 'D. K. ' 
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139. Malay Muslim critics based overseas have been the subject of 
controversy. For example, a Glasgow-based publication, Signs, attacked 
Malaysia's dominant `ulama-': 
" The pseudo Arab ulema with their turbans and beards will 
always remain alien misfits in Malay society. This is because they 
are neither true followers of the Prophet nor are they proud of 
their own Malay heritage. " 
The government Islamic institution Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia 
(I KIM. ) (the Institute of Islamic Understanding) was criticised for hiring 
a: 
"... freelance ulema (complete with turban, robes, and beard) to 
speak on its behalf This particular turban is said to have predicted 
the end of the world sometime ago. However, because no one can 
predict the future (Quran 27: 65) this 'ulema for hire' is now back 
to dressing like an Arab and unloading ulema compost on 
unsuspecting audiences - for a fee of course. It is so easy in 
Malaysia. " "The Polite Ulema Busters", Signs Magazine 
International Edition: 8 (Glasgow: 1996), pp. 4-5. 
The result was a warning from I. K. I. M. , recommending that 
Signs 
circulation could be restricted in Malaysia, and that its writers could be 
detained under the Internal Security Act. One I. K. I. M. critic suggested 
that the Sins' stance was an example of "ampu mengampu" ('scrotum 
polishing') by "dissidents" seeking to cause division amongst Muslims - 
" 
... an attempt at 
'divide and rule', a weapon our once colonial masters 
[sic] were fond of using. " Ahmad Faiz bin Abdul Rahman and Anwar Ab. 
Razak, "Controversy Over Signs Publication: IKIM's Memorandum to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs", (Kuala Lumpur: unpublished memorandum, 
IKIM, 1996), pp. 4-5. 
140. op. cit., Shamsuddin Mat Daud 
141. op. cit., Ahmed Ibrahim 
142. op. cit., Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman 
143. Ibid. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Chandra Muzaffar thought it was unlikely Parti P. A. S. would be elected 
to Federal government during the next twenty years: Parti P. A. S. had to 
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be more conscious of Malaysia's multi-religious, multi-ethnic nature of 
Malaysia, at this time, what U. M. N. O. represents is supported by the vast 
majority of Malays - who did not wish to be instructed in how to conduct 
their beliefs. op. cit., Chandra Muzaffar. 
146. 'U. C. ' noted Malaysia had inherited an Internal Security Act from the pre- 
independence British administration. This Act could be applied to place 
individuals into detention indefinitely, for reasons that could be 
interpreted as 'political' or 'discriminatory' by nature, against those 
elements in society that chose not to conform. U. C. ' suggested that, in this 
case, Mahathir benefited from the colonial legacy he so often criticised. 
Since independence, Federal administrations had utilised this Act "in the 
interests of national security" in "hundreds" of cases - including 
opposition members, trade unionists, and most recently against Dar ul- 
Arqam. Critics suggested that the 'illegality' of Dar ul-Argam, pronounced 
by the Federal Fatwii Council, could not be defended by Dar ul-Argam 
members - who were not given 'a fair trial' and a chance to 'defend' 
themselves. U. C. ' [pseud. ], interview by researcher, Transcript of notes, 
June 1995. 
147. Ahmad bin Abdullah suggests the activities of Dar ul-Argam had been 
'acceptable' at the time of its foundation, in the early 1970s. When 
original members left and new ones joined, the organisation's agenda 
changed to one he believed to be detrimental to Islam. There had been 
concern about the influence of pre-Islamic tradition and culture, especially 
that linked to Hinduism: these include the attribution of 'miracles' and 
special 'power' to holy men, to cure the sick. Dar ul-Argam was moving 
away from Islam because of bida - especially the claims of prophecy. In 
Alor Setar, the State Fatwä Committee endorsed the fatwä given at 
Federal level proscribing Dar ul-Argam. Setiausaha Ahmad bin Abdullah, 
Head of Administration, Religious Department, Kedah, interview by 
researcher, Transcript of notes, Alor Setar, 26 May 1995. 
148. The impression that Dar ul Argam was against the U. M. N. O. government 
had to be countered by the fact that - according to one critic - they shared 
many beliefs and approaches to Islamic decision-making issues. This 
included economic, social, and educational activities. Since being 
'proscribed', Dar ul-Argam business interests have continued under other 
names - including publishing and media interests. 
The rehabilitation 
centres were supported by some members of Parti P. A. S., who 
additionally indicated that the priority for 'rehabilitation' was not Dar iii- 
Arqam - but the U. M. N. O. government. op. cit., 
'D. K. ' 
149. op. cit., Hj. Abdullah Fahim Hj. Ab. Rahman 
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150. op. cit., Razali bin Hj. Nawawi 
151. Pressures to adopt this dress theoretically could emerge through family, 
community, leadership, religious, and/or environmental influences. It is 
useful to consider that, even in the area of women's dress, it took a male 
to make the initial decision and suggest the design. Questions emerge as 
to what the input of women was into the decision-making processes? 
152. As a male researcher, access to Muslim female decision-makers in 
Malaysia was limited, although at 'grass-roots' level there was dialogue 
with individuals. In terms of women's participation within Malaysian 
Muslim organisations, in urban areas, attempts that had been made in 
some states to initiate grass-roots 'women's branches' of organisations 
were described by one source as 'unsuccessful' - although this seems to 
represent a generalisation. 
U. M. N. O. has an active women's organisation Wanitan' - which was 
described (by a spokesman) as 'very effective' and 'outspoken'. Wanitan's 
chief is a man, the Minister of International Commerce. Parti P. A. S. has 
a women's wing, as does A. B. I. M.: it is difficult to assess levels of 
participation and input. During fieldwork, the author attended an A. B. I M. 
local policy meeting: its decision-making participants were male; their 
wives remained outside of the hall - although they participated in a 
communal meal at the end of the meeting. Other organisations include 
Muslim Sisters - described as 'exclusive', with membership limited to 
'intellectuals' and 'high society'. The issues influencing Muslim female 
society in Malaysia require further research. 
153. 'E. D. ', [pseud. ], interview with researcher, May 1995, transcript of notes. 
154. Whilst there are close ties with external Islamic agencies, their impact can 
be difficult to ascertain, and is contextual. The influences of 'external' 
Islamic interpretations, agencies and individuals upon decision-making 
processes require further research. 
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4 Singapore 
Singapore provides a useful contrast to the Islamic decision-making 
processes in Pakistan and Malaysia. Despite geographical proximity and certain 
close links with the Malaysian Federation, Muslim communities in Singapore 
represent a number of significant differences to their peninsular neighbours 
(whilst there are several immediate contrasts with approaches in Pakistan). This 
chapter demonstrates that, although there are some parallels with certain Muslim 
Malaysian approaches towards decision-making, the nature of Singapore as an 
example of a minority Islamic environment introduces some new concepts to the 
debate, ' in particular in the way in which aspects of religious activity are 
controlled in association with governmental organisational mechanisms. 
Muslims in Singapore 2 live in a technologically-centred, economically- 
'advanced' framework. Singapore shares a considerable amount with adjacent 
Malaysia - in terms of history, Islamic issues, and approaches to decision-making 
processes. The regional and global influence of Singapore, and its links with 
other Islamic countries, also impact on Singapore's own Muslim communities. 
This has contributed to the development of a specific Islamic decision-making 
framework, aspects of which have relevance to other Muslim minority contexts - 
such as the U. K. Decision-makers and opinion-formers have referred to i itihäd 
when making fatwä, and through pro-active approaches have pre-empted 
responses to particular 'modernising' issues. Singapore provides one model of a 
'proto-minority' Muslim environment, utilising 'Islamic' decision-making 
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frameworks. 
Representatives of Singapore's Muslim population anticipate the Islamic 
community(-ies) having an increased role in international dialogues concerning 
Islam and 'Islamic' countries. 3 This could include input regarding networking, 
'Islamic' protocol, and international representation. Priorities for interviewees 'I 
include relations with Singapore's other ethnic and religious communities, 
educational improvements, and economic prosperity. State-controlled 
Singaporean Islamic organisations naturally seek to promote the 'benefits' of their 
role in Singapore's Muslim communities. 5 The Census indicates that Muslims 
in Singapore attain disproportionately low educational qualifications, relative to 
the population as a whole. 6 This influences subsequent access to economic and 
political power, and general 'quality of life'. 
The proximity and historical links between Singapore and the remainder of 
the Malaysian peninsular may mean that some parallels can be drawn between 
respective Muslim communities. However, to an extent Muslims in Singapore 
differ in certain 'Islamic' aspirations, living in a minority context with a different 
historical background. Muslim traders had been active in Singapore region for 
several hundred years, prior to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles founding an East 
India Company trading post on the island of Singapore in 1819. The small 
Muslim communities on Singapore at this time expanded during Singapore's 
rapid development, attracting migrants from throughout the Peninsular and 
elsewhere. By 1880, Muslim interests were contained within the colonial legal 
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framework, represented by the Mahomedan Marriage Ordinance, which regulated 
marriage and divorce under a kädl. Singapore had a significant role as a had 
port, facilitating movement of people and ideas, as well as increasing the number 
of Muslims who stayed permanently in Singapore. 
Assertions of Muslim identity and 'rights' in the British colony increased in 
the early 20th century. After independence, in 1963 Singapore merged with the 
Malayan Federation, departitlg twenty-three months later (in August 1965). 8 
Rioting in 1964, involving Muslims, influenced the development and 
implementation of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (A. M. L. A. ) in 1966.9 
The social, economic and cultural changes in Singapore during the 1960s 
included extensive resettlement of Malay-Muslims, from kampungs into tower 
blocks, coupled with declining educational opportunities for Muslims. 1° The 
Singaporean Muslim communities' disenchantment with loss of "majority' status - 
coupled with a decline in social, economic, and educational opportunities - 
required rapid governmental action in order to prevent potential unrest. " There 
was also a need to appease neighbouring Muslim nations and communities, as 
well as the wider 'Islamic weld. ' 
A. M. L. A. legislated the creation of the governmental body, Majlis Ugama 
Islam Singapura (M. ILLS. ), which opened in 1968. This was headed by a state- 
appointed President, a Mü, fti, and a Committee (nominated by the M. U. I S. 
President and appointed by the state President). A. M. L. A. has wide jurisdiction 
in matters of Muslim personal law: this includes issues associated with marriage 
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and divorce, through the Syariah tourt. `' M. UI. S. controls administration and 
development of wakf endowments, 13 and collection of Islamic alms, including 
zakät and fitra. M. U J. S. has a legislated role in the coordinated development of 
new mosques and religious schools. In theory, at least one Singaporean dollar a 
month is given as a minimum to M ILLS., by each working Muslim, to assist the 
building of modern mosques; this is matched dollar-for-dollar by the Singaporean 
government. " The intention is to have 80% of Singapore's total Muslim 
population served by 'new generation' mosques -no more that three kilometres 
from their places of residence. " The emphasis is on multi-functional mosques, 
which include offices, conference rooms, and classrooms - `on-line' with 
computer facilities. The designs of these new mosques incorporate 'traditional' 1 
features, reflecting cultural influences, combined with modem architecture. 16 
The M. U. I. S. Legal Committee - or Fatwä Committee - forms part of 
Singapore's legislative framework for Muslims, sanctioned through A. M. L. A. " 
It provides the public with access to an 'official' channel of Islamic decision- 
making and opinion-formation, ' 8 with the (state-approved) ability to make what 
is described as 'i tihV, and to providefatwä opinions which may subsequently 
be published. '9 The Committee works on majority decisions and normally 
follows the Shäfi`i line - with questions that are not unanimous being referred 
back to MU IS. membership: 
"Provided that if the Majlis of the Legal Committee considers that the 
following of the tenets of the Shaji'i school of law will be opposed to the 
public interest, the Majlis may follow the tenets of any of the other 
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accepted schools of Muslim law as may be considered appropriate, but in 
any such ruling the provisions and principles to be followed shall be set 
out in full detail and with all necessary explanations. 1120 
The extent to which this could be seen as promoting idjtihäd and inaslaha has to 
be considered, in the context of M U. I. S. operating within a minority framework. 
The M U. I. S. remit is associated primarily with personal law issues, and the 
observation of (selected) 'Islamic' principles (centred around hukm). The extent 
to which state-input influences the 'independence' and 'impartiality' of M. U. I. S. 
must be considered. 
The Fatwä Committee met twelve times in 1993, and published fourteen 
Fatwä. Four examples are discussed below, to represent the approaches to Islamic 
decision-making issues in Singapore (researcher's emphasis in bold type): 
(a) "... smoking is 'makrüh' or discouraged and Muslims should refrain from 
indulging in the bad habit. It becomes 'haräm' or forbidden to those whose 
health have been affected [sic] and who have been advised to stop smoking 
by their doctors. " 
(b) "... Pork and its derivatives are an example of the highest category of food 
which are forbidden to Muslims. Crockery which have been used to serve 
food contained such forbidden food cannot be used for Muslims. Crockery 
used to serve forbidden food of other categories can be used to serve food to 
Muslims as long as the crockery is first washed in clean water. " 
(c) "The ceremony or practice ['Lenggang Perut1 21 is not Islamic. " 
(d) "Marriages involving Transsexual and Hermaphrodites: It is unlawful 
in Islam for a person to go through a sex change operation. The change in 
sexual status is not recognised for the purpose of marriages. " 22 
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The following responses are made by the researcher in relation to these fatit'ä: 
(a) The faiwa on smoking represents an issue that is not directly forbidden or 
mentioned within the Kur'än and Hadith - although its prevention could be 
analogous to maslaha in terms of harmful effects to public health and 
welfare (e. g. prevention of: passive smoking, cancer, bereavement of 
families), or because cigarettes possess 'addictive' or 'intoxicating' stimulant 
qualities. Extending the fatyvä to a total ban on Muslims is potentially 
impractical, would produce wide-spread resentment, and damage tax income. 
Smoking is illegal in public places in Singapore. 
r 
(b) The fatwä on 'forbidden crockery' raises a common issue in Muslim minority 
environments of Muslims mixing with non-Muslims, especially sharing 
meals, when pork is a staple food of non-Muslims. 23 
(c) The fatwä on 'Lenggang Perut' represents the familiar conflict between `äda 
and 'modem' Islam, the ceremony implicitly being interpreted as innovation 
(bida) by the Fatwä Committee. This could be compared with other 
practices promoted by M U. I S., including Hari Raga (celebrations of the 
Prophet Muhammad's Birthday) - deemed innovative or 'customary' in some 
other Islamic contexts. 24 
(d) The fatwä on the legal position of changes in sexual status reflects an issue 
that is not directly found in Islamic primary sources. It represents the impact 
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of medical technology on Muslim society. The fact M. U, I S. had received a 
question on this issue, and believed it necessary to publish an answer to it, 
could represent a number of potential issues: for example, a lack of 
'awareness' on the part of the questioner, in terms of gender roles and Islam; 
it could also represent 'openness', and perhaps an awareness on the part of 
M ULS., that this could be an issue for Muslims in Singapore - especially if 
it is under discussion amongst non-Muslim communities in Singapore. 
During fieldwork, it was clear that the M U. IS. officials25 wished to promote 
(their interpretation of) iditihäd. It was described as indicating the practicalities 
of Muslim life in the Singaporean context -a matter of survival of self and 
religion: 
" 
... 
like i jtihäd itself, maybe it is just a theory - in some countries it 
practised like that, some people say we cannot practice itihäd ... 
because they say the books written by the Muslim scholar, hundreds of 
books in different madhhab, why [do we] need an idjtih. W? But more 
radical `ulamä say 'Yes', the i tihäd until the hereafter and all that ... 
but 
living in a country like Singapore, you must say 'yes' to i/tihäd, otherwise 
you cannot live. You cannot survive. 
"We are the Shäfi`1 school of thought, but many things dealing with our 
daily life - economy, social - we sometimes adopt other schools of 
thought. Like Jmäm Abu Hanifä, because Hanifa was in Baghdad, which 
at that time was multi-religious, multi-racial, and our näm Shäf `i was in 
Hidjaz in Madina. They have only Muslims there, no other culture... "'6 
This pragmatic approach incorporates precedent, for example the exploration of 
context (Abu Hanifä in Baghdad) and acceptance of fikh, whilst contextually 
adapting it to fit a period in circumstances and time - especially in aspects of 
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Islamic interpretation seen as 'flexible' in orientation. 
The approach of an individual or group with a question to the Fatwä 
Committee represents an exhaustion of other channels of communication and 
decision-making. The 'formality' of approaching M. U. LS. with a question 
contrasts with the 'cathartic' element of other levels of decision-making. These are 
specific, technical questions which have the potential for conflict: a local nnäm 
may find that his viewpoint on a specific issue contradicts that of MU I. S. 
(although the extent to which this is a 'problem' in a community of state-funded 
nnams is open to discussion). The Mufti has to balance his viewpoint with that 
of the interests of the general Muslim public (and the rest of the Singaporean 
population): 
"Because [an] Irnäm [local nnäm] might worry that his view might 
contradict any view that the fatwä committee comes up with, because ... 
fatwä is a religious ruling we come out with after considering kiyäs and 
all that. At the same time, you must also consider the community, our 
requirements and all that, so sometimes the nnäm might keep his view, 
because his view might suit him but not suit the Muslim community as a 
whole. s27 
Mohd. Murat Md. Aris was asked whether, in the context of the Majlis, fat, wä 
represented "more of a ruling than an opinion? " 28 The response was: 
"Yes, and it will change, according to the time, according to the places, 
the environment and all that. , 29 
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There was an emphasis on 'pro-active ijdtihäd and decision-making, where 
individuals unable to wait for a Fatwä Committee ruling were encouraged in 
some areas to make their own decisions at a personal iýtihäd level - and dialogue 
with colleagues on 'new' issues. 30 This can be compared with those Muslim 
approaches which discourage or prohibit such decision-making: 
"So that is why we e, icourage even our Muslim workers ... to be more 
pro-active, to discuss things that have not happened yet. " 3' 
This ideal contrasts with the concern that Singaporean Muslims were 'afraid' to 
raise certain issues - for fear of contempt or ostracism - indicative of the 
'traditional nature' and understandings of the region: 
"But most of our people here, in this region they are very apologetic you 
see. It is not easy to come out with something which people has not think 
[sic] about it. It is not an issue yet. You are the person who started it, who 
creates the problems. That's why you keep quiet, and keep to yourself, 
until it becomes an issue, when we come with an opinion and all that. " 32 
This factor has an effect on decision-making processes, especially in terms of 
access towards authority (referred to in other Islamic contexts). Another source 
indicated a reluctance on the part of the authorities to make decisions: 
"The scholars need to come out, because they are frightened ... 
[on 
idjtihäd] there is much more that can be done, unfortunately there was a 
psychological block on that. Founders of Islamic schools of law were 
radical reformers in their own time, if they were to have this fossilised 
form of thinking, they would never have founded a school. " 33 
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This may be lined to a'scholar' believing in personal qualities and qualifications, 
enabling Islamic decision-making and interpretation. 
There are examples of this pragmatic interpretation of Islamic sources within 
Singapore. The development of property through walcfdevelopment schemes has 
provided, according to M. UIS., Singaporean Muslim religious institutions with 
financial security: 
"One of the unique rulings the Fatwä committee came out with, our wakf 
development, because according to our ShäfT school of thought we 
cannot develop wa/ f property [endowment] anyhow ... even 
Shäf `I 
scholars say that even if this property will be destroyed we cannot do any 
thing with it, because this property belongs to the person who give up 
[sic] his will before his death. So there were certain benefits or 
beneficiaries. 
"But even though we are attempting Shäf[ school of thought, the Fatwä 
Committee has come up with a ruling saying that this wakf property can 
be developed, it is necessary to do it and there are urgencies and all that, 
but if we just let it go, if we don't do something with this wakf property, 
Singapore government law is if you don't develop, government will 
acquire the property, the government will develop it you see. You cannot 
just leave it like that. 
"We have developed a few wakf properties, after the fatwä committee 
come up with this ruling, so we have developed a few wakf property. One 
was an old village house, which is rented out for 500 dollars a year, but 
after developing it, it is 60,000 dollars a year ... the wakf stays 
in Muslim 
34 hands, and this is one of the rulings. " 
This represents a pragmatic approach, contextually linked, designed to 'improve' 
the Islamic environments for Muslims in Singapore. Without this ruling, the 
logistics of the mosque-building programme would have been difficult to fulfil. 
It also represents an example of gotong royong: 35 
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"We consider ourselves lucky that we have been able to motivate the 
spirit of self-help amongst Muslims ... we create a sense of belonging, because we want Muslims not to ask for free from people ... you must 
spend within your budget. You want to extend the mosque-building, you 
must spend within your budget... " 36 
The extent to which this example of Muslim self-help has become part of 'the 
state system' in Singapore is demonstrated by this mosque-building policy: 
"Muslims have to donate the minimum of one dollar a month, nowadays 
most of us will contribute more than two dollars ... with that money, we buy land and we build mosques. The government is very supportive 
towards these mosque projects, they give us special offer for the mosque 
site, any new town they develop the site for the mosque. Not only for the 
mosque, but for other religious groups as well. For the mosque, no need 
for us to buy land through open tender. But other group have to buy land 
through open tender. Very expensive ... 
"We make use of government agencies, the central building fund, and 
make use of that system. The employer will deduct the contribution from 
employers every month, that money will be channelled through the ... 
system, the nnäm will be informed about the commission for that 
particular month, every month we manage to collect about 400,000 
dollars. Every year about four to five million [dollars]. From 1975 when 
the scheme was introduced until now, we have managed to raise almost 
60 million dollars. We have built 15 mosques, with great help from the 
government. Without that, it is not easy to build. Every mosque will cost 
four-five-six million, it is not easy to raise on the spot through pocket. " 
37 
Only one of Singapore's new mosques has been constructed through 'external 
money'. All mosques produce audited accounts, and are bound to raise funds for 
utilities and salaries of an Im m, biläl, teachers, and full-time security officers. 
Through donations, it was suggested by MUI. S. that an 'average' mosque could 
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raise $15-20,000 (Singaporean dollars) a month. 38 
These could be cited as good examples of maslaha, representing a pragmatic 
interpretation of 'Islamic values' in the 'public interest'. Islamic values are also 
promoted through education in these mosques, from kindergarten level upwards: 
"So from small they are exposed to the religious values, so when they 
grow up they will become good Muslims: dynamic, progressive and 
rational. And also good citizen. That is why government introduced 
Religious Harmony Act, to prevent the religious schools over-promoting 
their own reason, so we are now multi-religious multi-racial society, we 
don't want to create disturbance amongst our citizens. So that is important 
- to limit activities of every religious group ... 
"Singapore is a small country, we cannot afford social unrest... with 
stability we can concentrate on education, to organise activities for our 
people ... 
it 39 
There is not unreserved support for this (idealised) view of religious education, 
however, and one person noted the following: 
"I educate my own children rather than send them to traditional school, 
because it is completely different from what the Kur'än teaches... "4° 
In terms of higher education on Islamic issues, no university currently runs 
courses in Islam as a religion (nor on any other religion), although religious- 
Islamic issues form components of other courses (i. e. sociology, political studies). 
Students seeking to study 'Islamic sciences' travel outside of Singapore. This is 
partially for economic reasons, although sending students to an institution such 
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as al-Azhar is seen by 'too traditional' by some sources. Others feel that it is 
worthwhile to expose students to values from other Islamic environments - as 
Singaporean students already have been 'inculcated with modern values' such as 
knowledge of English, science and technology. 
The level to which these educational values influence the Islamic decision- 
making process might properly only be evaluated in the long term. However, the 
diversity of issues raised by MU IS. provide one indicator. Muff Sahibus 
Samaha Syed Isa bin Mohamed Bin Semait, educated at al-Azhar and Mufti of 
Singapore since 1972, has broad experience of Singaporean-Islamic decision- 
making contexts. One of the most controversial issues he faced was human-organ 
donation and transplantation, not permitted in an initial fatwiin 1974, but revised 
'for times of emergency' in 1986: 
"Among the reasons for the Shäfl' school of thought to give this kind of 
fatwä on this kind of issue is that we must make sure that the medical 
facilities [are adequate] ... 
[and that we] can assure that the people who 
receive the organ and the people who donate the organ must be safe. This 
is 70-75% confirmed. But during that time [of the original fatw] doctors 
cannot confirm. So the, fatwä committee say 'no'. Just recently ... 
[? ], the 
fatwä committee says 'yes' because the doctor can confirm, because they 
do the transplantation, check the blood and all that ... 
Now the doctor can 
confirm that the success rate is high, so the, falwa committee says 'yes' ... 
"Even if some of the rulings are like other countries, like organ 
transplantation and things like that, in the context of Muslim as a minority 
in the plural countries like Singapore, this kind of view is quite difficult 
for the fatwä committee to come out with it, and to tell the public that you 
are allowed to donate (your organs]. People might ask: 'Am I allowed to 
donate one of my kidneys to a non-Muslim, and what will happen? ' But 
the, fatwä committee comes out with a decision, and the fatwä committee 
has their own reasons ... 
it is to save life. i4' 
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In this instance, progress in medical technology has led to a revision of the 
original decision, in the light of improved survival chances (of recipient and 
donor, in 'live-transplants' of a single kidney). However, the decision-making 
process continues formulating itself in terms of related issues (for example, the 
final question regarding organ-donation to a non-Muslim). The implications 
relating to the medical-ethical area of I. V. F. and genetic engineering have not yet 
been fully formulated by MU IS, which was aware that it was a priority area that 
could take its place on the agenda immediately. However, it was felt that a 
decision could not be made until all the facts were at the disposal of MULS. 
This assembly of information may incorporate dialogue with other Islamic 
interests outside of Singapore, such as through MA. B. I M. S. 
In relation to education, one of the principal 'problem areas' for M. UIS. was 
'sex-education'. This has parallels with other Islamic environments, notably 
within the U. K. In Singapore, the interests of all population and interest groups 
had to be accommodated within the state education system - which could 
contradict values within an Islamic framework. The approach of the Singaporean 
Muslims is placed here to inform the debate: 
"... In Islamic education there is a way of approaching teenage young 
people ... 
in Singapore and Malaysia they have started off a campaign, and 
they have a sketch, something like that, about safe sex. Of course, our 
Muslim scholars' response to this is: 'How safe sex, there is no safe sex 
out of wedlock .. 
it is not allowed. ' ... 
In Malay, 'sex lambang' means 
'avoid 'free sex' [safe sex]' ... the 
`ulamY's response is that this is not 
correct [i. e. no sex is better than safe sex] ... 
"For the community [in Singapore], especially western-educated, 
r 
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especially Chinese-edi icated, they are facing this problem more and more frequently. They have more freedom, and that is really worrying 
government. That's why we have to educate, and other kinds of 
precautions ... 
" 
... 
from the Chinese, there is also comments [sic], if they are going to 
teach this subject, the teachers must also be properly trained in the skill 
of introducing such education. He or she must know the psychology of 
such education, not over-emphasise, impart in the proper way, not to 
make things worse. Chinese community is worried. Eastern people, it is 
very difficult for them to talk to the children, talk to the youths. It is not 
easy for them. They are very shy and very modest. 
"For Islam we usually use indirect way ... now 
it is not an issue in 
Singapore, any move to introduce it in Singapore school, even though it 
was discussed, but it is still not implemented in our school here. " 42 
This provides an example of different ethnic and religious elements having shared 
goals and objectives (albeit negative and prohibitive in some sources' opinions). 
In Singapore, there was common correlation between sex education and sex out- 
of-wedlock. " The reasoning behind reluctance to promote sex-education was 
linked to 'traditional' 'Eastern' behaviour, and was interpreted as part of a wider 
picture incorporating other belief-systems and/or ethnic groups. 4" 
Marriage and divorce law procedures provide an example of how 'minority' 
Islamic frameworks can be incorporated into a state system. This gives an 
indicator of some approaches to Islamic decision-making processes and issues 
within the state. A. M. L. A. legislates the requirements for marriage and divorce 
of Muslims in Singapore - for example the form of the marriage solemnization 
ceremony; the käds role; and the procedure of the Syariah Court regarding 
divorce 45 and polygamous marriage - which is discouraged but not prohibited. 
a6 
190 
Concern was expressed by sources regarding 'high' levels of divorce in 
Singapore, and what were judged as resultant 'social problems': 
"The children will become the ... drug addict, school drop-out, we are facing such problem and we try to make attempt [to resolve them]. " 47 
An innovation designed to pre-empt such'problemsi48 has been the development 
of compulsory 'marriage preparation classes', which are held within mosques: 
"We teach them how to be good father, good mother, good husband, good 
wife. How to look after their children, the family, how to do the 
budgeting, these things are very important. Financial [control] is very 
important, it will create the gap between husband and wife. 
"Hopefully from our course they will know their responsibility, they will 
know the problems they will face, because once you get married it does 
not mean all problems are solved. After beginning another era, a lot of 
problems (! ) ... " 
" 
During fieldwork in Singapore, the offices of the Registrar of Marriages were 
visited. In addition to an (optional) nikäh mosque ceremony, all Muslim couples 
have to be married and registered at these offices, where they are provided with 
a certificate and their details are entered onto a state computer database. 5° 
According to the Registrar, the marriage guidance course had been 'copied' by 
Malaysia: other religious organisations in Singapore had also 'borrowed' the 
programme, such as Hindus, who had adapted the blueprint for their own needs. 5' 
Approximately 4,500 Muslim couples married every year in Singapore, 80% of 
whom attended the course. Passouli commented that, of the eight components in 
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the course, 52 the non-participatory lectures more popular than workshops in 
which couples had to discuss issues and potential problems. 'High risk' couples 
were provided with special workshops, linked to educational background and 
ability. Couples also attended 'follow-up' post-marriage courses. 53 
The Syariah Court provides an practical example of how Islamic injunctions 
regarding divorce procedures have been adapted to fit the circumstances of the 
Muslim communities within Singapore. 5" A. M. L. A. explicitly covers the details 
of divorce procedure. 55 The Court oversees all actions over divorce, including 
procedure over property divisions, maintenance, and child custody. It also has a 
counselling section - of three male counsellors - through which all cases (and 
potential cases) have to pass. Each couple has to have at least three counselling 
sessions. If, after this, there is agreement for divorce, the case is processed by the 
Syariah Court. Mosque counselling also exists, but it was indicated that - because 
of the Court's status and power - the couples preferred to visit the Court for 
counselling. Prior to any divorce hearing, efforts are made to achieve a pre-trial 
agreement, to save departmental time and expense. If there is a hearing, families 
may attend - although at times there has been conflict and they have to be ejected. 
Court findings have not been published since 1970, to stop scandal circulating 
within Muslim communities. 56 
The Syariah Court handles approximately 2,500 reports (on potential 
divorces) a year, and of those 1,500 a year come to the Syariah Court. This 
means that, on average, one-in-four married Muslim couples in Singapore come 
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for consultation and divorce. Compared with the divorce rate of approximately 
one-in-ten in other sectors of Singaporean society, this may indicate a number of 
factors relating to Muslim couples in Singapore: 51 
"If you look at the reasons cited by women, most of them have been 
deserted. The decision is not that popular, but for most of them to get 
adequate maintenance [they need a Court decision] ... for most of the 
couples who come here for a divorce, during the first five years of 
marriage is the most volatile period - if they can survive the first five 
years, most likely their marriages will stay longer [sic]. 
"If you study the trend, most of them are from the lower primary, lower 
secondary level and you would expect that economic reasons must affect 
the marriages, and most likely if they are from the lower income, they are 
unable to support the family, [and] it leads to such problem. But many 
couples these days are citing 'personality differences', that's one of the 
most popular [sic] reasons you find here. " 58 
This puts a strain upon the decision-making processes and resources of the Court. 
Another reason cited for the high-divorce rate was the growing economic role of 
women in Singapore, increasing expectations within marriage. The changing 
context of marriage provides one example of 'Islamic' reconciliation of tradition 
with living in a 'modernising' environment. 
Cases included dealing with marriages where one party has come from 
outside of Singapore, and then deserted the other partner. Although lawyers are 
not necessary during the process, legal aid exists for their provision in some 
cases. There is also interaction with the civil courts, for example when an 
exclusion order is required in a case of domestic violence. The Syariah Court 
provides a model of an Islamic-oriented institution working under the aegis of ,a 
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non-Muslim majority state. In terms of decision-making processes, it has given 
some organisations in other Muslim minority environments a stimulus. 54 
Another Islamic decision-making model operating within Singapore is 
'Pertapis' 6° - one of several non-governmental organisations (N. G. O. ) working 
in the field of Muslim welfare. Pertapis is discussed here, because of its Islamic 
responses to issues that are often dismissed as haräm in other Islamic contexts. 
There are parallels behind the kinds of issues faced in Singapore and other 
Muslim minority environments, including the United Kingdom. Pertapis was 
founded in 1969, initially to provide socially deprived youth with religious 
education classes. Now it runs social welfare programmes on a wide scale, 
including homes for the elderly, hostels for abused and battered women, crisis 
centres for single mothers and children, and kindergartens. They also manage an 
Outward Bound scheme for youth with low educational attainment, providing 
them with opportunities to escape from the urban environment for the first time. 
The Pertapis Centre for recovering Muslim drug addicts provides a 
rehabilitation model, centred around an 'Islamic' value system: 61 
"[Pertapis seeks to] impress upon the public that social service is an 
integral part of religion, especially the Muslim religion. The Kur'an is the 
constitution of Islam. Whatever you say you have to profit from the 
Kur'än. And there is so much people do not know. X62 
Drug-'abuse' is un-Islamic, according to interpretation based on Jur"'an-ic 
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prohibition of alcohol (this in itself is an often cited form of idjtihac . Drug-use 
is seen as a significant problem within Singapore, and drug-trafficking carries a 
death penalty. Pertapis is a'last chance' for many addicts, 63 and was described 
as a Singaporean example of Islam 'in action' - utilising a decision-making 
process centred around values emphasising compassion rather than punishment 
for 'transgressors'. 64 
The programmes for drug addicts have a basis in an American model of 
behaviour modification, psycho-emotional support, and spiritual and intellectual 
growth. 65 According to one worker (a recovering heroin addict), the 'spiritual' 
aspect centres around Islam, the intention being that interpretation is not just a set 
of rituals and traditions, but also provides a framework of values as well. " 
Zainuddin Ismail, the Centre's Director, believed that a spiritual vacuum in 
Singapore contributed to people taking drugs, within a socially deprived urban 
environment. This may reflect the result of the rapid changes in Singapore - and 
the shift from rural to urban settings - for Muslims. Pertapis promotes an 
approach which adapts a drug-rehabilitation scheme to fit Islamic values: 
"The last part is, although we are Muslim, we do take in the parts [of 
Islam] which fit in with our programme, but we do not proselytise, right, 
because 
... 
it is more about the universal values that are shared with all 
[addict programme] communities all over the world ... 
"The last part, the most important part, is survival. It includes coping 
skills and vocational rehabilitation. Not just giving them a 
job here, but 
infusing them with correct vocational sincerity, the work ethic. 
"For example you've [the addicts have] got to work, you've got to regulate 
the work, regularity is important. They've got to start very early 
in the 
morning, so that part we simulate for them, we simulate 
interviews, we 
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make them doing everything - the whole joint here is run by addicts, it's 
not run by [the] administrative office, it's run by addicts. "67 
The 'Islamic influence' is not immediately obvious to the eye, in terms of 
building design or decoration, symbolism, or clothing worn in the Centre. 68 
Quotations from the Kur'än are on some office and meeting room walls. The 
library has small amounts of Islamic material within it. Pertapis publicity 
illustrates that certain Singaporean festivals and Islamic rituals are carried out on 
site - for example Hari Raya and Qiirbani. At the gate, there was a security 
officer; there is fencing around the perimeter of the Centre: 
"... So what happens is that we have to provide them with a safe 
environment. We don't have security guards. If they want, they can just 
climb over the fence. The fence there has been there from the very 
beginning. We provide them with a safe environment, not just physically 
but emotionally. A place where they can come out with their secrets, and 
they also know that whatever secrets they share will be kept confidential 
... we provide the environment, 
but they create the environment, they 
create the programmes themselves. , 69 
The onus of responsibility is placed on the addicts themselves: 
... you might come 
in as a hardcore drug addict ... 
but if you have the 
skills, you can become a co-therapist. In fact, three-quarters of the staff 
here are former hardcore drug addicts ... 
in fact I would say it is more like 
95%. But it is so wonderful, there is hardly any turnover of staff here. 
And we do not give them gorgeous salaries - just tolerable. But at the 
same time, because you are dealing with a residential centre, you must be 
careful not to take in those cases that are suicidal ... also very severe 
psychiatric cases. 
" 
... Our screening process 
[is quite strict], they go in front of addicts and 
they know if you are trying to pull a fast one, they will test you, and they 
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will test your patience as well. They will ask you to come at seven 
o'clock, 'bloody hell, I've been here for five hours, you've pushed me 
around. " 
"Social workers would not put up with that, it is not the regular way. 
They [addict applicants seeking to come to the centre] have to be patient, 
because the process is very gruelling. Just imagine, a hardcore addict, 45 
years old, drops a piece of paper - he is immediately confronted by a 
young addict, who says: 'Excuse me, brother, what did you do that for? 
Pick it up. Don't do it again. ' If he does it again, he is immediately 
confronted at different levels ... 
" 70 
Within this 'Islamic environment', a realignment of certain `external values' is 
necessary for Pertapis Centre to thrive: 
"... We don't allow any kind of drugs, no substitutes down there. No 
narcotics of any kind, no methadone, no sex and no violence. During the 
encounter groups, someone comes up to you and says: 'Brother, do you 
know why you are hers? ' You say 'you don't know? ' They say 'you didn't 
flush [get withdrawal pain/symptoms] for a few days. ' 
"It's very small [i. e. a small achievement], but for them, it is a very big 
thing ... they go through your 
history, and it really works ... that's why 
normally you can't find a piece of paper, they've got no attenders, there 
are no papers, they've got no cooks. It's all done by them. There are no 
boys in the kitchen who are good at cooking. Those who don't know 
how to cook are put there. They have to suffer! And now they [ex- 
addicts, going through Pertapis] are in the top hotels in Singapore! ."" 
Pertapis promotes itself as providing vocational guidance, as well as support 
at all levels for recovering addicts. The notion of gotong royong provides another 
reference point, within the Islamic framework of approaches towards intoxication 
and transgression. The Singaporean government supports the Pertapis` role with 
these addicts, referring cases to the N. G. O. from prison, as well as providing 
funding and advantageous rates for property purchase and rental, medical care, 
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and provision of equipment. Pertaprs provides a model worthy of further 
exploration and study, in the context of drug-rehabilitation in an Islamic 
environment, and in the provision of social welfare for Muslims who are in a 
minority. It represents a fusion of pragmatic Islamic values with the realities of 
a modem social situation; its staff saw these values reflected in the Kur'an and 
other Islamic sources, and understood their implementation as practical responses 
to issues facing Muslims in Singapore - without simply being part of a dakwah 
programme. As such, Pertapis was cited by its workers as an example of 
maslaha and 'iftihac1. 
The position of Muslims in Singapore may give the impression of a'quietist' 
community(ies), unwilling to cause confrontation and anxious to improve its role 
within the multi-ethnic, multi-religious setting. Issues deemed of importance in 
Muslim majority environments do not have the same immediacy for the Muslim 
community in Singapore - although their importance within an Islamic framework 
is recognised. Proximity to Malaysia provides access to an Islamic 'finance' 
system; Malaysian banks have branches in Singapore; an Islamic insurance 
scheme runs within Singapore. Some 'Islamic' issues are dealt with without the 
need for high-level state intervention, for example halal meat production. 
Certificates are available from M U. I IS., but locally produced meat slaughtered 
by Muslims in the halal method does not require a halal certificate. 72 
M. U. I. S. policy indicates a quietist approach to other issues, even if they 
transgress 'Islamic values'. For example, the researcher noted a proliferation of 
198 
advertising on the M. R. T. (Mass Rapid Transit) railway system that might be 
deemed 'sexually explicit' in its representation (primarily) of women. This was 
seen as an issue of concern to the Chinese population in Singapore, as well as the 
Muslim community, according to M UI. S.: 
"Normally our Fatwä Committee would come into the picture [sic] when 
people have problems that they cannot solve themselves. On this issue 
they will just complain to the government. They can say that 'I don't want 
my children to see all this and all that! "' 73 
"Another thing we ask for is open society ... 
They [commerce, financial 
concerns] emphasise commercial [activity], make money-money-money, 
investment-investment-investment, and Muslims understand that we 
cannot expect everything to suit our [belief], we must give and take, that 
is where tolerance comes, harmony, we must respect peoples. 
Commercial advertisers feel that the best way to attract business -I think 
we must be reasonable, because that one [advertisement is] not designed 
for Muslim communities, for general public. So Muslims understand there 
is tolerance, otherwise you can't move! For them it is art [laughter]. " 
M U. I. S. noted that non-Muslims had contacted its officials, expecting'an Islamic 
response' against such advertising. It was believed that there was a need, in the 
minority context, to 'draw a line' as to where and how M. U. I. S. responded to 
certain issues. There was a belief that, given an appropriate Islamic education, 
a Muslim would be able to respond in a pragmatic fashion to such 'non-Islarnic' 
values: 
"The concept of agreeing to disagree is very important practice, because 
you know we are minority ... we cannot 
do something, so find the positive 
way of relating, and that is what we are doing. We don't want people to 
be forced to accept our values ... 
 " 
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This may not be a'uniforrn' response amongst Muslims in Singapore, as there are 
a number of interests that are not directly aligned with M. U. I. S. interests. The 
majority of Singapore's Muslims, however, have interests which are represented 
directly or indirectly by its actions and rulings (through the Fatwä Committee). 
As indicated in the population survey, it would be incorrect to assume that 
Muslims in Singapore are homogenous in beliefs or interests. 
The prospects for the Muslim population of Singapore in the future is linked 
to the decision-making processes and institutions outlined above. Responding to 
'modernity' plays a key issue in this minority setting. The population size of 
Singapore, and the Muslim communities' 'representation' or 'control' by a single 
government special interest umbrella group, also plays a factor in the immediacy 
of , 
fatwä and iditihäd in Singapore's Muslim communities. Part of this is 
associated - according to M. U. I S. - with interaction between Muslim and other 
groups in Singapore: 
"The condition in which Muslims see themselves as a community in 
isolation - denying the world beyond narrowly-defined boundaries, deaf 
to new logic and quarrelling - has gone on too long. 
"We the Singapore Muslims know where we shall be when the twenty- 
first century arrives. We know what point we shall have reached in our 
own history. We shall be on the starting grid, along with Christian, Taoist, 
Buddhist and Hindu Singaporeans. We shall be ready and keen to move 
forward. X76 
The future role of Singapore's Muslim community, given the (current) 
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governmental position on Islamic affairs, is in a transitional phase. Singapore's 
emphasis on technology and economics could benefit further from a higher 
attainment of educational levels amongst Muslims. M. U. IS. seeks to influence 
the region (and elsewhere) in Islamic issues, which could have subsidiary 
political, economic, and strategic benefits. The extent to which M. U I. S. interacts 
with religious leaders in other Islamic societies would also have implications on 
a global level - especially as an emphasis is placed on Muslim leaders having 
experience of science and technology - as well as the English language. 
The projected growth of ASEAN economic influence and power during the 
21 st century could increase the emphasis on Islamic interpretations emerging out 
of South East Asia. The frameworks for decision-making which have been set in 
place in Singapore (and Malaysia) could have far-wider implications for the 
'ummah in the future. Whether this influence supersedes or augments current 
major Islamic influences, for example those coming from Saudi Arabia 
(especially if there is an economic shortfall in oil production), may be a factor 
within 21 st century Islamic developments. 
Singapore's proposed role as a global provider of high-technology services 
and personnel, partially through computer systems and the 'information super- 
highway', may in itself have a subsidiary impact on the nature of Islamic 
information and interpretation circulating electronically throughout the growing 
number of 'Islamic databases'. This at least could increase the amount of 
discussion about decision-making processes amongst a global 'ummah, including 
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the future roles of fatwa and iJtihgd. Whether this assists in a fusion of values, 
or a further dispersal of interpretations, remains to be seen. Potentially, in 
Singapore, the infrastructure is in place for one model of a future-oriented 
Muslim community pragmatically interpreting Islamic sources in the light of 
contemporary needs and circumstances. 
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Endnotes 
4: Singapore 
According to the 1990 Census of Population, Singapore has a resident 
population of 2,276,734. Specific questions in the Census addressed matters 
of affiliation and adherence, providing details that the equivalent United 
Kingdom Census does not provide. The proportion of Singapore's population 
professing Islam in 1990 was 15.4%. This compares with: Buddhism 
(31.1 %), Taoism (22.4%), Christianity (12.5%), Hinduism (3.7%), 'Other 
Religions' (0.6%), and 'No Religion' (14.3%). All Census data cited is based 
on persons aged ten years or over. Therefore, estimated calculations of the 
total population would have to account for those children under ten years of 
age. Eddie C. Y. Kuo & Tong Chee Kiong, Religion in Singapore, 
(Singapore: Singapore National Printers Ltd, Census of Population, 1990, 
Monograph No. 2,1995), p. 5. 
2. Muslims in Singapore are defined here as any individual born into a Muslim 
family, or identifying themselves as 'Muslim' - whatever the level of belief. 
The Census included questions on frequencies of 'religious practices'. There 
are reservations about such analyses which quantify religions in this manner. 
However, the Census provides some indication of 'Islamic practices' in 
Singapore: data indicated 84.3% of Muslims practised Islam at home; 7% 
visited a mosque daily; 45% visited a mosque weekly; 19.1 % did not visit a 
mosque at all. Defining what is meant by 'practising Islam at home' is in 
itself a negligible area, with many interpretations - whether it be occasional 
prayer, five times daily prayer, living life as dm, visiting a mosque, or self- 
identification with Islam (however 'secular' an individual may be). Kuo & 
Kiong, op. cit., pp. 44-48. 
3. Singapore is a member of Menteri Agama Negara Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia dan Singapure (M. A. B. I M. S. ), Ministers in-charge of 
Religious Affairs of Negara Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. MA. B. I MS. has held regular meetings since 1989, in an attempt 
to create regional Islamic co-operation on selected issues. 
4. Fieldwork consisted of formal interviews, observation of 'Muslim 
environments', and informal (off-the-record) discussions with Muslims. The 
nature of Singapore means that opportunities for dissident expression 
(beyond certain 'acceptable' boundaries) are limited. Access to parties 
expressing such views was not possible during fieldwork. 
5. According to the 1990 Census, the Muslim population of Singapore 
consisted of 350,520,85.2% of which is 'Malay'; 12.2% is 'Indian', 1.0% is 
'Chinese', and 1.6% 'Others. Census data can be supplemented by the 
following observations: the Malay population of Singapore includes non- 
Muslim Malays, such as peoples of Javanese, Bugis, and Minangkabau 
Sumatran ancestral origin; the 'Others' category includes those who designate 
themselves as 'Arab' and 'Pakistanis'. 'Indian' Muslims are mostly Tamil 
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Muslims, ancestrally linked with southern Indian (there is also a community 
of Khoja Shi'a Muslims, primarily of South India origin). The 'Indian' 
population in of 158,385 is 27% Muslim, the majority of 52.6% being Hindu. 
Kuo and Kiong, pp. 9-10. The utility of such categories can be called into 
question - especially if Census respondents have 'mixed' heritage. See: John 
H. Stanfield II, "Epistemological Considerations", Chap., in: John H. 
Stanfield II and Rutledge M. Dennis (Ed. ), Race and Ethnicity Methods, 
(London: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 16-35. 
6.7.2% reached the Upper Secondary and Polytechnic levels, and 2.6% attained 
University level qualifications. 'Other' groups, particularly Christians and 
'No Religions', attained significantly higher University level qualifications 
(39.4% and 31.1% respectively). op. cit., Kuo & Kiong, p. 20. 
7. For a history of Singapore's Muslim community and the role of the ham, 
see: op. cit., Roff pp. 34-43 & passim. 
8. The psychological impact on Muslims becoming part of the majority Muslim 
community in the Federation - and then losing that status - is open to 
assessment. 
9. Zuraidah Ibrahim, Muslims in Singapore: A Shared Vision (Singapore: 
Times Editions Pte Ltd/Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 1994), p. 25 
10. For a discussion on the social implications relating to the development of 
Singapore's Malay communities, see: Tania Li, Malays in Singapore: 
Culture, Economy, and Ideology, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
11. op. cit., Zuraidah Ibrahim, p. 26. 
12. Syariah is the Bahasa Malay transliteration of the Arabic 'share `a. ' 
13. See: Yaacob Ibrahim, "Wakaf Development in Singapore, " in Fikrah: 
Shaping the Future, 1, (Singapore: MULS. , 1996), pp. 
31-40. 
14. op. cit., Zuraidah Ibrahim, p. 82 
15. M. ULS. New Generation Mosques and Their Activities Bringing Back the 
Golden Era of Islam in Singapore (Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, 1991), p. 6. 
16. Within Singapore, there were seventy-six mosques in 1995: sixty-three of 
these are 'old' mosques, whilst thirteen are 'new generation' mosques. 
M. U. I. S. 
, 
New Generation Mosques, op. cit., p. 8. 
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17. The Committee consists of the Müfll, two M. U. LS. members, and two non- M. U. I. S members. 
18. Government of Singapore, The Statutes of the Republic of Singapore: 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (Chanter 3) Revised Edition 1985 
(Singapore: Government of Singapore, 1986), Section 32 (1-2), pp. 14-15. 
19. This provision includes published compilations incorporating 96 fatwa", on 
questions relating to diverse subjects, including: adoption, marriage, divorce, 
insurance, prayer at graves, horoscopes, yoga, and arak rice-spirit 
production. Kumpulan Fatwa (1) (Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, 1987), pp. 40. Kumpulan Fatwa (2) (Singapore: Majlis Ugama 
Islam Singapura, 1991), pp. 41. 
20. Government of Singapore, Administration of Muslim Law Act op. cit., 
Section 33, p. 15. 
21. Lenggang Perut: "... to bathe ceremonially in [the] seventh month of 
pregnancy. " op. cit., bin Yusop, p. 159. 
22. These examples have been edited (with emphasis added) by the researcher 
from a list offatwas. Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Annual Report 1993, 
(Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 1993), p. 22. 
23. In the U. K., this issue was discussed by Dr. Syed ad-Darsh, regarding eating 
utensils for haläl and haram foods. Citing Su-a al-Mä/dah regarding 'lawful' 
foods (Surah 5: 4-5), Darsh said that utensils used for haräm foods can be 
washed and used. Syed ad-Darsh, "What you ought to know, " Q-News, 2-9 
June 1995. 
24. Mawlid, the Arabic term for the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's 
birthday, has a number of different forms internationally. It has been 
opposed by some as 'bida'. For examples of the origins, celebratory forms, 
and controversy surrounding Mawlid, see: New Encyclopedia of Islam, VI, 
pp. 895-6. 
25. Mufti Sahibus Samaha Syed Isa bin Mohamed Bin Semait (Mufti of 
Singapore since 1972) was outside of the country during the fieldwork 
period. 
26. Mohd. Murat Md. Aris, Public Relations Officer, Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, interview by researcher, 20 June 1995, tape recording, Singapore. 
27. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris 
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28. Within A. M. L. A., fatwä is defined as "a ruling. " This could be compared 
with other definitions in Islamic contexts, where the term can allude more 
towards 'opinion'. 
29. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris 
30. This might reflect on Islamic sources which state that there should be no fear 
in discussing issues, but also that too many questions are not necessarily a 
positive thing. Sahih Bukhari. trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Translation 
of the Meaning of Sahih Bukhari: Arabic-English IX, (New Delhi: Kitab 
Bhaban, 5th Rev. Ed., 1971,1984), pp. 164-165. 
31. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Maideen Sulaiman, Personnel and Administrative Manager, PERTAPIS, 
interview by researcher, 21 June 1995, tape recording, Singapore. 
34. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris 
35. The Bahasa Malay term 'gotong royong' means 'co-operating. ' op. cit., bin 
Yusop, p. 84. 
36. Hj. Jaffar Kassim (Senior Public Relations Officer) Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, Islamic Centre of Singapore, interview by researcher, 20 June 
1995, tape recording, Singapore. 
37. op. cit., Hj. Jaffar Kassim 
38. See: Mardiana Abu Bakar, "Rebuilding Programme of Old Mosques by 
M. U. LS., " Warita: 104, (May-June 1996). 
39. op. cit., Hj. Jaffar Kassin 
40. 'LS. T. ' [pseud. ], interview by researcher, June 1995, tape recording, 
Singapore. 
41. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris 
42. Ibid. 
43. The researcher did raise with M. ULS. and other interviewees the possible 
correlation between the sex-education issue and the relatively high divorce 
rate within Singapore. See: U. K. chapter for a discussion on sex-education 
and Islam. 
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44. Reluctance to implement sex-education because of 'traditional' 'Eastern' 
values conflicts with other aspects of Singaporean society, including wide- 
spread promotion of sexuality and sexual-imagery within advertising, fashion, and media. 
45. op. cit., Government of Singapore, Administration of Muslim Law Act, 
Section 32 (1-2), p. 14. 
46. During 1994, according to anecdotal evidence provided in the Syariah Court, 
there were 80 applications for polygamous marriage - of which 20 were 
approved by the Court. For the A. M. L. A. provision regarding polygamy, see: 
Government of Singapore, The Administration of Muslim Law Act (Chapter 
3): Revised Edition of Subsidiary Legislation, (Singapore: Government of 
Singapore, 1990), Sect. 11, p. 5. 
47. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Anis. 
48. This in itself represents a value-judgement regarding 'one-parent families', 
which some would suggest as contentious. 
49. op. cit., Mohd. Murat Md. Aris 
50. Non-Muslims have to marry at the Department of Civil Marriages, the 
equivalent (and adjacent) department to that of the Registrar. The Muslim 
Registration Hall included a 'traditional' canopy and a sofa - set upon the 
front of the hall. Several couples were observed being 'processed', and 
outside of the building, official wedding photographs were being taken in the 
adjacent gardens of Fort Canning Park. The Muslim couples seen had non- 
Muslim friends in attendance (and vice versa). Unfortunately, the wedding 
that was scheduled to be "observed' for fieldwork purposes was - at the very 
last minute - postponed 'indefinitely' due to a heated dispute between the 
families of the bride and groom. 
51. The department did not currently have a religious scholar understanding 
Tamil - therefore non-Bahasa Malay speaking Tamil Muslims could not 
attend the marriage guidance course. 
52. Components of the marriage course include: the meaning of marriage in 
Islam; the pressure for marriage; husband/wife responsibilities; how to find 
insurance; household administration; divorce and its implications for society; 
the role of religion in marriage. 
53. M. Pasouli, Registrar of Marriages, interviewed by researcher, 23 June 1995, 
tape recording, Singapore. 
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54. Due to the nature of cases in the Syariah Court, they were examined in 
camera. However, issues were explored by the interviewer in discussion 
with the kädL. 
55. op. cit., Government of Singapore Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(1986), Sect. 49., p. 20. 
56. Hj. Sallim Jasman, Kädl, Syariah Court, interview by researcher, 23 June 
1995, tape recording, Singapore. 
57. Government of Singapore, Statistics of Marriages & Divorces in Singapore 
(Singapore: Government of Singapore, n. d. ) 
5 8. Jamilah Beevi Bte. Suleman, Executive Officer, Syariah Court, interview by 
researcher, 23 June 1995, tape recording, Singapore. 
59. Parties from South Africa, Australia, and Germany were cited as interested 
in the Singaporean Muslim decision-making model. 
60. Pertapis literally means 'pioneer' in Bahasa Malay. It is an acronym for 
Persatuan Taman Pengajian Islam Singapura - the Islamic Theological 
Association of Singapore. 
61. It would be useful to compare this Islamic perspective towards drug addicts 
with that of approaches towards addicts in other Islamic environments. 
During fieldwork in both Pakistan and Malaysia, the researcher observed 
'drug cultures': for example, in Pakistan these included heroin addicts 
begging for alms in a Peshawar mini-bus station. Many people chewed betel- 
nut derivatives, which the researcher was informed have narcotic qualities, 
and are openly available in pan shops. In Malaysia, there were many media 
references to penyalah gunaan dahdah (drug abuse), particularly amongst 
youth. Both states have heavy penalties for drug smuggling. Further 
research is necessary in this sensitive area to determine Islamic rehabilitation 
responses - other than punishment and prohibition - towards 
drug addiction. 
62. op. cit., Maideen Sulaiman 
63. The Pertapis Centre is based in an old school premises, in a Singapore 
suburb. At the time of the visit, an anti-drug programme for schoolchildren, 
run by ex-addicts, was in progress: children were being marshalled 
in 
rigorous games on various apparatus set out in the centre's grass square. 
All 
around the Centre, there was activity: vehicle maintenance, cooking, classes, 
a kindergarten, and social activities; the Centre's administration shared the 
complex. Nearly all the activities within the centre - at all 
levels - were being 
undertaken and managed by addicts and ex-addicts. Similar schemes, 
based 
on an American model, are located worldwide. One example 
is in Dyfed, 
r 
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Wales: 'Teen Challenge' is an evangelical Christian project for rehabilitation 
of substance abusers. 
64. Zianuddin Ismail, Executive Director, PERTAPIS, interviewed by researcher, 
21 June 1995, transcript of notes, Singapore. 
65. op. cit., Zainuddin Ismail 
66. 'S. Y. A. ' [pseud. ], interview by researcher, 20 June 1995, transcript of notes, 
Singapore. 
67. op. cit., Maideen Sulaiman 
68. Some women were seen wearing 'traditional' Malay-style dress, including 
head-scarf, but this was optional. No men were seen in 'traditional dress' 
(jeans and t-shirts - complete with Pertapis slogans - were seen). 
69. op. cit., Maideen Sulaiman 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid. 
72. "Halal Meat: Clarification from M. U. I. S., " Warita (Singapore: M. U. I. S., 
April 1995), p. 14. 
73. op. cit., Md. Murat Md. Aris 
74. op. cit., Hj. Jaffar Kassirn 
75. Ibid. 
76. "Muslims Ready To Set Aside Problems That Divide Them. " Warita 
(Singapore: Maglis Ugama Islam Singapura, April 1994), p. 4. Citing: Hj. 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed, President of M. ULS., Islamic Pluralism - Challenges 
and. Opportunities for the 21 st Century speech, 16 April 1994. 
C 
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5 United Kingdom 
Islamic decision-making in the United Kingdom represents a number of 
alternative models, which may have some links and commonalities with Pakistan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. Muslims in the U. K. are having to evolve 
infrastructures and approaches towards any desired 'Islamic decision-making' in 
a relatively-short periods of time - synthesising or introducing a wide range of 
influences both from within and outside of the 'Islamic world. ' Some of these 
influences are connected with the strong historical and ancestral associations 
between Pakistan and a proportion of Muslims in the U. K. - who may maintain 
close family ties with Pakistan, or other organisational links. Whilst the influence 
of the Malaysia Federation on Muslims in the U. K. may be less 'obvious, ' 
Malaysia represents an example of a contrasting Muslim majority framework, 
with varied perspectives endeavouring to 'Islamically' approach issues - including 
technology, ethnic diversity, political representation, and coming to terms with 
rapid economic 'advancement. ' These issues, and the presence of substantial 
numbers of Malay Muslim students in the U. K. since the 1960s, presents 
opportunities for certain comparisons between Malaysia and the U. I. Islamic 
environments. Both Malaysia and Singapore maintain strong economic and 
political links with the U. K. Like Singapore's Muslim communities, the U. K. 
provides a further example of a Muslim minority environment, although in terms 
of the creation of decision-making infrastructures, unlike Singapore, 
governmental input has been minimal. Whilst the majority of Muslims in 
Singapore share a common (if nominal) `Malay' identity, Muslims in the United 
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Kingdom represent a diffusion of identities and approaches towards Islamic 
decision-making. An exchange of experiences and approaches - between 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, and the U. K. - may prove valuable in analysis of 
Islamic decision-making issues: 
Muslims in Britain are often represented in U. K. sources - for example, 
within certain academic, media, political and social welfare environments - as 
possessing an homogenous identity, which affiliates them directly and indirectly 
with Muslims and Islamic issues internationally (whether they have any direct 
interest, concern or contact themselves). This is influential in discussions of 
Islam and Islamic issues in Britain, by Muslims and non-Muslims, and is , 
detrimental in the manifestation of direct and indirect discrimination, prejudice, 
and anti-Islamic bias. ' It also has an impact upon the varied Islamic decision- 
making processes, linked to interpretations of primary sources, that can be found 
within the U. K. Despite a prevalent societal view that persists of Islamic 
homogeneity, Muslims in Britain do not have a fixed, national representative 
platform. The debate on relevant issues within Muslim communities incorporates 
wide views and diverse platforms. 
Examining statistics can contribute to research into this diversity of opinion 
within Muslim communities in Britain, and the contexts of decision-making. The 
1991 Census introduced a question on ethnic-origin, but not religious affiliation. 
Calculating the Muslim proportion of the U. K. population using this ethnicity 
question is problematic: ethnicity identities are not exclusively 'Muslim. Arab, 
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African, Afro-Caribbean, European, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani categories 
include non-Muslim and Muslim components; the 'Indian" category could 
incorporate people from East Africa or the Caribbean; 'Pakistani' could include 
migrants from pre-1971 East Pakistan. With these factors in mind, several 
theories and estimates have been considered, with significant variations in 
figures: 
"Various sources estimate the Muslim population between 550,000 and 
3,000,000. Any figures over 1.5 million are normally mentioned by 
Muslim organisations. The most common estimate of the Muslim 
population is about one million. " 2 
Anwar's study of the 1991 Census estimates the number of Muslims at 1.5 million 
in 1993.3 The proportionally most significant number of Muslims come from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (pre-1971 East Pakistan) origins. Other Muslim 
populations in Britain have ancestral links with India (pre- and post-Partition 
boundaries), Cyprus (pre- and post-partition boundaries, including the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus), sub-Saharan African countries, Turkey, the 
Maghreb, Egypt, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, and Arab Gulf/'Middle East' states. 
Minor discrepancies occur with figures concerning non-Muslim migrants from 
Muslim majority countries. 4 Migrants whose statehood has been, or continues to 
be, 'undefined' include: migrants of Kurdish origin, Gulf Marsh Arabs, 
Palestinians, Kashmiris, and Muslims from the former-Yugoslavia. 
Population analysis can be augmented with information on religious 
f 
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affiliation, to create more accurate understandings of the diverse Islamic 
platforms within U. K. Islamic environments - representing varied approaches 
towards decision-making processes. Statistically, there is no current analysis of 
Muslim religious affiliations in the U. K. Networks of Islamic affiliation include: 
Tablighi-Jama`at; Jamb at-e Islamit Brelwi/Ahl-i-sunna wa-jdma at, Ahl-i- 
Hadith; Ahl-i-Kur'än; Deobandi; Salafi; and various Sü fF' tars kh (including 
Suhrawardiyya, Qadiriyya, Chisti, Nakshbandiyya). 5 Organisations and 
individuals with connections to some of these networks are discussed below, in 
relation to approaches towards decision-making processes and itihäd. 
Different emphases are apparent on certain issues, between and within broad 
bands of Islamic interests in the U. I. Platforms may be influenced by 
commitments to ancestral origin-centred agendas and priorities. These can shift 
to incorporate a greater 'Islamically' focused agenda, within the minority context, 
under the influence of other U. K. Islamic networks and communities. Levels of 
co-operation between and within Islamic interest groups may, however, be limited 
or non-existent. Amidst the diversity, it is recognised that certain issues have 
received a wide response from within different sectors of Islamic expression in 
the U. K., although not all have - or wish to have - high profile platforms with 
which to express their viewpoints to other Muslims, as well as non-Muslims. 
Specific issues have immediate personal impact on living life 'Islamically' as a 
Muslim in Britain. 'Being a Muslim' has many different meanings and levels of 
practice. The intention here is to explore issues relating to Islamic decision- 
making processes and interpretations of various sources - whether the individual 
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Muslim wishes to utilise or observe these interpretations or not. A 'secularised' 
Muslim may not be concerned with issues of interpreting Islamic primary sources 
in a contemporary context, or in observing hukm or other boundaries. 
The non-Muslim 'external' environment also influences the decision-making 
processes of Muslims in the U. K. The history of key contact points between 
Muslims and Britain demonstrates that many formative manifestations of anti- 
Muslim prejudice in Western Europe and - more specifically, Britain - have 
continuity with contemporary patterns of prejudice experienced within 
contemporary U. K. Islamic environments. 6 The current research has indicated 
that these prejudices influence the decision-making processes and the structures 
of contemporary environments within which the majority of Muslims in Britain 
live. 
Non-Muslim prejudices have influenced Muslim community activities - at 
local and national levels. Occasionally, prejudices have contributed towards 
organisations advancing their aims, through the catalyst of indignation and anger 
mobilising action - notably during the initial flash-point and aftermath following 
publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. ' The responses of the non- 
Muslim majority towards 'Islamic' issues has influenced Muslim self-perception 
in the U. K., and demonstrated a need for stronger or different forms of lobbying, 
organisation, and leadership: 
"Until recently, the community was concerned only with jobs. The Labour 
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Party was a natural ally ... During the Rushdie affair we found out that not 
only did out M. P. s not support us, but they opposed us. " $ 
The 'Rushdie Affair' stimulated efforts within sectors of Muslim communities to 
promote the knowledge of Islam, even in the High Court' Efforts at lobbying for, 
and analysing, the requirements of Muslims in Britain have been severely 
restricted by lack of funding, and organisational difficulties. 10 
Muslim individuals, families and communities in the U. K. can be classified 
by contextual indicators, including: gender, Islamic 'affiliation' (if any), ethnic 
identity and age; the number of family-generations born and/or raised in the UK. " 
Contextual indicators are influential within analysis of decision-making - and 
should be considered in terms of interviewee responses discussed below i. e. when 
comparing the responses of teenage youth to the responses of 'elders. ' 
The majority of Muslims in the U. K. are linked (either directly or through 
ancestry) with migration after World War Two. British Commonwealth Muslims 
comprised a significant proportion of the two million migrants to Britain. 
'Pioneer' Muslim immigrants were often young, single males - who sought to 
work, save, and subsequently purchase property within places of origin. These 
pioneers formed the basis of existing Muslim communities, remaining in the U. K. 
for diverse reasons, including acquisition of rights of residence restricted or 
denied to later prospective migrants. Acquisition in the U. K. of employment, 
property and businesses facilitated improved economic opportunities and security 
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than in places of origin. Certain pioneers became alienated from places of origin, 
through distance of time, as well as shifting cultural patterns and practices linked 
to'westernisation': wars, class-clan conflicts, political shifts, and other 'crises' also 
influenced patterns of settlement. 12 New family ties and networks of patronage 
and status influenced many pioneers to remain in the U. K. The ambition of 
acquiring 'British' standards of education and enculturisation for their U. K. -born 
(and passport-holding) children also contributed to the reticence to return to 
places of origin. '3 
Despite pressures - including poverty, declining employment opportunities, 
and manifestations of prejudice - these factors persuaded many 'temporary' . 11 
migrants to stay. Specific, new Islamic 'community infrastructures' were 
gradually formed, by migrants and their descendants who sought: 
" 
... to preserve religion and culture 
in a minority situation. It is not simply 
the predominance of another religion which caused concern to Muslims; 
they wanted to safeguard Islam from the growing secularisation of British 
society. " 14 
It could be disputed whether this was desire for preservation of 'Islam' per se, or 
preservation of specific interpretations based - for example - on varieties of 
cultural, religious, and traditional expression. The creation of infrastructures 
included development of frameworks for Islamic decision-making processes, 
linked (although not exclusively) to places of origins and 'imported' decision 
makers, including ünams. One reaction to the 'threat' of'secularisation' (which has 
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several possible definitions) was the creation of 'barriers' around Islamic 
interpretations, which endeavoured to shelter offspring from secularisation 
pressures (which were similarly being experienced in places of origin). In 
particular, there was a fear that Muslims in the U. K. would be 'assimilated' into 
the majority non-Muslim population - especially those Muslims born, encultured 
and/or educated in the I. K. - and that there would be a subsequent loss of 
identity. Similar fears have been expressed in Pakistan and Malaysia - and other 
Islamic environments - regarding so-called 'Westen' values 'corrupting' youth. 
These opinions - however rhetorical in nature - have informed the nature of 
Islamic decision-making in Britain, and reactions to 'modernity'. They have been 
expressed amongst a cross-section of Muslim opinion in the United Kingdom. f 
Fieldwork in Pakistan, Malaysia and Singapore demonstrated that - to a 
certain extent -a number of concerns are broadly shared. It has already been seen 
that approaches and solutions can differ considerably - although the differences 
transcend national boundaries, and relate more to specific groupings within each 
country. Many of the issues are interlinked, and cannot be easily incorporated 
into narrow categories. However, a central theme throughout all the fieldwork 
has been the focus of the family - and different approaches towards maintenance 
of'values'. These approaches may incorporate so-called 'Islamic values', although 
generalisations cannot be made as to which situation is 'better' or 'worse`. For 
Muslims seeking to maintain 'Islamic beliefs', their priorities may be reflected in 
the observation of Ahmad bin Mohamed Ibrahim: 
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"The problems of a Muslim in following the Islamic law in a Muslim 
minority country are many, but the most acute are in the fields of marriage 
and divorce. Marriage in Islam is a solemn covenant... " 15 
Concern was expressed amongst interviewees that the numerically predominant 
non-Muslim population - through cultural, religious, secular, 'moral', and other 
influences - would 'corrupt' or adversely influence the 'Islamic values' of 
individuals, the family, and the 'community' (whether that is perceived in the eyes 
of individuals on a local, national, or international 'ummah basis). The 
understanding of this 'corruption` is itself enlightening: the concept of 'corruption' 
can be used as rhetoric, attempting to mobilise Muslims (perhaps in association 
with an Islamic or political platform). This 'corruption' can also be linked to a 
fear of assimilation, where values determined as'un-Islamic' are incorporated into 
the identity of an individual or community. The level to which an `Islamic 
identity' is interwound with a cultural specific identity - incorporating aspects of 
Islamic understanding and interpretation which may not be seen as 'universal' by 
other Muslim individuals or groups - should be considered when assessing the 
responses below. Descriptions of Islamic identity vary across cultural, religious, 
gender, geographic, and ethnic boundaries - even though they may incorporate 
key similarities and concepts. 
One interviewee believed that 'Muslim values' were affected by the external 
environment, and work pressures of work upon individuals within that family 
unit: 
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" ... 
in England, a person goes for work for example, the distance of the 
work involved means he doesn't find time or energy to pay attention to his 
wife and children - matters get out of hand - that is causing some 
problems ... 
" ... And sometimes because of economic situation both have to work ... And they have children, and that is a problem ... Although quite a number 
of our families still maintain this joint family... and the majority of the 
mothers are quite helpful. "16 
Such pressures on the family, of course, have similar effects on non-Muslim 
family structures - and this provides an example of a 'shared concern'. These 
difficulties can also be found within countries with Muslim majority populations. 
Malaysian Muslims in urban environments alluded to the pressures facing 
families in the context of increasing industrialisation and demands upon the 
work-force - and the detrimental effects this had on the ideals of family life. 
Within Singapore, the pressure was such that individuals postponed marriage 
because of lack of socialisation opportunities, and the time-demands of the office 
workplace. Youth delinquency in Singapore was directly associated with a lack 
of parenting and an absence of'Islamic values' - because of pressures on parents 
to achieve specific work-objectives and high-income. In the U. K., work pressures 
have been one factor in an increasing divorce rate, changing aspirations, and 
development of single parent families. These trends have been described as 
problematic by Muslims in Britain, and seen as one of the pressures facing the 
'Muslim family ideal'. 
Another interviewee interpreted the pressures on the family unit that emerged 
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as linked to the fact that the U. K. is not a'Muslim country'. She stated that, for the 
majority of Muslims, sharl`a does not apply to wider circles of life - only within 
the context of private life. This led to double standards and tension, compounded 
by the difficulties Muslims had in achieving within predominantly non-Muslim 
settings. " It could be argued that this is to some extent a representation of an 
'ideal', as within'Muslim countries', than a does not apply to wider circles of life 
- and may only be effective in limited private sectors. For example, several 
interviewees in Pakistan felt that the lack of implementation of share `a (which 
itself was described in varying ways) was a problem, despite the fact that the 
majority of the country was 'Muslim'. That in itself was not seen as a solution. 
Similarly, share `a in Malaysia was linked only to elements of personal law. The 
comment of this interviewee may, therefore, represent a distancing between 
herself and the practicalities of life within a 'Muslim country'. It may also 
represent an idealised assumption of how Muslims live in the private context in 
the U. K. 
'Q. S. ', an newly-qualified nnäm, had spent only a few years in the U. K., 
working within a Muslim community and its extended national network. Q. S. 
was directly involved in decision-making processes at grass-roots level. Q. S. 
considered that his primary concern was linked to youth and Islamic education - 
particularly values associated with the family. According to Q. S., British schools 
were not disciplined, and mixed gender classes led to ill-discipline and parental 
concern (this concern centred on girls obtaining boyfriends, rather than boys 
obtaining girlfriends. ) Q. S. believed that, because of different cultural influences, 
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it was unsafe to allow young girls out at thirteen years of age - walking alone (this 
view would also be found in non-Muslim contexts in the U . K. ) Q. S. believed that 
a quick marriage offered 'relaxation' to the parents. The opinion of the girl was 
not discussed by Q. S. '$ 
Q. S. raised the example of what he described as a 'Pakistani Muslim girl' 
who found [sic] a 'Hindu boyfriend'. This had not pleased the girl's parents, who 
came to the nnäm for advice: he asked them why she had not married earlier? It 
was his belief that the girl should be sent to Pakistan or other `Islamic countries'. 
deemed 'safer' environments for young women, where they might find marriage 
partners (or partners might be arranged for them). The parents' response was that 
it was expensive to travel. Q. S. recognised that the majority of parents he 
encountered 'look after their girls well' in the U. K., but that there were many 
difficulties. Q. S. believed that Muslims should remove their children from 
'mixed schools' for such reasons, even at great personal sacrifice. 
Q. S. suggested that, within the U. K. school environment, with six hours 
speaking English in class - and a subsequent three hours watching children's 
television, there was no time for children to learn about Islam or 'home' cultural 
values. " Q. S. had difficulty recognising and dealing with the pressures associated 
with living in his 'first generation' minority context - whilst involved with 
decision-making processes of a community with a long history within Britain. 
Whilst extensively-trained in Islamic sciences, the practicalities of applying this 
knowledge was tempered (within certain issues) by limited personal experience 
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within his new environment - albeit a relatively small, well-organised and funded 
community. 
Certain points Q. S. raised conflict with existing norms within much of the 
wider society: for example, the desire to have a girl married at twelve years of age 
would not be well-received by the majority population. Whilst girls are still 'sent 
away' to be married abroad, increasing assertiveness of girls raised and influenced 
within a predominantly non-Muslim environment has led to some girls running 
away from home, fearing being sent to a country of which they have limited or 
negative knowledge or experience. Family ties, parental upbringing in the U. K., 
and a distancing from places of ancestral origin, also influence decisions 
regarding sending a girl abroad for marriage. 
Certain non-Muslim opinions within the censorship debate would strongly 
agree with the Q. S. °s views on the media, as well as wider issues related to mixed 
schools and the 'morality' of Carly marriage. The views of Q. S. regarding these 
values have - to some extent - been answered by his community developing its 
own school system, promoting its understanding of Islam within the National 
Curriculum, and ensuring (after a certain age) only limited gender-mixing in 
school. Not all parents are able (or wish) to send their children to such a school. 
Some believe that better education standards are found outside of Muslim-run 
schools. 2° 
Within the family context, there are many possibilities for disputes requiring 
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decision-making in an 'Islamic' framework. A single example will not be 
representative of the complexities and the 'entirety'. The following example does, 
however, raise a number of issues connected with the decision-making processes. 
Q. S. found, on arriving in the U. K., that he was expected to have a role 
intervening in family disputes, for example between a husband and a wife. He 
provided the following example, of an approach towards a common issue: 
Q. S. was contacted by a man, 'M', who was having problems with his 
wife, W. She had been shouting at him that she wanted a divorce, 
although'M' did not know why. Q. S. visited the couple's house, and was 
well-received by both parties. Q. S. talked to W, who said that 'M' did not 
care for their baby; when the husband came home from work, he just went 
to sleep. 'W' was expected to attend to the child at all hours, with no 
assistance, resulting in 'W' getting little sleep herself. 'W' had no 
opportunity to leave the house, because 'M' would not look after the child. 
Q. S. provided his solution, on 'Islamic' lines: he suggested that 'M' was 
responsible out of home (he described the husband as 'foreign minister'), 
whilst the 'W' was responsible in the house (he described the wife as 
'interior minister'). The whole process of mediation was time-consuming 
and wearing, according to Q. S., although he said it was always 'a pleasure' 
for him to solve problems. Q. S. said that problems occur in all families, 
even his own. He suggested that 'M' be responsible for the child in the 
evening (and that each partner was to sleep for four hour periods, 
alternately caring for the baby if required during the other four hours). 
Q. S. concluded his story with the example of Muhammad, who stated that 
peace between two families is as important as prayer and fasting - and that 
divorce is the worst thing. Q. S. felt that there were many problems 
regarding divorce within the Muslim communities, and suggested a two 
to three year attempt at reconciliation prior to final divorce. He was 
conscious of what he considered as the related social problems, especially 
linked to finance. 2' 
This provides one approach to decision-making within a so-called'traditional' 
f 
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Islamic framework within the U. K. External marital relations counsellors were 
not consulted. It has a resemblance to equivalent processes practised within 
Singapore by the Syariah Court (which functions in a state-funded capacity). 
Muslim couples in Singapore may take their dispute to a councillor in the Syariah 
Court, for arbitration. This pattern of arbitration is also reflected in other Islamic 
contexts. In the first instance, Muslims in Britain may consult local Islamic 
'systems' or authorities for help and guidance. Whilst they have no legislated 
'legal' power or authority, their capacity as 'representatives' of Islam and their 
status within the local community provides the status for consultation. Whether 
the process outlined in the example can be described as i jtihäd or not is open to 
discussion. 
Q. S. also noted that he was consulted to help families find marital partners 
for their children. This was described as another 'problem' within Islamic 
environments, demonstrated by the responses Q. S. received when providing his 
selections: they were rejected by assertive U. K. Muslim families, because the 
men chosen did not come from Britain but from a'foreign' culture - frequently not 
speaking English - and without jobs and prospects. Another criterion was that 
the 
women simply did not like the 'looks' of the men 'chosen(! ). 
22 
Another full-time nnäm indicated that 80% of his time concerned 
interpretation of the Kur'än, and that a high proportion of those 
interpretations 
related to marriage and divorce. 10% of his time was spent on associated social 
issues, visiting people, as well as being contacted on the telephone and 
fax 
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machine. He suggested that many people sought a listener to their problems, and 
through discussing them 'Islamically', it becomes a cathartic process. When 
subjects cannot be dealt with, within a marital dispute, if both parties are 'strong', 
they seek assistance from others in the U. K. Alternatively, a religious leader can 
be consulted abroad via the U. K. -based nnäm. 23 
A Muslim decision-maker in London, 'H. I. ', widely consulted for his 
expertise and self-defined 'modernising' approaches towards Islamic 
interpretation, provided further examples of Islamic issues within the family 
context, and the problems when parties are unfamiliar with the issues from an 
'Islamic perspective' - or have been provided (deliberately or otherwise) with 
incorrect information: 
H. I. was consulted by two young women, both seeking divorce from their 
husbands after one year's marriage. They did not believe that - 
'Islamically' - they had the choice of initiating separation, believing that 
the initiative could only come from their husbands (who were reluctant 
to provide it). 
H. I. told them that, according to his interpretation of Islam, women had 
the choice of initiating divorce too. This calmed the situation for the 
women, through providing them with empowerment. They were able to 
inform their husbands and families of the 'correct' authoritative Islamic 
position within this particular belief framework. This contradicted the 
opinions obtained by the women's families, who had consulted two 
'culture-centred' scholars, who presented their interpretation that the 
woman has no choice regarding divorce. 
H. I. was able to prove, through his interpretation, that he was 'correct'. It 
demonstrated to H. I. that, in his view, many Muslims lack understanding 
of basic principles regarding Islam. He reflected, however, that the 
erroneous 'traditional' perspective frequently prevailed in similar cases - 
and that he was in a 'minority'. 24 
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This is one of several examples of the clash between so-called 'traditional' and 
'modern' perspectives, discussed in greater detail below. It demonstrates that a 
diversity of opinions (whichever one is'correct') are available within U. K. Islamic 
contexts, and that a lack of 'knowledge' regarding what are 'Islamic' procedures 
and principles can be 'damaging' to individuals. 
H. I. is not a 'professional' decision-maker - and is employed by other means. 
His duties are voluntary; he found the complexities and pressures in this part-time 
situation too time-consuming - especially being contacted at unsocial hours with 
'trivial' questions. H. I. also found it frustrating that - having made decisions -1 
those to whom he gave his time and knowledge did not always accept his 
authority or that of the affiliated mosque. One individual chose to ignore H. L's 
advice on an important religious issue relating to something 'forbidden', whilst 
continuing to use the mosque, in which H. I. led the prayers and delivered the 
khutba. H. I. considered this was 'hypocrisy', but also commented that such 
selectivity regarding authority reflected the 'general situation' within Muslim 
communities in Britain. 25 Several other interviewees in positions of authority 
also expressed disappointment that they were frequently ignored, or only followed 
when it was convenient to an individual. Further research is necessary regarding 
the value judgements associated with such feelings, both on the behalf of the 
decision 
maker, and the individual or community to whom the decision is 
directed. Determining whether H. I. is 'correct' in his assessment of those 
individuals who ignored him may simply be disquiet and 'dejection' at being 
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undermined - H. I. 's advice is not 'compulsory'. 
According to the Kur'an, there is no reason why an nnäm or decision maker 
should be a 'professional'. In the U. K., the pressures - especially in a minority 
context - have led several communities and mosques to pay for an nnäm's 
services. The amount of money available to a community may - according to 
some commentators - be reflected in the 'quality' of the nnams. Some 'imported' 
. näms have little knowledge of the contexts in which Muslims in Britain live, or 
knowledge of the English language. This can lead to conflict and factionalism 
within mosques and communities. 26 Muhammad Khalid Masud noted that 
Islamic context(s) in the U. K. lent themselves to the development of a 'imam' 
class to a greater extent - proportionally - than an equivalent community in 
Pakistan. This also related to increased community mosque use in Britain, and 
a changing emphasis of the mosque. 27 
Some mosques and Islamic organisations provide Marriage Reconciliation 
Committees within their structure, to deal with attempts to bring marriage 
partners back together, according to 'Islamic' principles. 2$ The Islamic Shari'ah 
Council of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, founded in 1982, sought to advise 
Muslims in Britain on matters of personal and family law referred to it. Amongst 
its publicised aims were: 
"To strive to resolve problems confronting Muslims in the light of the 
Qur'an and Sunnah and according to the agreed principles of the Islamic 
jurists and to establish a bench to give decisions (fatawa) on any problem 
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referred to it by Muslims in the light of the Qur'an and Sunnah. " 29 
In 1985, the Imams and Mosques Council separately founded The Muslim Law 
Shari'ah Council, which included 23 `ulama-'. Within certain parameters, these 
were intended to representing the differing interpretations of Islam in the U. K., 
in order to deal with issues of personal law. 30 
Whether these bodies were successful is open to speculation. Their financial 
resources were limited, a factor contributing to their current state of inactivity. 
Whilst active, these bodies answered enquiries and deal with cases related to 
aspects of interpretation of Islam - in particular those relating to niljäh (marriage), 
taläk (divorce), and custody of children after separation or divorce. A common 
problem the `ulama-' had to deal with was incompatibility between a married 
couple, represented in this example: 
" ... of a girl 
from a 'British' background and a boy from Pakistan (who) 
was imported, and they could not carry on. And therefore the question of 
separation came, and we were struggling, we were fighting ... on that 
Islamic issue. 
"I was part of that, that Islamic law - particularly the Islamic personal law: 
this is one of the demands by the Muslims, that Islamic personal law 
should be accepted within British courts. It has not been accepted up until 
now. So if a couple is separated, on the decision of a British court, a 
magistrate has issued a separation certificate, but the community does not 
accept that. 
"Therefore an Islamic separation or an Islamic divorce has to be acquired, 
and therefore there were cases where the decisions of the British court 
was there, but the girl approached the Shari'ah Council, that: 'I want to 
marry, but the community does not accept that separation. Therefore 
I 
should be issued an Islamic divorce. '" 31 
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Whilst the matter of Islamic personal law being fully accepted within the U. K. 
courts has been on several Islamic agendas, the possibilities of it occurring in the 
short-term have not improved. This may reflect the difficulties of integrating 
separate 'Islamic' aspects into the legal system, or identifying common Islamic 
ground; some people believe it is an example of discrimination and 'anti-Muslim' 
sentiments. A legislative acknowledgement of 'Islamic' personal law would open 
the way for other religious interests to present the case for acceptance of their 
'law'. There is also the 'Kur'än-ic' viewpoint that, when an individual is present 
in a non-Muslim land, that individual must follow the laws laid down there, and 
have friendly relations with non-Muslims (within certain limits). 32 Islamic 
decision-making processes are restricted by a jurisdiction that is to an extent r 
'voluntary' on behalf of members of a given community, in that it is not or cannot 
be enforced by officers of the law or the courts, unless it matches or falls into line 
with the laws of the majority society (for example, a process of Islamic decision- 
making which is made with the intent of clarifying and agreeing with new 
legislation or laws). There are no restrictions on voluntary observation of 
'Islamic' personal law, unless that observation contradicts with British law. 
Community and family pressures can change the 'voluntary' nature of this 
observation, through applying pressures and 'forcing' an individual to follow a 
specific code or interpretation. 
There is limited legislative provisions specifically relating to Islam and 
Muslims. 33 The Marriage Act (1983) provides one example, of how an 'Islamic' 
practice is incorporated into law: it requires that a couple attend a Registrar prior 
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to a marriage in Britain, if the official (usually an nnäm) undertaking the nikäh 
ceremony does not have the appropriate Registrar authority. A marriage which 
does not have a licence from a Registrar is not valid in Britain. The usual practice 
would be for a couple to arrange a state recognised ceremony to obtain the 
marriage licence, prior to a Muslim wedding - which is often in a mosque. This 
is one area which may see an increasing number of mosque officials obtaining 
validation to function as a Registrar. 
Family issues dominate Syed ad-Darsh's column in the London-published 
Muslim newspaper Q-News International (formerly Q-News), and provides 
indicators of other topics that Islamic decision makers have to deal with. Syed ad- 
Darsh attempts to provide Islamic responses to issues raised by readers, utilising 
knowledge acquired at al-Azhar. He also relates his own experiences as an 
Islamic decision maker in the U. K., including work at the Shari'ah Council. 
Frequently asked questions on family matters have included approaches towards 
'mixed-marriages' between Sunni and Shi `a Muslims, and Muslims and 
converts. 34 Whilst promoting conversion to Sunni Islam, Darsh's view has shifted 
away from 'mixed-marriages', because of fears regarding custody of children and 
their Muslim upbringing in the event of separation, within marriages his 
experience has indicated have a 'short-shelf life'. 35 Darsh was critical of non- 
Muslim men who do not want to convert in order to marry a Muslim woman; 
these men are described as narrow minded, seeking to destroy the women. 36 
Darsh believed that the problem of 'mixing' between men and women, where one 
partner is not a Muslim, is indicative of the dangers contained within a minority, 
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non-Islamic environment. It also reflected what was seen as the failure of 'a 
community' to provide 'Islamic' 'pass-times' for children. 37 Citing Shari'ah 
Council experience, Darsh also opposed marriages between Muslims and Peoples 
of the Book', i. e. Christians and Jews . 
3' Darsh has been opposed to the concept 
of an 'engagement', because of the 'dangers' of unchaperoned meetings between 
the couple prior to marriage. 39 He did, however, describe how scholars permitted 
the presentation of 'decent' photos between the couple prior to their marriage. " 
He also said there was nothing 'un-Islamic' in the concept of a'honeymoon'. 41 One 
particular issue related to marriage that has proved controversial has been the 
dowry, and its growth in value: this growth - which in the U. K. can incorporate 
provision of cars, expensive domestic appliances, and houses - has been seen as 
disproportionate and 'un-Islamic' by Darsh, who seeks a return to more modest 
dowries which he believes do not impede marriage. " 
Issues concerning Islamic `moral values' and the Muslim family form a focus 
of Darsh's column, and also have implications within the wider debate on 
decision-making processes, given the importance of family structures and 
networks for Muslims in Britain. The notion of 'partner choice' (disparagingly 
termed 'love marriages' by some sources) and arranged marriages is a dominant 
one for a minority existing in a society where partner choice is the norm. These 
pressures may surface within the British legal-system. 43 As Muslims interact and 
form friendships and relationships with non-Muslims, the issue of `mixed 
marriages' is likely to remain on the decision-making agenda. This provides one 
indication of the 'transition period' certain Muslim frameworks are passing 
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through, in the U. K. There is potential growth for more 'mixed' marriages 
between different Muslim groups that have traditionally been separate within the 
U. K. context (reflecting the removal of linguistic and cultural barriers). ' Not all 
Muslims wish to observe an Islamic agenda regarding their relationships, 
particularly those outside of marriage. These have clear-cut responses within the 
Islamic sources, and have generally not been dealt with in Darsh's column in great 
detail - although adultery has been referred to at least twice, once in the context 
of the burden of proof requiring four reliable witnesses. 45 
Issues of Islamic morality have links with Islamic 'education' values; these 
include concepts instilled in the family environment, those provided in the 
context of Islamic communities in the U. K., and/or those values presented by 
'external' Islamic sources, leaders, and 'authorities'. The educational process also 
incorporates those values obtained within various education systems (from pre- 
school through to university), and those influences obtained from the wider non- 
Muslim society (i. e. through interaction with people and media). All these 
complex factors play integral roles in the impact of decision-making processes 
within U. K. Islamic environments, in that they inform the community about 
responses towards various issues. 
The madrasa, or mosque school (as frequently defined in the U. K. context), 
provide facilities for children and youth to learn about Islam out of school hours. 
Concern was generally expressed regarding the low quality of education provided 
in some mosques and madrasas, although some people believed that `something 
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is better than nothing'. It was identified that there is a need to move away from 
'ad-hoc-ism', towards recognisable standards of achievement for students in the 
madrasas. It was also suggested that 'understanding Islam' means more than 
mastering recitation of the Kur'An, and should incorporate actual understanding 
of the meaning of texts. Whilst studying the Kur'än, Sunna, and Hadith had 
importance, it was one interviewee's belief that students in madrasas should be 
taught about their fundamental rights within British society, in order to preserve 
them against anti-Islamic values. a6 Such changes could be effective within a 
national madrasa framework, if there was co-operation between different'Islamic 
interests'. There was an impression that systems of teaching had been 'imported' - 
along with their teachers - without being structurally adjusted to accommodate f 
British-born and raised Muslims. National development of new systems would 
require the input and experience of trained professionals, with the likelihood of 
encountering resistance amongst established educational interests within 
madrasas and mosques. This is a significant area for future Islamic decision- 
making processes and policy in the U. K. 
The comments of teenagers, who had attended an inner-city madrasa in 
Leicester, 4' on the quality of the education they received reflects some of the 
difficulties. These have similarities with the comments of other interviewees. 
Three male youths ['A. A. ', B. A. ', 'C. A. '] were interviewed by the researcher 
['G. B. ']: two had attended classes on 'learning the Kur'än', at the insistence of their 
parents (the third had learnt at home). They reflected and encapsulated criticisms 
heard elsewhere about madrasa education: 
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G. B. Did you learn what the Kur'än actually means, rather than simply 
recitation? 
B. A. Sometimes we don't learn the meanings. We would like to learn more. We've got a new priest [sic], who tells you the meaning. 
A. A. Priests tell you the meaning of an important part. But it is hard to learn 
all of it. 
G. B. Do you feel that the im ms and teachers should be selecting what portions 
you understand? Shouldn°t you have the choice to be able to read about 
any issue, and then to make up your own mind? 
C. A. We learn progressively. First learn the Kurän by rote, and then 
understanding and meaning. 
G. B. What about if you were taught [Kur'än] in school? 
C. A. If schools had a facility whereby you could learn Arabic, then we'd be 
successful in school, and in praying in Kur'n. 
G. B. Shouldn't the madrasa teacher do it [teach them]? 
A. A. Well, they have big classes, and there is not enough time. 
B. A. Also we speak Gujarati and Urdu. Arabic should be learnt in the mosque, 
though, not Urdu. Then we would understand the khutba fluently. 
C. A. There is a lack of priests and mosques. Arabic speaking is not for the 
lower class. For häfiz [learning the Kur'än by heart] only. 48 
Whilst not reflecting the experience of every mosque school in Britain, these 
comments are indicators of several issues connected with decision-making 
priorities in Islamic environments. As well as recitation, understanding the 
meaning of the Kur'än held a significance for these youth, who had access to 
English language translations of the meaning of the Kur'än, but sought to learn 
the Arabic properly. They expressed a desire to learn Arabic as part of the 
National Curriculum, seeing it as 'more useful' than - for example - French and 
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German. They believed it would enhance their overall educational performance, 
and could even be useful in the workplace. 
The youth felt there were also pressures to acquire knowledge in languages 
linked to places of ancestral origin, including Urdu and Gujurati. They were 
concerned that they did not understand the khutba, which was delivered either in 
Arabic, Urdu, or Gujurati -a problem compounded by a lack of educated 
personnel to teach them. They were dissuaded by the 'methodology' of learning 
the Kur'än - and provided examples of bullying and beating by madrasa teachers 
(an issue that has also appeared in the Muslim press): many contemporaries were 
disenchanted, and had given up studies in the subject altogether. Educational 
achievement in school was believed to be a greater priority. Several of these 
comments were also reflected during fieldwork in Pakistan, although learning 
Arabic and the Kur'än had a place within some school curriculums (to a certain 
level) and was augmented in after-school classes. " Within both the U. I. and 
Pakistan, several interviewees stated that once a child had learnt to recite some 
portions of the Kurän, there was no obligation for the child to attend further 
studies. Criticisms of religious teaching in these settings is consistent amongst 
several interviewees, including former teachers. However, some smaller, more 
insular community leaders expressed satisfaction (or complacency? ) with the 
quality of religious education - whilst believing that this was not the situation 
amongst other Muslim communities. 'L. T. ' -a youth worker - noted that Islamic 
schooling within mosques was insufficient, because of large classes, and the 
fact 
that they were taking place in children's 'peripheral time' - children having a 
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limited attention span. L. T. indicated that, for the majority of children, given a 
choice about attending such schools, they would refuse. " 
The provision of'Islamic education' features strongly in demands for Muslim 
schools, where it can be incorporated into the school curriculum. There are a 
number of examples of Islamic schools in Britain, and the demands of the Islamia 
Trust for state-funded Islamic schools by Yusuf Islam has placed the issue 
prominently upon the national education agenda. Several educational platforms 
exist, within the Association of Muslim Schools, Muslim Educational Trust, Iqra 
Trust, Islamia Schools Trust, Union of Muslim Organisations, Islamic 
Foundation, U. K. Education Wagf, Muslim Parliament, and Islamic Academy. 
Fieldwork indicated severe disagreement between members of these platforms, 
resulting in a general lack of consensus. Several Islamic schools have achieved 
high positions in U. K. school league tables, including Bradford Girls' School and 
Tower Hamlets Islamic College, London. Education within state schools remains 
the predominant issue, given that many parents do not have access - 
geographically or financially - to privately-run Islamic schools: the majority of 
Muslim students are in state education. One interviewee stated that Muslims 
should seek greater participation within education provision, and encourage the 
training of more Muslim teachers. Within U. K. Islamic environments, the status 
of teachers has been undermined by cultural pressures, and because of the 
relatively low income of teachers compared with other professionals. " 
Demands for Islamic components within the state system are not universal 
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or consistent in terms of priorities amongst Muslim parents, who prefer an 
emphasis on education that will enhance their children's economic chances, and 
future educational and employment opportunities. One interviewee, a Muslim 
head working within a state school with a large Muslim studentship, felt it was 
important for Muslims to function within the mainstream of society, learning the 
National Curriculum, rather than Muslims being 'marginalised' within Islamic 
schools. 52 This raises the issue of working and influencing attitudes within a state 
system, reflecting not just 'Islamic decision-making' - but 'external' decision- 
making factors influencing Muslims. This raises the hypothetical question of 
whether - in the long term - 'Islamic' principles and/or policies promoted by 
Muslims could influence the state-education system? 
The debate about funding for education can only be referred to briefly here: 
some interviewees sought to present the arguments regarding financial assistance 
from the Department for Education [D. F. E. ]. The D. F. E. -Islamic platform 
dialogue regarding Muslim schools not receiving full-funding is a long-standing 
one. Whilst other religious schools obtain funding - for example, Roman 
Catholic, Jewish, and Church of England schools - no Muslim school had 
received full state support. The arguments are complex: some authorities believe 
that this is because Muslim schools have not attained specific standards; some 
Muslim platforms see the refusal as a manifestation of anti-Muslim prejudice. 
Discussions remain in progress. Given that the majority of Muslim pupils will 
continue to attend state schools, some platforms have concentrated on developing 
links with educational bodies and providing an 'Islamic' input in this way. One 
C 
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example is the Muslim organisational and individual contribution to 'S. A, C. R. E. ' 
(Standing Advisory Committee on Religious Education), developing syllabus 
material. 
The influence and quality of education contributes towards the shaping of 
Islamic decision-making processes in the U. K. A well-educated (and employed) 
Muslim workforce is clearly going to make a greater impact on the wider society 
than a poorly educated one. The political ramifications of education provision 
impact directly upon the future structures of Muslim frameworks in the U. K., and 
the attitudes towards Islam expressed by generations of Muslims educated within 
the state system. 'H. O. ' noted that the different gender roles expressed within r 
certain interpretations of Islam also had implications for educational standards. 
In a generalisation, it was stated that males had a greater freedom of movement, 
whilst females remained in the home environment. This meant that females had 
more time to study, and were enjoying superior examination results which could 
be attributed to this factor. It was felt that males did - in certain cases - 'catch up 
later'. This comment, however, may reflect a wider pattern amongst non-Muslim 
pupils. The relative academic success of female Muslim students had contributed 
to changing parental attitudes, together with parents' own experience within the 
educational system: this had led to an increase in opportunities for female 
students to achieve at higher academic levels, such as college and university. 
s3 
This includes students who have attended 'Islamic' schools: 
"If the girls are properly disciplined during this age, then they should 
be 
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O. K. to attend universities after they get their G. C. S. E. s. When girls leave 
school, they know how to conduct themselves in public and should have 
no difficulty in handling the cultural conflict, arising from growing up between home and schools. "54 
Higher achievement at non-Muslim institutions, and the issue of choosing 
appropriate places of education, has been raised within Syed ad-Darsh's column. 
Despite the concern that children might academically under-perform at a single 
sex Muslim school, Darsh still recommended that children attended the Muslim 
school, indicating that Islam took the priority: 
"... we are here either by accident or by birth or by necessity. " 55 
r 
The contents of the National Curriculum has been a cause of contention and 
discussion between Muslim educational lobbyists56 and educational authorities. " 
The dialogue has included conferences and establishment of a consolidated 
charitable platform of (select) interested parties - the United Kingdom Islamic 
Education Wagf, chaired by Yusuf Islam of Islamia Schools Trust. 58 Amongst the 
issues of concern within the Islamic agenda, one of the priorities has been 
provision of 'appropriate' sex education. There is no single 'Islamic' viewpoint 
regarding sex education: views of interviewees ranged from parents/interested 
parties not wanting children/young adults to receive sex education, through to 
acceptance that it is part of the National Curriculum and has to be covered within 
a Muslim school (teachers also having to be trained to answer questions 
appropriately). The Muslim Educational Trust has provided one approach, based 
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upon an interpretation of primary Islamic sources, with which it has endeavoured 
to lobby Parliamentary and other authorities. It incorporates a'sexual etiquette of 
Islam', a discussion on approaches to Local Educational Authorities, and advice 
on how parents can approach teachers and question them regarding sex 
education. " The realisation that compromise is necessary - accommodating and 
balancing National Curriculum demands, the needs for awareness on sexual 
issues, the pragmatism of living in Britain, and the requirements of Islam - has led 
in some cases to conflict not just between Muslims in Britain, but between 
platforms and individuals who maintain contact with Muslims overseas: 
M. J. ... we 
had a conference on sex education. We were trying to prepare our 
response to sex education being given in schools. The Imams from the 
[Indian] sub-continent, they protested. They said: 
'What you are trying to prepare and bring to the attention of the children, 
it is not proper. ' 
So we said: 
'We know better. Whether you like it or not, this education is being given. 
And they see these things on TV and they read about them in newspapers. 
They see it outside. Unless we prepared an alternative Islamic response 
to it our children go astray. ' 
G. B. 
... 
Do you find that there is a two-way traffic - do you find that your 
concept of sex-education is going back to Pakistan or wherever? " 
M. J. No. I happened to receive a telephone call from Karachi, and [that] he was 
talking to me, saying that he thought I'd gone to the UK to try to make 
them better Muslims - 'now you have become like them 
in trying to 
prepare sex education! "' 
This provides an example of the difficulties and pressures experienced within the 
decision-making/opinion-forming frameworks of U. I. Islamic environments. 
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The concept of sex education was seen as anathema to certain inäms and 
authorities in Pakistan. However, during fieldwork in Pakistan, it was recognised 
by some interviewees that Islamic sources and resources exist regarding sex 
education - but that some authorities were selective in choosing to incorporate 
these views or ignore them completely. When the subject of sex education was 
raised in Pakistan, several interviewees determined that it was symptomatic of a 
'Western' or 'secular' 'immorality'. One interviewee in the U. K., a community 
worker with strong links to Muslim youth, asked where, if nnärns and other 
authorities were reluctant to provide advice, would the answers be found? Even 
writings on sexual issues by otherwise respected sources such as al-Ghazali were 
seen as 'too frank' by some Muslims. 61 
It could be asked whether this provides one indicator of a so-called 'tradition'- 
bound approach towards interpreting Islam? Is it indicative of the trend 
(suggested by several fieldwork sources), that the geographical and chronological 
'distance' - between migrants (and their descendants) and places of origination - 
has contributed to a time-bound Islamic interpretations by some nnams? One 
interviewee in Pakistan believed this was true, and that some Muslims in Britain 
had an incomplete knowledge of Islam: 
" 
... the 
Muslims who have been to England (sic) some thirty to forty 
years before, they were not much learned, and the knowledge of Islam 
was not complete to them. So most of the people who were living there, 
in UK, they belong to labour, work in factories - their knowledge was not 
complete. That is the reason they have narrowed down their minds, and 
do not want to change that. One of the reasons I came to England was to 
put the concept of Islam in a modern way. Muslims living in England, 
r 
241 
um 
they should cope with situations. " 62 
This is a view directed at the 'average' Muslim, rather than those within areas of 
leadership or academia (even though those areas may incorporate the traits 
discussed). Other interviewees in Pakistan believed that levels of individual 
knowledge and scholarship about Islam were improving in the U. K., and 
compared 'favourably' with those in Pakistan (whether that is a compliment or not 
is open to discussion). 
Examples surface of practices described as 'Islamic' that are resonant of 
aspects of 'traditional' rural culture in the Indian subcontinent. These are, on 
occasion, described negatively by other Muslim interests: 
"The really backward-looking imams, who can't even speak English, have 
tried to take control of the mosques everywhere, from Walthamstow to 
Bolton. I heard one the other day saying that our children shouldn't read 
literature. Another said girls should not be educated after the age of 10. 
And people are listening to these crazy things, particularly those troubled 
that their daughters are getting too independent. One said that eating with 
knives and forks is un-Islamic. "" 
This reflects a recognition of certain difficulties facing decision-making processes 
and Islamic interests in Britain, in particular the conflict between different 
interpretative aspects of Islam. The impact of so-called 'traditional outlooks` has 
an impact on many Muslims in the U. K., especially those educated within the 
state system. Decision-making based on 'traditional' concepts 
is likely to be 
further challenged throughout this transitional phase, without necessarily any 
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reconciliation between interests and parties. 
Certain 'Islamic' practices receive adverse publicity, for example in the 
media. Apologists often equate these practices with 'tradition', although 'tradition' 
in itself does not equate with 'harmful'; it may reflect a Muslim apologist's 
personal or organisational 'Islamic' viewpoint, for example through equating `urf 
with bida. It is not intended here to enter into the semantics of these terms, or 
to make value judgments regarding these concepts. There is no doubt, however, 
that media coverage of certain stories which indicate an 'Islamic' or 'Muslim' 
connection do cause harm to wider communities. These include criminal cases 
regarding plr' 'exorcisms, which have resulted in the death of the 'exorcised'. 64 r 
Whilst such extreme activities are not representative of the majority Muslim 
population, they provide 'ammunition' for an increase in anti-Muslim feeling. 
They also impact upon Muslim communities, influencing the maintenance of 
other 'traditional' practices that are not 'harmful' (in the sense of resulting in death 
or injury), and enhancing 'anti-traditionalism' and/or 'selective traditionalist' 
platforms. Certain practices may be driven 'underground', or practitioners 
ostracised. 
Such practices - even if atypical - put severe pressure on 'leadership' within 
communities, at local and national levels. Within some spheres, it increases the 
demands for 'British'-centred 'modern non-traditional` interpretations of Islam. 
There are varied theories behind the implementation of this ideal. 'Q. F. ', an 
interviewee with experience in U. K. and Pakistan Islamic contexts, believed it 
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would be the experience of U. K. Muslim scholars that would provide the required 
levels of knowledge and interpretations of Islam for a 'modern, non-traditional' 
society (both in the U. K. and Pakistan) - and that this would be promoted by 
U. K. -born and raised mutahid: 
Q. F. The need of the time is that the British Muslim scholars who know 
Western culture very much, and they are well versed with Islamic 
religion, they should try to bring these incompatible theological solutions. 
The problem is that the `ulamj' from Pakistan, from India, they are well 
versed [in Islam] but they don't know Britain. That's why there's a mish- 
mash. So we need those muLtahids, innovators, that should cultivate 
within those environments. 
G. B. Where do you think they are going to come from? In the lack of any 
developed educational system within the U. K., some people would say 
there was a decline in the standards of teaching of Islam, that there is no 
infrastructure at this stage - so where do you think these mu jtahids might 
appear from? 
Q. F. 
... 
Of those scholars, I'm just giving examples, whether they are ten, 
twelve, fifteen, it doesn't matter - because they have been living in Britain 
for many decades. They know oriental and Islamic culture very well, and 
they are good scholars. The selective few we can, of course, but you are 
very right, that we can't hang on for new scholars, emerging scholars, who 
are not really competent. 65 
The paradigmatic 'Islamic education system', therefore, is not just about informing 
Muslims about living life 'Islamically' in Britain. It is also about creating an 
environment and an opportunity, in which 'indigenous', culturally-attuned 
leadership(s) will emerge at all levels: 
"They [elders] are still operating the mosques as though they were still in 
Karachi... We want better educated imams with more modem views, and 
more say in the management. But they won't let us in. " 
66 
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The issue of training for such a role is a difficult one, given the limited number 
of organisations providing specific courses for 'Islamic knowledge' in the U. K.: 
institutions includes the Muslim College in London, which runs a course for 
training nnäms (incorporating history, English language, and counselling 
components) and Darul Ulum, in Dewsberry, Lancashire (based on a Deoband 
model of training). 
The discussion also incorporates university education, and the acquisition of 
degrees within related areas. This includes the nebulous areas within 'Islamic 
Studies', which has broad definitions and can contain markedly different 'primary 
source' components, depending upon the institution. 67 These institutions can be 
influential in providing knowledge about Islam and related issues to Muslim and 
non-Muslim students. " Deciding on an appropriate curriculum and location for 
such a course would raise logistical and ideological difficulties. Whilst several 
universities provide courses for aspiring Christian clergy, the likelihood of 
parallel Islamic frameworks emerging within universities in the short-term is 
remote. The concept of university institutions training Islamic religious leadership 
(however that may be defined) has not yet been incorporated within British 
academic frameworks. External funding institutions could influence existing or 
new departments of Islamic Studies in this direction in the future, given that 
governmental or educational authorities in Britain are generally reluctant to 
provide funding for Islamic-related studies in schools. The approaches of current 
Islamic decision makers, and whether or not they apply idjtihäd or related 
concepts in the formulation of approaches, will require consideration in future 
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analyses. Some sectors within U. K. Islamic environments believe such education 
on a more extensive scale would be beneficial for Muslim societies in Britain: 
"It would have advantages; `alims [sic] could be trained within the society 
and would understand the problems, but otherwise they should visit the 
same institutions - al-Azhar and the other schools - but here what they 
would get would not be the full breadth of knowledge at separate 
institutions, because the `ulamai' who run these institutions, they don't 
understand what the challenges of the modern times are. But they 
command the confidence. "69 
No data is available on the number of students who may be undertaking education 
outside of the United Kingdom, with a view to returning as an `älim/nnäm/ müftL 
There are different levels of education and institutions that provide such training, 
ranging from traditional schools centred around pis on the Indian sub-continent, 
through to long-established institutions such as al-Azhar. During fieldwork, it 
was interesting to compare approaches to this issue: within the minority context 
of Singapore, there were no university options for individuals seeking any Islamic 
Studies education: it was necessary to study abroad. The length of time of certain 
courses, such as al-Azhar, meant that there was a trend to direct students to those 
courses based on more intensive, 'western' university models (i. e. 3-4 year degrees 
for undergraduates). Other courses were described as prohibitive (in time and 
expense), by interviewees in Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan. 7° 
Within the Kur'an and other sources, the notion of 'professional' imams is not 
obligatory: anyone may lead the prayers, if they have sufficient 'knowledge'. 
In 
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both national and local British spheres, there is no 'professional Muslim clergy', 
at least not in the same sense as 'clergy' found in - for example - churches or 
synagogues. Larger mosques do have paid full or part-time staff, leading prayers, 
delivering khutbas, teaching, and/or providing other services. The leading of 
prayers requires different skills to dealing with 'personal' issues. 
Effective leadership at local and national level was felt necessary by many 
interviewees, in order to counter differing forms of pressures and prejudices that 
can be experienced by Muslim communities and individuals. Leadership is 
associated with the question of Muslim identity in the U. K. context, especially 
because leaders as 'spokespeople' often (consciously or unconsciously) operate 
as paradigmatic Muslims to non-Muslims. Leadership can represent effective 
responses to issues, contextually incorporating interpretation of primary sources, 
which are followed by sectors within U. K. Islamic environments. This following 
can be on -every issue: alternatively, it can be selective, and vary from case to 
case. As in other Islamic contexts, the forms of authority that exist vary, and it 
is impossible to make generalisations regarding 'Muslim leadership': some may 
be pro-active, others reactive; some focus upon a small community, others on the 
U. K. 's entire Muslim population; a 'leader' may be based outside of the U. K., and 
may not be familiar with U. I. contextual environments. Authority may 
incorporate 'pronouncements' on well-publicised platforms (to Muslim and non- 
Muslim audiences); to idatihäd or, fatwä; through to simple comments on issues 
of minor concern. These responses can form a framework for decision-making 
processes, on personal or community level: they could be given in publications 
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or other media, within a khutba (either directly by the leader or indirectly through 
a reading), or in another forum incorporating interpretation and direction of 
individuals (for example, a study circle or personal consultation). As discussed 
in earlier chapters, the roles and definitions of Islamic leadership vary between 
different schools and areas of interest, and certain of these variations are reflected 
within the U. K. 
Reference cannot be made to every form of Muslim leadership, or determine 
how 'representative' community leaders are. There is a need to differentiate 
between Islamic leadership - for example from nnäms and pp-, s - and other 
community leaders on political and social platforms, although these may be 
interlinked. Acceptance by non-Muslims of a community's leader has in the past 
been compounded by communication difficulties, when a limited number of a 
community spoke English - or had knowledge of the appropriate channels within 
Britain for the access of assistance or representation. The diversity of Muslim 
environments in the U. K. suggests that the creation of a single representative 
platform could not possibly serve all agendas and viewpoints. It should not be 
assumed that all communities or individuals want such leadership, especially if 
it is founded around interests or belief frameworks dissimilar from their own. 
Attempts have been made to form national or majority Muslim platforms in 
Britain - which at this stage have often failed to find common ground or 
become 
accepted by the majority of Muslims in Britain. The 'Muslim Parliament' 
has been 
an important development, if only because of its high media profile 
for initial 
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meetings and pronouncements. Critics argue that Muslims should gain access to 
normal channels of power - rather than form 'separatist' platforms. The Muslim 
Parliament's founder and first leader, Kalim Siddiqui, directed the Muslim 
Institute for Planning and Research - which drew up a 'Muslim Manifesto' as a 
reaction to issues of concern to different Muslim communities. The initiatives 
included the creation of a Muslim 'house of representatives', later known as the 
Muslim Parliament. " The reaction of the media was generally negative, 
especially towards the pronouncements of Siddiqui, who was accused of having 
connections with Iran, and being influential in the imposition of the Rushdie 
fatwa~. 72 Siddiqui utilised his professional background in the media in 
publicising and promoting the Parliament and his own community position. His ` 
impact was the creation of a 'Muslim platform', which intended to develop 
representation at grass-roots level. It publicised recruitment from all sectors in the 
communities, male and female. Members of the Lower House pay a financial 
contribution to become an M. M. P. (Members of the Muslim Parliament), whilst 
an Upper House has members who raise a significant financial contribution. 73 
The Muslim Manifesto attempted to define a role for the General Assembly of 
Muslims in Britain (later known as the Muslim Parliament), and: 
" ... to provide a 
framework for the healthy growth of all parts of the 
community as well as a common Muslim identity and purpose. " 74 
Muslims that did not consider themselves represented by Siddiqui or M. M. P. s 
have often been alienated by the assumptions of the `Parliament`, and its 
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pronouncements on Islam. In terms of decision-making processes, at this stage, 
the Parliament's influence is unq_uantifiable. As a forum for discussion, through 
various Committees and Conferences, the Parliament has generated publicity - if 
not 'policy' that is followed by the majority of Muslims in Britain. 75 
The lack of interaction between groupings with different interests on a 
national level is also reflected locally. L. T., an activist within a youth 
organisation, suggested that this was having a harmful effect upon the youth, and 
that some kind of decision-making processes were necessary to break down the 
sectarian divisions. There was a fear that the cycle of 'difference' was 
perpetuated, because when youngsters attend mosques, they heard sectarian 
speeches. This creates an impression, according to L. T., of serious divisions 
within the Muslim communities. L. T. suggested that, within his community and 
others, there is poor leadership. It was felt that this was taken for granted by 
Muslims, who were perceived by L. T. to have an apathetic approach to 
participation in Muslim community affairs: going to the mosque and receiving 
lectures was seen as sufficient for getting through everyday life 'Islamically'. 
Changing this situation was difficult, according to L. T., because the leaders are 
local people seeking to maintain power bases and status. No other catalysts 
existed for change. L. T. believed that, despite a lack of Islamic knowledge in the 
community - especially amongst youth who are 'well-mixed' with 
local non- 
Muslim subcultures - leaders are reluctant to intervene. 
76 
These comments reflect the influence of so-called 'traditional' stances 
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towards leadership, which have parallels elsewhere in the U. K. Islamic 
environments. The community discussed above has a substantial Indian sub- 
continent origin compositioil: the types of 'power struggles' and uncritical 
acceptance of religious authority is reflected in analyses elsewhere, and some 
basic comparisons could be made between Pakistan and U. K. environments: these 
include notions of infallibility linked to religious status and knowledge, where a 
challenge against authority might be described as a challenge against din or Islam. 
The question of izzat" of a leader or the challenger might also be compromised. 
An emphasis on 'spiritual' matters, and the interpretation of issues such as 
leadership being part of the 'mundane world', also has an impact on the power of 
authority within Islamic environments. L. T. represents a Muslim worker who has 
f 
a position in local administration, knowledge of the local situation, but is 
powerless primarily because cf a lack of impetus, awareness, and consensus from 
the local Muslim leadership. Without this common platform, there is little 
political reason for the local area authority to contribute or participate in 
improving the situation for youth. 
On the other hand, an interviewee believed that lack of consensus has a 
positive role to play in some aspects of Muslim communities, whilst 
''homogenisation' could also be of practical value: 
"The community members often find an excuse to argue. The situation 
is that the community came into being by default: through eco-political 
factors. Faced with responsibilities which have not been planned, equalled 
ad hoc-ism, and weaknesses. I hope that the community 
learns from it. 
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"There can be strengths in homogenisation. Politically there are power 
struggles regarding mosques. Leadership is in a process of evolution: 
communities were established at different times. Functional leadership 
has to learn political and religious ways. Often the difficulties are only 
seen by the media, and are difficult for outsiders to comprehend. 
"... Islamic society is a self-propelling self-motivating society. It requires 
co-ordination on common issues. It is currently going through a search. 
The Muslim Parliament is part of that search, but it has not arrived yet. 
Muslim society has a devolved structure. Muslims do not have to think 
alike. Islamic society is not monolithic. "78 
Education (or its absence) has a high degree of influence on current formulations 
of Islamic leadership, especially in promotion in some quarters of the ideal of 
khalat. 79 
In the U. K., a minority activist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir has vigorously 
promoted this ideal, especially at campus level, where students can be distanced 
from community influences. 80 The organisation has been accused of inciting 
racial violence, through anti-Jewish statements. It has also been opposed by other 
Muslim groups in Britain, including Young Muslims U. K. " A 1994 Conference 
in London, organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir, passed without serious incident. 82 Hizb 
ut-Tahrin-nay represent a selective historical reading of a phenomena which itself 
contained diversity, at different times in its history. 83 The promotion of khalrfat 
represents the articulation of a view by Muslims in Britain, that speculatively may 
not have been a common view amongst their forebears. As such, it represents in 
part the acquisition of 'new' values and a 'new' identity. The leadership issue 
illustrates that, in terms of decision-making, there is not necessarily a correlation 
between generations on key issues concerning Muslims. The same intentions can 
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be promoted in disparate ways, leading to disagreement within Islamic 
environments: 
"The khal. ifat, when established, was OK. But the organisation - no! It 
stresses only part of community life. I don't approve. They are clutching at 
straws. Hizb ut-Tahrir are based in Jordan, and are a relentless organisation. 
They are taking power through power. Within Tunisia and Libya they are not 
significant. The young generation is not fully educated in Islam. This leads 
to anger. I don't recommend Hizb ut-Tahrir as part of the community ... Islam is not just about reading texts, but about translating what is right and 
good. It is about intention. Many are going through the motions. " 84 
The targeting of youth by Hizb ut-Tahrir may lead them to question elders' 
attitudes within their community; the organisational stance also empowers youth 
to break away from their community and traditional practices/interpretations, 
providing appropriate alternative Islamic support system. Questions asked by 
Hizb ut-Tahrir are not necessarily the ones that others in a community feel should 
be asked. Many parents and elders fear the impact of Hizb ut-Tahrir, especially 
its influence at local levels - which can damage their own position: 
"I have to deal with them in my community and I cannot go against them. 
Nobody can. I'm only going to the meeting to be seen. I don't agree with 
their views at all, there's too much hate in them. But you can't fight 
them. " 85 
Long-term growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir could impact upon the existing decision- 
making processes within Islamic environments. The expansion of this platform 
is indicative of frustration felt (by some) of living in a'minority' context, which 
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is dominated by elders described as unresponsive towards the contemporary 
demands of U. K. society. The profile and publicity accorded to Hizb ut-Tahtrir 
'everts' reflects curiosity and 'a good story' on the part of certain media sources, 
whereas - to many Muslims - the content of the rhetoric has a familiar edge: 
"We've heard all this stuff before. It means little to us, and to be honest, 
you can hear speeches like this in every mosque in the country. i86 
Whether this reflects a need for greater non-Muslim media accessibility to 
mosques and leadership - and a need for publicity for 'other kinds' of speeches 
and discussion frameworks (not necessarily as 'sensationalist') - is open to 
question. 87 
Interviewees generally considered that questions on leadership had to be 
encouraged (if only to discourage 'dissident' elements or innovatory 
interpretations deemed 'un-Islamic' ). A reluctance to question or intervene was 
expressed on local levels by interviewees. Barriers around communities and 
individuals still have to be broken, perhaps through the example of leadership. 
'Z. A. ' believes that Islam's 'inherent practicality' is not demonstrated, until it is 
applied to enhance interaction between Muslims: 
"Z. A. recounted the example of awaking early one morning during 
Ramadän, prior to the commencement of the fast. Looking outside his 
house, he noticed that his neighbours curtains were still drawn, indicating 
that they were still asleep and would soon miss the opportunity to eat 
prior to fasting. 
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"Z. A. and his wife did not know how to react: as Muslims, it was their duty to wake their neighbours; living in Britain, other pressures regarding 
neighbourly relations exist. Eventually, Z. A. decided to tell his wife to 
go outside, and 'accidentally' make a noise with a dustbin (this delegation 
in itself is revealing in terms of male: female roles). " 88 
To Z. A., this example is an analogy demonstrating that, on a community level, 
Muslims are not interacting or forging bonds with each other. Whilst one example 
may not represent the entire situation, it could be a useful model of the state of 
inter-Muslim relations. It indicates the conflict of interests that can occur, in 
some settings. The final decision might be a pragmatic interpretation of the 
situation, in the light of circumstances and an evaluation of knowledge regarding 
Ramadan (perhaps a form of personal i tihäd? ). A reluctance of Muslims at 
community level to form bonds is also reflected at leadership level. What has 
been described as 'Ada - in terms of 'manners' - has not found a footing in 
elements of U. K. Islamic environments. 
The interaction (or lack of it) may be engendered by values instilled through 
local level leadership. Confidence can be built at an early stage, through 
accessibility to leadership, and being able to ask questions without fear of 
ridicule. Leadership also has to 'create' Islamic environments, through provision 
of facilities, as well as the appropriate 'atmosphere'. In one inner-city 
environment in Leicester, youth believed that those mosques and leaders who 
were gradually becoming more accessible to them reaped the benefits of increased 
attendance and interaction as a result: 
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"... What they've done is - especially at Cleethorpes Mosque - just a few 
streets away from here like, they've made an 18 year old in charge of all 
the youth. Then after the prayers, they usually have a little talk and 
thing. i89 
I think that what the mosques should do is try and attract more youths, 
like, by holding more sessions - doing sports and everything like. For 
example ... they could play football and everything, and they can go to 
prayers. They enjoy it and they say, yeah, we've got company and we feel 
like going to mosque. " 9° 
On the part of decision-makers, this requires a re-evaluation of the usage of 
mosque space, particularly in the U. K. context. This may lead to clashes between 
youth and leadership: 
"Whenever I go, right, to the prayers, some people just - mainly aged 
people, they just sit there and pray to themselves. And the youngsters, 
they get together in a group and then an older person comes along and 
tells them how they should be. " 9' 
The development of younger leadership may change decision-making processes 
in this area: 
"I've seen that the biggest influence at Berners Mosque in Highfields. 
There's a Mullasab [mcäm], and in Ramadan what he used to do was 
attract a lot of kids you see. I went there personally. I had said 'I don't 
want to go there, I don't want to go there', but one of my friends said: 'Go 
there, see what happens, it's really good. ' 
"And you see, the way he approaches the children, he speaks in English, 
he speaks in Gujarati, he makes some jokes. He talks serious, you want 
to be interested because there are some other imams around Leicester, 
right, you go in there, you sit in there, right, wondering what he is talking 
about. He speaks in another language to me, he speaks in Urdu. I 
understand Urdu, right, but not too much, just understand the key words. 
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"But what Mullasab Salim Tara used to do was to speak in English, speak 
in Gujarati and everything, and they used to actually stay there for hours, 
listening to him every day in Ramadan. And I was really fascinated. And 
the crowds that used to come! First it started off on the first day, right, it 
started with like thirty to fifty people, and then a couple of days later the 
whole prayer hall was full. There was no space to sit. I was really 
fascinated with that. And from then on, right, really he has become a kind 
of idol to me... not an idol but he has really touched me. I think because 
he is attracting so much people [sic]. " 
''The thing about it is, it could be because he is more younger [sic]. 
They're more older [predominant existing leadership]. I think they should 
try, at least try, to attract more youths because the old people, right, what 
they've got in their hearts is that we're gonna die so we'd better pray as 
much as we can. 
"But the youths, right, they'e thinking let's enjoy our lives, let's do that, 
right, they think let me smoke today, I won't do it tomorrow. Let me just 
try it. They get addicted to it, right. And you know Mullasab Salim he 
used to make sure that you are aware of what happens when you are 
smoking. Even going to scientific terms, telling them what happens to you 
and stuff like that, whereas the other Imäms they don't speak in scientific 
terms, they just want to tell stories from the past. In a way you would 
learn things from it, but you wouldn't learn it. They wouldn't express what 
the story tells you, they'll just tell out the story. , 92 
This transcript demonstrates the importance to WE of a leader understanding his 
community, and the types of decisions that have to be made within it. The 
'mullasab' represents a person who speaks the language of a tough inner city area, 
and attains popularity through pragmatic explanation and interpretation of Islamic 
sources to the youth. 
According to H. I., this example may be a rarity, in that he believes that the 
majority of young people are (still) not understood by elements within the 
`ulamä', who are seen to take its own assumptions and prejudices to 
interpret 
Islam, and to protect their own position. H. I. suggests that U. I. `ulamä' 
have lost 
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scholarly qualities, through laziness, lack of resources, and/or lack of time. To 
H. I., this represents a lack of the willpower to create decision-making processes 
within the local and national leadership, primarily through the inability of many 
nnärns to communicate to the majority of Muslims in the U. K. Ultimately, H. I. 
states, this means that there is a lack of qualities for application of i/tihäd in the 
U. K. 
H. I. responds to this situation through a belief that the current leadership will 
be brushed aside, by those seeking the meaning of primary sources of Islam, 
speaking English, and having a knowledge of British society. This trend has, 
according to H. I., led to many `ulamä ' and leaders fearing for their personal 
positions. H. I. believed that the `ularnä ' steer away from idtihäd, abstracting 
themselves from textual sources, and losing the meaning of Islam. 93 
H. I. provided a pessimistic analysis of the current situation regarding 
leadership at local levels, which can be compared with the optimism generated 
by A. E. at being exposed to a mullasab who can be understood by youth. Unlike 
the elder leaders, A. E. feels he can approach the mullasab with his problems, to 
assist in an 'Islamic decision-making process': 
G. B. Do you feel that you can go to him if you've got some kind of problem 
and he'll understand? 
A. E. Yeah, he'll understand. Like, if I went and said, 'well, I'm addicted to 
smoking', I'd go to him for a solution and he really would you know. 
Like last time I was visiting one of my cousins, right, whose mother was 
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sick, I think he was feeling shy going to the nným. But this one, he went 
up to him and ... (the nnAm) explained what he should do. He felt relief... 
A. E. ... 
And the thing about it right, is that we've even got a mullasab that 
makes people pray the Kur'än. And the thing is, I've noticed about other 
mullasab is we go to the other mullasabs in the line of subub -I mean 
prayers, right - it hits you straight away. You do it, they're really be angry 
on you. 
Whereas Mullah Sahib don't do that, he'd try to win the child's heart by 
being kind to him at first. He would hit him, yes, he wouldn't be too kind 
so the child goes overboard and starts messing about but he uses both 
ways, right, to keep the child under control. And I've noted that he's been 
getting enough people going to him, wanting to join his class, so it's the 
way he approaches people. 
But I can't really pinpoint the nnams, it's the communities, the nnän s, it 
could be anybody, right but I think that the main job for the nnärn is to 
settle everybody down ... 
because people, there are big people, if they start 
telling us other things, like, you're undecided. 
G. B. You want somebody who understands the kind of issues you are going 
through? 
A. E. That's what I mean. 
G. B. When he comes from the same streets? 
A. E. He was actually saying, right, 'I was just like you', into the same problems 
as us. t94 
This represents 'A. E. "s expectations of the kind of role and services a 'mullasab' 
should provide, entering counselling roles that may not reflect the training 
received. This 'pastoral' role has some parallels with - for example - the expected 
roles of Christian clergy. 
The ease of accessibility and type of knowledge required in 
'A. E. "s model 
mullasab requires detailed further research, and a comparison of roles within 
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U. K. and other Islamic settings. However, the role of nnjms and mosques in the 
U. K. were briefly discussed during fieldwork, where the viewpoints of'A. E. ' and 
'A. F. ' were presented to a number of high-level decision makers within Pakistan. 
This presentation related to discussions on leadership, and also the self-identity 
of Muslims within a U. K. Islamic environment. The dialogue from the U. K. is 
juxtaposed (without the researcher's comments) with the reactions of Pakistani 
academic Muhammad Khalid Masud (abbreviated to M. K. ) who had experience 
of similar U. K. environments: 
A. E. ... 
I think the small children, right, they enjoy being Muslims but the thing 
about it is that they are not full time Muslims. Like myself really. I'm not 
being a hypocrite, but, you know, they do it part time. They call 
themselves Muslims, but they do something else. They do bad. They go 
around thieving, they go around bullying people but they still call 
themselves Muslims, and you know the main thing about Islam is not to 
hurt another person. 
The biggest problem is that they don't really go to pray as much as they 
should do. There should be five times daily prayers, and they don't attend 
it. I don't, right, but I think it's mostly because of the community, because 
if the whole community and everybody around is Muslims, if my 
neighbour was Muslim, it would be like 'do you want to come to the 
mosque? ' - and you feel that you've got somebody to talk to when you're 
going to mosque. And it's no use, right, living in some place like Oldby 
where you're surrounded by Christian or maybe other people where they 
can't even offer you to go to the mosque, and then you yourself do not feel 
like going to mosque. 95 
A. F. Some Muslim people I know they dress up in khufniz, jabuz, go to prayers 
as well, but once they are outside the mosque it's like a completely 
different attitude. They smoke, they swear at other flat tenants. They go 
around skiving lessons, things like that. So it's just like alter-ego. 
96 
M. K. My reaction to that is that it is typical, in the way they are doing things: 
for instance, going to mosque is a substitute for going to church. Now for 
me, going for prayer, whether you do it at home or in the mosque, that 
would be expressing a Muslim practice. Now going to mosque Friday, 
once a week, that is something that comes from Christian environment, 
also the role of imam and the role of mosque - this is interesting to me 
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also ... 
... 
The role of ini m in our communities here is very limited, just leading 
the prayers, but in Britain and in other societies the role of nnäm is like 
that of a pastor, that he has to be consulted and he has to be at home with 
people and guide them in his ways, so that is something new that is 
coming in those Musiim communities and is not yet coming in Muslim 
lands, in Muslim societies, and I think even the concern of that young girl 
or boy - the ideal - now I don't think that any Christian or Hindu or Jew 
differs in how he defines a good Muslim, a good Hindu, a good Jew 
would be defined the same way - that he should not be thieving, he should 
not be - now, that person has got that idea. 
If you speak to a thirteen year old Muslim here [in Pakistan], he will 
define it differently. Although I should say that, as a general rule, that the 
moral concern is more vital, more crucial, in Muslims living in Christian 
societies. Here it will be more like saying prayers, fasting, and keeping 
beard, these will be the things with which he will be identifying for an 
ideal Muslim. 
So I think that it is a new dimension which is coming to a new generation 
of Muslims living in a totally different area where the concerns are 
different. He or she has reacted to that moral deprivation and his or her 
ideal is that these are the things which he or she should be doing - 
whether they are specifically Muslim or not ... 
... 
But the language, that has a Christian background. We in Urdu or even 
in English here, we don't say we don't say that a 'good Muslim' goes to 
mosque, so that is a literally substitution for a term that has a Christian 
connotation. Similarly for nnäm, nnam is almost a substitute or a 
translation for 'pastor' or 'priest'. 97 
The changing framework of defining terms is a reflection of the evolving nature 
of Muslim communities in Biý, tain, and the (projected) changing roles of leaders 
within communities. These transcriptions provide one indication that different 
conceptions of Islam within different environments require pragmatic evaluation 
of priorities, in the light of specific circumstances. 
Questions were raised by some interviewees, in the U. K. and elsewhere, as 
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to the levels of understanding of these issues amongst U. K. Muslim decision- 
makers - and how this impacts upon ordinary individual Muslims. How useful 
is it for an 'authority' in Pakistan to interpret Islamic sources pragmatically for 
Muslims in the U. K.? Some decisions may be applicable in both contexts, but 
there are many issues in the U. I. that have no direct correlation with Pakistan. 
Whilst the thirteen year old in Pakistan might share certain values (depending on 
varied environmental factors discussed above), the level of difference could be 
irreconcilable. To an extent, this strengthens the case for U. K. -based Islamic 
decision-making processes, that recognise the needs specifically of British-born 
Muslims. 
Khurram Murad, who has extensive experience in 'Islamic' contexts both in 
Pakistan and Britain, confirmed the problem regarding 'inter-generational' 
communication: 
"The people who are leading religiously in Britain, unfortunately they are 
incapable of doing itihäd, and many of them don't want to look at the 
word i jtihad. And they think that everything that is needed has already 
been said, which I don't think is the right thing ... and they cannot 
communicate with the new generation. "" 
This reluctance to make decisions in the light of new or changing circumstances 
clearly impacts on the perception of Islam by individuals - such as the youths 
interviewed above - seeking to reconcile cultural interpretations of primary source 
material with their environment. It would be useful to determine the level to 
which the youths' views represent a transitory opinion, and to what extent it is 
262 
ý' 
maintained in the future. There is also the attribute of 'adaptability' within certain 
Islamic frameworks: 
"My fear is that if the proper facilities are not provided for the Muslim 
youth, and if Muslims are not allowed to live according to their identity 
within a British framework, I think that the Muslims in Britain have to 
develop their way of adjustments. That adjustment is going to be made 
definitely, but that adjustment is available within an Islamic framework. 
"We all need something new. Islam is a universal religion, and cultures 
and nations and communities have come into that and therefore it adapts. 
British Islam, as far as the current situations are concerned, is different 
from Pakistani and Indian and Malay situations. They will be having 
trousers and shirts and ties and everything. "99 
This process of adjustment is also linked to a perceived need for changing 
mosque roles, and their'success' when initiatives were taken to present activities 
centred around youth requirements. An example was provided, by one 
interviewee, of a South London mosque, which cleared the prayer space for youth 
club activities (interspersed with prayer) creating an 'Islamic environment' free 
from external influences, which had a long-standing impact on the immediate 
community in that the youth attracted to it became long-term members of the 
mosque. 1°° However, a disadvantage of the new-found centrality of mosques was 
expressed several times, in the 'creation' of 'exclusive' mosques geared for specific 
culture-centric mosques (i. e. for people with links to specific pfs, ethnic 
groupings, etc. ): 
"When I went to one of the mosques in East London, the people were 
looking at me as if I was someone that does not belong there. 
This was 
a Bengali mosque, and all of them they had the mosque, 
but they had their 
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own books, and almost of them were Bengali... " 10° 
This example is, however, reproduced in other environments (within Muslim 
majority countries and other minority settings) where there is diversity within 
Islamic frameworks. 
Exclusivity may also be linked to gender: it is not proposed here to fully 
survey the extensive leadership responses to decision-making issues concerning 
women. "' One issue that is significant in terms of decision-making is access to 
mosques. Only a small proportion of mosques in the U. I. encourage women to 
use them (or connected facilities); access to places of communal prayer can be 
limited. This can be because of the restrictions within the construction of 
mosque, limited space, because men do not want women in their mosques, or 
because women feel intimidated entering them. Within some interpretations of 
primary source material, women are seen to be a distraction to men praying, and 
were expected to pray at the back of the mosque. Mawdudi - whose English- 
language translated tafsir has some influence in the U. K. context - indicated that 
men should keep silent on the matter of mosque access, unless their wife asked 
permission to attend. 10' Syed Mutawalli ad-Darsh believes that restricting 
mosque access for women (in Britain and elsewhere) has contributed 
" 
... to a 
large extent, for the absence of deep Islamic knowledge in many 
of our wives and mothers who are charged with the responsibility of 
bringing up the young; teaching them, playing with them, acting as role 
model. Recently, a m. n from a West of England city approached me with 
a view to opening up for women one of the city's two magnificent 
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mosques. Nine ladies had just converted to Islam, he told me, who were keen to pray in the mosque. But when I approached the imam. he 
threatened to resign if a woman ever set foot inside his mosque. Faced 
with overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the imam insisted he could do nothing until he received afatwa from his Darul Uloom in India. We 
are still waiting. " 104 
Clearly there is conflict in this area that needs to be resolved. Inherited tradition- 
centred attitudes are interfering with some women's desire to pray within a 
mosque. It seems that purpose-built mosques in the U. K. can be accommodating 
(in some areas) towards women. For example, a Leicester mosque invested in a 
women's gallery. 1°5 This may be an area in which Islamic decision-making is 
responsive to the U. K. context, and the different expectations of women's roles 
(i. e. acquiring work and a financial status that could be greater than that of men). 
The pragmatic interpretation of Islamic sources has the potential to significantly 
alter the roles of Muslim women in the U. K. Other society pressures, and the 
impact of new female expectations, could impact beyond the basic issue of 
mosque access. Whether any future changes have an 'Islamic' basis or not is open 
to speculation. 
All issues connected with decision-making processes have implications for 
Muslim women, although the question arises of the degree to which women have 
input into these processes in the U. K. There are specific gender-centred issues, 
several of which are focused on the effects on Muslim women of living within the 
minority context of Britain. The position of women is often seen as very 
different, compared with those of women in certain majority contexts - in 
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particular on the Indian sub-continent, where many individuals in Britain have 
ancestral links: 
"Women here have a better position. Girls are bolder, and can have 
economic independence. Cultural differences are sanctified by religious 
interpretation. The question is how far Islam will cope, especially with 
the changing family structure? Women have far more rights, organised 
within the structure of law. "i06 
This 'better position' is particularly asserted by those people who have been 
educated within 'the British system'. The acceptance of this difference, however, 
is not universal within families seeking to maintain all aspects of their 'traditional' 
cultural expression. This can lead to conflict within families, for example on 
issues such as: dress-code, employment, education, relationships, and marriage. 
In the worst possible scenario, these conflicts lead to forms of domestic violence. 
The options for victims are limited, in particular with the fear of ostracism from 
a community, or limited access to appropriately sympathetic and culturally- 
attuned social services. "' 
Some interviewees, who could be described as following a 'middle ground' 
within the decision-making debate, presented more 'traditional' approaches to 
women in authority within the U. K. Islamic environment. For example, one 
believed that: 
"Women were not taking lead for physiological and psychological reasons 
[! !] it 108 
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Whilst not representative of all interviewees' viewpoints, another interviewee 
suggested that only 'one per-cent' of Islamic decision makers in the U. K. were 
'enlightened' on the issue of gender, and did not follow 'traditional' 
understandings. 109 An example was given of women that sought to join a (all- 
male) mosque committee. A separate women's committee existed, with its own 
agenda and Annual General Meeting. The problem was raised of communication 
between respective committees - and how to contribute when attendance of 
women was prohibited at the all-male committee. The interviewee suggested that 
(potentially) managing the respective 'tensions' was difficult - and felt that the 
committees' agendas of seeking single sex schooling meant that joint male/female 
committee represented 'hypocrisy'. 10 This issue is indicative of the issues 
connected with establishment of appropriate decision-making structures, and the 
problem of women establishing an agenda which can be presented and acted upon 
by (male) decision makers. Women raised in a British educational framework - 
either as Muslims or later becoming converts to Islam - are contributing to the 
changes in these processes. Clarification of gender issues influences decision- 
making processes, in terms of fully informing agendas. 
Given the resources and inclination, social support frameworks, committees, 
and self-help groups could be viable within more U. I. mosques and Muslim 
communities. These could exist on an 'Islamic' or 'Islamic-culture-centric' basis: 
the issue of language is important here. An 'Islamic' approach would have to cross 
the varied linguistic barriers that exist within U. K. Islamic environments - 
requiring a 'common tongue'. Many current Islamic 'services' provided, of 
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necessity, have to be divided at least on the basis of linguistic differences. Certain 
groups, for example the majority of Somali Muslims, have not had the time to 
build infrastructures necessary for these services - survival and adjustment to the 
? new? environment being a necessity. However, as many more Muslims in Britain 
(for example, proportionally to twenty years ago) have been raised in English- 
speaking environments, this eliminates one 'barrier' preventing unity. Dividing 
lines based around other factors are strong, inhibiting emergence of large scale 
common platforms and leadership. "' 
Significant barriers exist regarding notions of 'class', 'tribe', and/or 'clan', 
within groups perceived by many outsiders as 'homogeneous'. Places of 
(ancestral) origin and time of (ancestral) migration are also significant, in placing 
an individual and a family within a community. ' 12 For example, during war 
within (and between) north and south Yemen, the conflict was reflected on a 
micro-scale within Yemenite communities of Britain - including at community 
organisational levels. ' 13 The issues and identities of specific groupings alter, 
according to circumstances developing in places of (ancestral) origin: for 
example, clan-consciousness has emerged to further divide the East London 
Somali community, which has also seen the development of expressions of an 
'Islamic' identity based on 'Arab Gulf models. "' Notions of organisation also 
vary significantly between (and within) places of ancestral origin and 
communities in the U. K., especially in terms of the nature of funding, influences 
the framework of decision-making processes. For example, Bengali Muslim 
institutions and mosques in Sylhet are funded by endowments, whilst the Sylheti 
268 
community in Bradford relies entirely on voluntary funding and occasional aid - 
many of its people also being unemployed. '" Occasionally, conflicting 
approaches towards mosque funding and institutional management has led to 
violence. 1' 
Islamic environments perpetuate cultural and religious traditional diversity. 
Attempts to go beyond these boundaries can be met by community resistance. 
There is no motivation for families to raise their children in non-culture specific 
environments, or send children to a madrasa or mosques which do not present a 
cultural-centric perspective. If parents send their children to these establishments, 
one reason may be because they believe it is best for their child, providing values 
which can be useful to them within their community in the future, as well as 
instilling Islamic knowledge (which is seen as having value in this world and the 
next); parents may also send children because of local community/family 
'pressures' and expectations. The extent to which this has to be balanced 
alongside not isolating the child (and the community) from the wider environment 
is a key issue of future decision-making processes. Exposure through state 
educational systems is balanced with maintenance of 'Islamic' value systems. 
This balance of values can be linked to the wider picture of relationships 
between Muslim individuals and communities, in the U. K. and abroad. It can 
also be linked to so-called 'Inter-Faith' dialogues, involving discussions between 
representatives from different belief-systems. The 'success' of such platform s 
cannot be quantified. "7 The extent to which Muslims are fully represented at 
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national and local level is open to question. Some Muslim representatives are 
willing to have dialogue, but unwilling to attend sessions of joint prayer in non- 
Islamic settings; this is seen as unhelpful by members of other faiths, who may 
not see the wider religious and social implications of such interactions. Similarly, 
a fear of the undue effects of such interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
exists on both sides of the debate. Dialogue may be conditional. Although there 
have been ''success stories' at local levels regarding inter-faith dialogues, assessing 
effect such inter-faith platforms have on 'ground-floor' level for Muslims requires 
further research. 
The following extract provides an indication of one North London 
community, endeavouring to make religious links within its local environment, 
and the kind of responses it received: 
"... our community has been active in Inter-faith and also in trying to 
establish our relations with the Councils ... 
'"... and we have visitors, non-Muslim visitors, and sometimes we talk to 
them; and we go out and meet other senior citizens from other 
communities. But we sometimes find that the churches and the 
synagogues are reticent, are hesitant - they can be very friendly but they 
tend not to have relations with us. They invite you to come to their church 
or synagogue. But I suggested that we should have meetings in the 
centres, so on behalf of my community I offered our centre [at the 
mosque]. For one month I would like a Jew, a Rabbi, to come and speak 
about Judaism and Jews. Next month I suggested a Muslim would go to 
a church - they [the community] refused! ... 
"... So we have been trying to work together on common issues. There are 
a few Christians who are worried about morality in this country - so we 
have been trying to co-operate with them. I wrote to Mrs Mary 
Whitehouse, so she wrote back to say that 'this is a Christian 
organisation'! So I saw a letter in a newspaper from somebody in 
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Leicester about sex and morality - so I wrote to him and he replied - so we co-operated on that issue, the community circular for the community to 
protest and all that. So on a number of issues of common interest we can join hands - if we can do that more often, it will bring a lot better 
understanding ... 
"... We are nearer to the Catholics than the Protestants, and that is why 
even in Africa we preferred our children to go to Catholic schools, where 
the nuns would be teaching them. "'" 
The level to which this dialogue is 'typical' is difficult to determine, but it raises 
some of the issues facing efforts at inter-faith dialogue. The discovery of 
'common ground', including on issues regarding sex and morality, may make 
further inter-faith dialogues a priority issue within certain Islamic decision- 
making frameworks in the U. K. Some interviewees cited the comfort from 
(selective) Christian authority sympathy, for example during The Satanic Verses' 
controversy, education and morality debates, or during disputes regarding 
'Planned Parenthood'/contraceptive debates. A lack of inter-faith dialogue may be 
linked to a common assumption that the U. I. is not a 'religious' society, or that 
the majority of non-Muslims are 'non-religious' - without recognition of other 
value systems and moral frameworks not directly associated with 'religion'. 
In terms of the decision-making processes, it would be incorrect to assume 
that all interviewees believed there were grounds for pessimism. Some felt there 
were grounds for optimism, and that gradually a framework was being put into 
place which - some time in the future - would provide a foundation 
for 'Islamic' 
system(s), with integrated knowledge of 'British' society pressures and values. 
The 'Young Muslims', an organisation linked to the Islamic Foundation, was 
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founded to establish such a idealised framework. One of its instigators, Khurram 
Murad, had a degree of optimism regarding the instilling of 'Islamic' values 
(based around a specific agenda) in Young Muslim members: 
" 
... 
I am very hopeful out of the young people [sic] and my help in 
building the Young Muslims ... 
last year [1994] 1,500 young students and 
men and women [were] all together, and I addressed them. So I think that 
most of them must go to the sources, and get a good grounding in the 
Kur'än and Sunna of the Prophet - and by analogy, and by examples, and 
deduction, so many methods which are commonly applied by our jurists - 
because they can find it. But they must have the knowledge. 
"Because just because people think this is the Revelation, they do not 
accept that unless it is grounded in the basic sources ... they should not be doing it [undertaking iitihäd] because of social pressures, but because 
they are convinced it is the right thing - the right understanding of the 
Kur'gn and Sunna interpretation in our times: then they will accept and 
follow [Islam] 
... 
" "`' 
This is not a 'typical' viewpoint, as not every Islamic perspective accommodates 
ijtihäd. If the Young Muslims follow a policy of attracting educated, motivated 
people - especially within professional groups - the influence of a small minority 
could be pervasive, including an impact upon non-Muslim attitudes towards 
Islam (utilising financial, social, and political contacts). The extent to which such 
'knowledge', described by Khurram Murad, is acquired and applied by Muslims 
in Britain in the future could alter the nature and structure of the Islamic decision- 
making processes, conceivably with impact beyond the U. I. Islamic contexts. 
Links between Muslims in the U. K. and various external Muslim 
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organisations and decision-making processes vary considerably, and - as with 
other issues approached here - generalisations cannot be made. Connections can 
be intensive and frequent, but there are also examples of self-contained 
communities, with limited links outside of local or U. K. networks. The nature 
of these links causes confusion to observers. For example, during the Gulf War, 
several mosques and community centres were approached by police or 
government security interests - incorrectly assuming sympathy between the U. K. - 
based mosques and external 'Islamic' interests, or linkages between mosques with 
similar constituencies: 
M. J. 
... we are 
far from the Middle East communities. Middle East 
communities are either in central London or East London - not this side 
[North London]. So anything that happens there does not affect us in the 
same manner. 
We are mostly non-political. Even in British politics I personally have 
been going around trying to persuade people to vote. They are not 
interested in the vote ... 
We are a business community, whether it will be to our benefit or not, in 
the short term and in the long term. So even if it were beneficial in the 
short term, but harmful in the long term, we would not do it. 
G. B. And what about links internationally, with other communities? Are they 
quite close? 
M. J. Not very close. We have been trying to help our community in the poorer 
areas, supporting them in India and Pakistan. But we are not very close 
with any organisation in any communities. We communicate, we write, 
we receive the letters and the newspapers. 
G. B. And in terms of the decision-making process? 
M. J. Nothing... there is nothing whatsoever. ''0 
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Within some communities there are closer links, affecting decision-making 
processes on a day-to-day level. Several interviewees described the use of fax 
machines and telephones in these processes, which could be two-way. H. I., who 
believed that an international Islamic decision-making 'structure' was necessary 
prior to any local infrastructure being formed, saw the vestiges of such a structure 
in his own experiences. H. I. received regular faxes from a religious centre in 
India, seeking answers to basic questions regarding Islamic practices (such as the 
issue of 'intent' during prayer). He believed such questions were time-consuming 
and unnecessary, only sent because the individuals in India had nothing 'better' 
to do, or enjoyed using the technology. H. I. also utilises the technology himself: 
for example, during a controversy regarding hallt meat and animal slaughter, H. I. 
faxed to peers in South Africa and India. He believed this desire for alternate or 
corresponding opinion covered his own status and reputation too, especially 
because the effort to acquire advice from external decision-makers was about 
'being seen to care'. 121 The role of technology in integrating Islamic 
communities, and decision-makers, in the U. K. with their peers abroad could be 
seen as a realisation of increasing tawhld. Incorporation within this network has 
implications for communities with close links abroad, especially with the 
possibility of decisions and approaches being rapidly reproduced and 
electronically distributed throughout the world, through computer technology. 
Alternatively, this technology could lead to greater fragmentation and less unity, 
through increasing the forum for discussion (and arguments). 
Whether information technology could restrict Islamic decision-making 
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processes in the U. K., through suppressing U. K. authorities and imposing 
precedents relating to other environments, is an area open to discussion. 
Examination of Internet discussion groups relating to 'Islamic' topics indicates 
wide-scale disunity amongst participants - and the negative impact of aggressive, 
polemical minority platforms promoting the 'definitive' Islamic position on 
specific issues. The impact of electronic technology cannot 'compensate' for 
living in a non-Muslim environment - especially when that technology is only 
accessible to a minority of ('educated') people. Despite the growth in computer 
accessibility, this technology has yet to make mass impact into worldwide Islamic 
contexts. Similarly, the agendas of certain Islamic platforms cannot reach down 
to the majority of Muslims in the U. K., and change the way society is developing: 
"Here we cannot escape the reality that we have become members of this 
society. We may deny that: we may have people shouting their heads off 
that we are not of this society - let us say Jamd at-e-Islami - but these 
people are irrelevant. These people are generally the megaphone of 
politicians in our countries and they do not reflect the society here. And 
their children are growing here, and whatever else they might pretend to 
be otherwise, they are becoming more and more Anglicised. So there is 
no way that the Muslim world can sit still and not bring forth new 
interpretations of the share `a. i 322 
This suggests that decision-making processes within external (and U. K. ) Islamic 
environments have to adapt and respond to changing conditions - recognising 
shifting identities and requirements of Muslims (in Britain and elsewhere). 
Zaki Badawi is Principal of the Muslim College, Ealing, London. Egyptian- 
born, and educated at al-Azhar, he is frequently consulted by non-Muslim media 
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as a 'spokesperson' on Islamic issues. Badawi indicates that certain platforms face 
a struggle to be accepted in U. K. Islamic environments, at least on certain issues, 
and that the 'distance' between these platforms and the U. K. is increasing as the 
Muslim community becomes more 'British'. This negates the impact of culture- 
centred 'Islamic' practices; although this projection may be more long- than short- 
term, the impact of these factors is still significant. The implication of Badawi's 
view on this issue could be linked to a homogenisation of Islamic identity, 
although the 'Anglicization' could still contain diverse Islamic threads. The level 
to which 'Anglicization' could change Islamic decision-making processes - if at 
all - is open to discussion. 
Within this discussion, reference should be made again to levels of 
understanding, and communalities between sectors of U. K. Islamic environments 
and peers abroad. For example, a wealthy U. K. business-person of Pakistani 
ancestry could have more in common with his/her contemporary equivalent in 
Pakistan (more so if they shared cultural, traditional, interpretative, linguistic 
and/or ethnic perspectives); the commonalities could be greater than those 
between two contemporaneous wealthy business people in the U. K., one of 
Pakistani ancestry and one of Bangladeshi ancestry, even if they lived in the same 
street. Badawi's 'Anglicization' may only, therefore, have a limited impact on 
decision-making processes, even in the long-term. During fieldwork in Pakistan, 
this topic was introduced, as an indication that different approaches towards 
Islamic issues reflected 'politics' or 'class' rather than directly 'Islamic' trans- 
boundary issues. The point was made that 'ordinary' Muslims engaged in 
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attempting to establish their understanding of the 'true' 'Islamic' position have 
different decision-making resources and approaches, compared with those in 
'higher' social echelons, especially those in positions of power. 123 The emphasis 
on Islamic conscience and belief, which have to be considered, centred around 
notions of intent. Different emphases lead to variations in the decision-making 
processes. The motivation behind a decision have to be considered, including 
political and economic agendas. Some examples were introduced as 'indicators' 
of how political and other factors impact on decision-making processes, and how 
these factors influence the U. K. Islamic environment. Whether these indicators 
are representative of the 'complete' picture, or isolated examples, is open to 
discussion. 
One issue that reflects diversity of Islamic decision-making processes is the 
sighting of the hiläl new moon, to mark the commencement and conclusion of 
Ramadän. For example, in 1992, different 'authorities' pronounced four separate 
`id al-fitr, based on various calculations and sources, on occasion dividing 
families and causing disputes within communities. 124 According to Syed ad- 
Darsh: 
"It is not a legal requirement for Muslims to celebrate id on the same day. 
But it is important. The exigencies of living in a non-Muslim society 
required that timetables be compiled well in advance so that employers 
can be notified. 11125 
Moon sighting represents practical problems within the United Kingdom, 
277 
.., 
where a physical sighting may be obscured by clouds. Questions have continued 
for several years, on whether a sighting should be dependent on the resources of 
an 'external source', for example, from Saudi Arabia or the Indian sub-continent. 
Differences of opinion have led to a lack of uniformity on this issue, particularly 
(but not exclusively) in Muslim minority environments where there is no state- 
centred national 'policy' or holiday (such as in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or 
Malaysia) where national/Islamic-astronomical resources are applied for moon 
sightings - and timings of commencement and conclusion of sawm: 
"Really should we have an `Id on that day, should we insist on the visual 
sighting of the moon, as it is done back home, or should we say on the 
basis of scientific calculations and decide ahead of time, which just makes 
for convenience and so on? 
"I think that a great deal has been done in the States on this. I met 
someone from Canada two years ago and he was saying that they had to 
a very large extent been able to solve this problem, by bringing people of 
the communities together - although it sounds too good to be true. A lot 
of Muslims agreeing with one another! It astonished me... 
"We do have to make decision by consensus, all Muslims accept it. What 
I am trying to say is that there ... 
for the leaders of the community for their 
country back home, a certain privileged status, so when they say it is `id, 
the fasting begins. And of course these people would have an element of 
consensus in so far as they look upon Islam as an instrument. 
"But a fairly good proportion of them think about these matters as 
Muslims: their religious consciences and piety is involved. They might for 
instance say that it is safest to be conservative, it is safest to hold off to a 
position we are familiar with, but I think they are not doing that kind of 
cynical approach. ""' 
Ansari suggested that varying levels of sincerity exists within decision 
makers and processes, despite an awareness of related 'political' problems and 
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issues. Muhammad Khalid Masud noted the implications of such a decision- 
making dispute: 
"Now on that issue, if you look at the dispute, the dispute is carried over 
or looked upon: for instance, a person coming from Libya or a person 
coming from India, both of them will be looking at the moon-sighting 
incident in their own countries. Now scientifically or from the Islamic 
point of view, it [the timing] becomes secondary. So Arabs will have Jd 
day at a different time. 
"So for me it looks like, when I've looked at a dispute, that is not an 
Islamic legal issue, but it looks like the political domination of a certain 
country. That they want to hold, not only the people who have come to 
work in their country, but also to claim a leadership of Muslims - Saudi 
Arabian leadership or Libyan leadership, Egyptian leadership or Pakistani 
leadership. It is a different kind of dimension of i tihäd - it's not really 
an Islamic legal issue. " 127 
In the U. K., this issue provides one indicator of the demands for 'unity', giving as 
it does the precedented possibilities for three different `Id timings. The wide-scale 
implications in Britain would be if `zd al-fitr (and other festivals) were to become 
national holidays, or if employers sought to co-ordinate 'days off (both unlikely 
scenarios). Whilst noting the efforts made towards consensus on this basic issue 
of timing, Syed ad-Darsh has been inconclusive to date on a definitive timing for 
Ramadän. i2ß The observation and intent behind the commencement of Ramadän 
may have greater import than the actual timing. The influence of political and 
other factors on ijtihäd and decision-making processes will be considered further 
below. 
On occasion, these 'external' factors have been reflected in dialogues 
between 
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'leadership' at local and national levels, within U. K. Islamic environments. One 
example was provided of the diverse platforms represented in Birmingham: 
"Up until now the position in Birmingham was that each sect - because the community is divided on sectarian lines - the Ahl-i Hadlths [sic], and 
the Deobandis and the Barelwis, so a person would go to one of their 
mosques or leaders for his opinion. I don't know anybody who has a 
cross-section approach, and who is well aware of the cultural situation in 
which the Muslim community is living there. 
"... there was a meeting in Birmingham in which they were trying to 
perform a sort of Federation of the Organisations of the Muslims: to have 
a forum from which they unified viewpoint of the Muslim could come 
out. An alternative to the Muslim Parliament ... 
because Muslim 
Parliament is an Iranian viewpoint, and therefore the majority of the 
Sunnis do not agree with that. Moreover it has taken a more aggressive 
stance within a British context, a stance of conflict with[in] the Muslim 
minority group ... 
" 
... 
I know one institution ... that 
is Islamic Shari'ah Council -I was a 
member of that Council. And the Council, which is organised on the 
pattern of Saudi model, it has a cross-section representation. Deobandis 
have their wa-Hanä , the 
Chairman of the Council is a Shäfi`l from 
Egypt, a the secretary is from Ahl-i-HadJhs, and I was an independent 
person who believed that all the schools of legal thought are valid... " 129 
The Shari `ah Council had a decision-making agenda, seeking to influence 
processes within U. K. Islamic environments, but did not 'represent' all Muslims 
in the U. K. Limited funding influenced its efficiency (being a voluntary Council), 
although this limitation has the 'benefit' of 'independence' from certain interests 
and agendas potentially linked to external funding. 130 One interviewee, 'I. S. A. ', 
suggested that the more mature the Islamic environment became, the less reliance 
there would be on external funding He also indicated that 
finance can be 
a Syed ad-Darsh 
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obtained from abroad without 'strings attached', and that institutions can get 
'positive' donations. The notion of such 'independence' is disputed by many 
observers. 'LS. A. ' suggested that the more mature the Islamic environment 
became, the less reliance there would be on external funding. He also indicated 
that finance can be obtained from abroad without 'strings attached', and that 
institutions can get positive donations. This is disputed within several Islamic 
circles. '3' 
The Shari'ah Council centred activities around issues connected with 
marriage, divorce and custody of children. All cases were recorded and 
documented in Arabic, Urdu, and English. H. I. considered that, in 98% [his 
figure] of cases, the rulings were clear - but the difficulties came in arbitration. 
The procedure required paying attention to the background of interviewees, and 
attempted to re-establish relationships within divorce rights, based on 'Islamic' 
procedures. Whilst H. I. was involved with the Council, over 400 cases per year 
were considered. H. I. believed i tihäd was applicable in a minority of cases, and 
that every madrasa was considered within decision-making processes. Despite 
the activities, H. I. remained pessimistic regarding the creation of a more united 
Muslim community - either in microcosm in the U. K., or as an 'internationally- 
defined' 'ummah. ' 32 
Critics of this view pointed out that there has to be an appropriate 
developmental timescale to implement both a united community, and appropriate 
infrastructures within it. One interviewee believed that forms of consensus are 
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created through an evolutionary process, establishing a practical workable 
structure, without abolishing or displacing existing mechanisms of 
understanding. "' No hard evidence was provided for this - and others would say 
that the existing structures need to be demolished, because they are hindering the 
development of 'new' systems of decision-making. 
M. Hashir Faruqi suggested that, in the 1990s, idjtihad on a wide scale was 
impossible - and that only 'personal' i/tihäd had any viability. This may not 
represent a denial of igLtihäd, so much as a recognition that in local and 
international contexts, the environment is inappropriate. It could be said that this 
represents a generalisation, assuming a global stagnancy within Islam and 
decision-making. Such a generalisation may not be of practical value, despite the 
interviewee being a professional commentator on global issues. M. Hashir Faruqi 
believed in the concept of pragmatism within Islam, as encapsulated within 
i. tihaa, but that issues which could utilise pragmatic decision-making based on 
Islamic sources were generally not confronted on a wide scale; this was primarily 
because of political reasons, rather than a lack of mu jtahids (although the two 
can be connected). '34 
This recognition of the mechanics of idatihäd and its relevance is coupled 
with acknowledgement by several interviewees of the principle of sh ä. 
135 
Whilst acknowledging that certain Islamic societies contained aspects of sh ürä, 
some believed that shürä did not exist as a mechanism applied by 'Muslim' or 
'Islamic' countries, and that - in the U. K. - shrhä 
is non-existent. Faruqi felt that, 
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when reference was made towards shürä. it was only symbolic and not 
implemented in its original spirit. 136 This tokenism towards consultation was 
also reflected by interviewees during fieldwork in Malaysia and Pakistan. It may 
reflect `äda not to argue pedantic details of a case, but many wider issues are also 
at stake. As discussed throughout this thesis, the decision-making priorities vary 
within and between Islamic environments, priorities incorporating responses to 
technology, 'traditional' practices, and the creation of an infrastructures to provide 
'basic' decisions relating to personal law. The perceived lack of shuira within 
U. K. Islamic contexts may be reflected in several issues - including disputes 
between and within mosques, especially in relation to leadership. Definitive 
structures of authority and consultation have yet to be installed - given the 
diversity of Islamic expression within Britain, the likelihood of idjtihäd processes 
becoming part of the Islamic frameworks is associated with the establishment of 
infrastructures that accommodate these interests. 
Determining trends of these processes at a national level raises specific 
difficulties, notably a reluctance of 'authorities' and individuals to commit 
themselves beyond their ideological frameworks (especially to a non-Muslim 
academic researcher). Numerically small, well-organised and funded 
communities can illustrate a wide-range of Islamic decision-making on 
contemporary issues. 
137 On a wider, primarily Sunni centred scale, decision- 
making processes are in a state of flux. The personnel who deal with decisions 
have to be considered. Two opinions are selected, as indicators of diverse 
approaches towards decision-making. Both recognise levels of i tihäd, at 
least 
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on a theoretical level. 
H. L, a Deoband-trained Hanäf-`älim, promoted flexibility and independence 
of decision-making within a 'traditional' framework, whilst acknowledging his 
position as one of the '1%' [his estimate] minority of pragmatic decision-makers 
utilising idUtihäd: the majority of decision-makers were described by H. I. as 
'blind followers'. H. I. raised the problem of training and educating these decision- 
makers. Their training had a practical slant, including the selecting at random of 
letters - what was described as 'encounter through experience'. Students in 
Deoband were faced with U. K. petitions, which they dealt with without 
knowledge of the U. K. environment, conforming to 'traditional' practices through 
training and also because of consideration of employment possibilities. The 
pattern of takhd was maintained, even when these students acquired positions in 
the U. K. 138 
H. I. discussed how approaches towards the promotion of flexibility in 
interpretation could be linked to association with external agencies, but there was 
reluctance on the part of decision makers to make such an 'innovation'. The 
minority of thinkers who had capability to provide pragmatic interpretation of 
Islam based upon primary source material often lacked the courage, according to 
H. I., to articulate their views. This was linked to traditional 'baggage'. However, 
H. I. suggested that newcomers to Islam had: 
"more open minds and practices: they are adaptable. 
"39 
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H. I. believed that, if converts became scholars, with independence and courage, 
they could provide a framework for new decision-making processes - free of 
cultural prejudices and historical distortion. The practicalities of this idealistic 
viewpoint may be realised in the long-term. 
This opinion can be contrasted with that of 'P. Q. ', who lives in the West 
Midlands, and states that he follows Välikl madhhab'. He wants Muslims in 
Britain to address idjtihäd, but questions why Muslims are in the U. K.? Are they 
here to change the 'British' system, or is the 'British' system changing Muslims? 
P. Q. seeks definition of itihäd, after which there can be ijmä `. P. Q. 's 
understanding of the Malikl'school' is that it is based on the judicial opinions of 
what people did, during the time of the Prophet. By returning to these opinions, 
through a process of education, P. Q. believed the Madina community can be re- 
created. Within the U. K. context, he believed that actions rather than speeches 
are most effective in terms of decision-making processes. In terms of his own 
decision-making, P. Q. is himself consulted by local people, but will also 
approach the 'empowered' 'Emir' on share `a matters (the Emir's authority has been 
'transmitted' to P. Q. ). This approach enables P. Q. to 'escape the rhetoric', and 
provide practical decisions based on M liki interpretations of primary source 
materials. 
The key issue for P. Q. is to deal with the enquirer in a'Ada environment, 
exploring those aspects of interpretation which are negotiable using the tools of 
judgement. The Emir refers to Mälik's Muwatta and the Ash-Shia, whilst - 
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according to P. Q. - applying 'common sense' within decision-making: being a 
Muslim is seen as a 'sub-text' by P. Q. to the decision-making processes. P. Q. 
understands that this means idjtihäd operates and is established within the 
framework of his Islamic environment. In terms of informing the decision- 
making process, P. Q. believes that every Muslim can make decisions, if they 
fulfil the 'basic requirements' of Islam and have an 'Islamic' lifestyle. According 
to P. Q., this includes applying IKur'än and Sunna, with interpretations if required 
based on Mälik's `amal (and appropriate advice if necessary from the Emir), and 
contributing to an 'Islamic' environment based on `äda. These factors could be 
applied to empower many Muslims in the decision-making processes, within any 
location or community. According to P. Q., this represents i tihäd within the 
U. K. Islamic environment. People seek his opinions through personal 
consultation, telephone, and by the holding of a weekly 'surgery'. However, P. Q. 
understood that there was a need to make 'instant decisions', where 'culture- 
centric' frameworks could prevent immediate responses: these decisions could be 
made on the basis of `amal, where a specific situation can be analyzed, and an 
appropriate response made immediately. 140 
As a means of approaching some of the variables in the decision-making 
processes, these two advocates of i-djtihäd are compared: H. I. and P. Q. both 
promote itihäd, but have different frames of reference for its operation, 
representing complex and diverse nuances of understanding. They are both 
involved in the consultative process, although - unlike P. Q. - I. I. has had a 
traditional training in a madrasa (P. Q. believed that he was consulted through 
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'personal circumstances', seen as possessing the widest knowledge of Islamic 
issues in his community, rather than 'formal' qualification). Both represent 
differing patterns of decision-making, specific reactions to prevalent tradition- 
bound frameworks that do not offer flexibility within interpretation. Whether it 
would be seen as idjtihäd, or not, was not really of importance to either H. I. or 
P. Q.: the practicalities of the decision took priority. Both felt that they were 
within a'living community', rather than a time-bound, hermetically sealed Islamic 
framework. 
P. Q. believed that these decision-making processes formed part of the 
Kur'än-ic sub-text of social justice, and that every Muslim community and 
individual in the U. K. needed a similar framework of consultation. Both 
interviewees agreed on the need for appropriate organisation within Islamic 
communities, although they have different approaches to how this would be done: 
P. Q. basing his model on Madina, and seeking elimination of current decision- 
making bodies, whilst H. I. seeks to compromise and utilise existing mechanisms 
where feasible. P. Q. centres his model of decision-making on effective, 
Islarnically-empowered leader ship - to whom allegiance has to be given. H. I. has 
an approach based around the effective education and empowerment of qualified 
individuals, who have the courage to implement decisions, and the power to 
challenge existing systems. 
This brief comparison demonstrates that - even between pro-idjtihäd 
advocates - there can be a limited common ground. 
The likelihood of them 
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sharing an agenda, even on the most basic issues, is probably remote. If placed 
together on a hypothetical madjlis-i-shürä, 14i location of common ground would 
present difficulties. Differences in approaches they express provide one indicator 
of the problem of identifying communalities between different Islamic 
frameworks in the U. K. Motivation is limited, especially when infrastructures are 
not intact or are in development. 
As demonstrated within the fieldwork, these difficulties are not exclusive to 
the U. K., but represent issues of concern within and between communities 
worldwide. Identifying common ground was seen as a key question within 
Malaysia and Pakistan, although it was not necessarily a key concern. In 
Malaysia, the common ground had linkage to the wider political debate - 
including the Islamic components within different political perspectives, and 
identification with traditional practices. The question of leadership and 
infrastructures within these perspectives had been largely resolved (i. e. through 
creation of governmental and opposition Islamic agencies). Defining decision- 
making processes, both within and outside of a political framework, and 
determining the levels of 'Islamicization' in society, were seen as key issues in 
Pakistan - where the search for common ground was seen by many as elusive 
within the current decision-making frameworks. Questions need to be asked of 
to what extent the decision-making process has an impact at grass-roots levels, 
given the varied agendas and diverse interpretations of Islam - and whether issues 
surrounding idjtihäd retain theoretical rather than practical implications for the 
majority of Muslims in the U. K.? 
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Some Muslims in the U. K. believe that the need for idjtihäd is actually 
greater in the minority context than in majority environments such as Pakistan 
and Malaysia, and that in the U. K. the practical implications of situations 
requiring immediate decisions actually over-ride the slow mechanisms of 
decision-making currently consulted. This trend also exists outside of the U. K.: 
"Our communities at the other end, of course, they move as slowly and 
sometimes artificially slowly, while the society actually outstrips the 
scholars - as usual. On the whole, our communities everywhere need 
their own solution, practical solution, and survive with it. And one has to 
accept the fact that our people are loyal to their faith. They don't want to 
be outside their faith at all. But they make their own - what I call - 
practical idjtihäd. And the theologians have to come in and look at what 
happened, and try to see whether that can be justified within the terms of 
the law. Or has to be modified in some form or other. These are the 
mu/tahids who really would be relevant. " 142 
This view indicates the pragmatic need to deal with a situation reactively, rather 
than endeavouring to change a situation pro-actively. Whilst Islam can be 
presented as a formulaic way of life, offering (varying) approaches to specific 
situations, there is also the need for Islamic responses either to issues not directly 
referred to in primary sources; situations requiring clarity; or situations in which 
an individual or community was unaware of the appropriate 'Islamic' response(s) 
to it. Within the U. I. context, the majority of questions sent to the Shari'ah 
Council - for example - were reactive, in that they are 
dealing with specific 
situations that have occurred. By contrast, the nature of Syed ad-Darsh's column 
is essentially pro-active - in that it is dealing with a wide range of 
'new` issues and 
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situations - as well as reacting to events readers have experienced. "' It could be 
considered to what extent idjtihäd is reactive rather than pro-active in the U. K. 
context. Fieldwork suggested that a majority of decision-makers encountered in 
Malaysia and Pakistan were emphasising and dealing with situations which had 
already occurred, rather than projecting towards future possible scenarios. 144 
Islamic understandings in the U. K. are centred upon interpretations, based 
on ancestral history, as well as upon varying sources offikh and Share-'a. The 
level to which this can be continued within the modern urban context of Britain - 
which itself is radically shifting - is open to question. Recognition of similar 
parallel shifts in environments of ancestral origin are also promoted by some 
interpreters in the U. K.: 
"You'll have other people, who will say 'Well, look, any change 
whatsoever is rejected and what we need to do is to go back to our 
tradition. ' And they become advocates of cultural purity - not religious 
[purity], mind you - 'We Pakistanis must retain our Pakistani traditions: 
it's our great heritage and we are proud of it. ' 
"Very good! Nobody will stop you. But unfortunately you cannot live in 
this society with many aspects of the Pakistani culture. Not even in 
Pakistan itself can you survive on the old tradition of Pakistani culture, 
because it is a change even in Pakistan as well. Despite all the appearance 
of movements of what you might call reaction against any change, a 
change is taking place in our societies, however it's going. "145 
Again, it can be questioned to what extent this is a real issue for Muslims at grass 
roots level, particularly those located in a rural environment. It should be asked 
to what extent 'the old tradition of Pakistani culture' (and other locations) was 
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itself static, given the constant shifts in Indian sub-continent population groups 
and the diversity within different traditions and cultures of Pakistan. 
Fieldwork demonstrates this diversity. Islamic frameworks - even those 
described as'tradition-bound' - of necessity react to and incorporate specific shifts 
according to circumstances. Individuals from these frameworks maintained 
specific interpretations, when they relocated from rural Indian sub-continent 
environments to urban U. K. environments: 
"... There's a very good term, which is 'cultural brokers, ' you see the 
people who are defining these terms who are those, either they are `ulama' 
from villages in Pakistan or India who have gone there [to the U. K. ], or 
they are the first-generation Muslims, who built the mosque, who 
associate with mosque, they don't have much broader knowledge about 
Islam. 
"But they are emotionally very attached to it, and their own concepts of 
tradition, and they want their new generations to abide to these traditions; 
they are very powerful, [and] influential in the mosque: they are on the 
committees, they know who to bring in [as] anImam, things like that - so 
those are the people also who are defining [Islam and its 
interpretations]. " 146 
The responses of younger generations to this has been to react to these 
traditions: 
"They are looking for ideas, they are looking for something which should 
be there, but they don't find. Now it is quite natural for you to look back 
on your roots. 
"Some of them I met, they have their own Virtual Reality of Islam. 
" 147 
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This analogy is a useful one, and could be developed, in terms of expressing 
individual creation(s) of specific understandings of Islam: the Virtual Reality can 
draw on different hardware and software, from 'traditional' sources and elsewhere. 
This Virtual Reality could extend itself, through drawing upon communications 
with other systems and 'realities', and borrowing/copying other computer systems. 
It is also open to future developments, and innovations in technology and design 
of the environment. Other equipment and software can become obsolete. The 
Virtual Reality can be reproduced by anybody, but it is unlikely that identical 
realities can be created separately - every reality being open to subtle 
interpretative differences and specific creative influences. The creation of distinct 
'U. K. Muslim identities' offers variations in the Virtual Reality analogy, 
developing and changing through the generations, especially with inter-mixing 
within non-Muslims at different social levels. Some commentators believe that 
this has brought Muslims partially into the mainstream - although there is still a 
level of exclusion linked to racial identities. 
In terms of Islamic values, one interviewee believed that many Muslims in 
Britain fail to 'live up' to requirements of Islam - and that there is an element of 
hypocrisy within the community (singular) in its 'rebellion against the Laws of 
God'. 14' The extent to which decision-making processes based around iitihäd 
will be incorporated into the Virtual Reality of Islamic interpretations in the U. K. 
is open to question. As such, dealing with 'new issues' - including topics related 
to technology, medical issues, morality, and living as a minority within a non- 
Muslim context - will have variable results. 
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The efficiency of support systems, and future results of current diverse 
decision-making processes, play significant roles in shaping the future of Islamic 
environments in the U. K. This could involve the creation of numerous reference 
frameworks, for reactive and pro-active decision-making processes, interlinked 
with external Islamic influences whilst generating responses specific to the U. K. 
environment. Responses to these issues could, in turn, influence international 
Islamic frameworks. Levels of interaction between shared minority contexts may 
also increase. A body of literature and other reference material, together with 
contextually appropriate education, could incorporate 'new' interpretations - and 
fuse aspects of culture-specific interpretations. The extent to which totally 
'tradition-bound' interpretation will isolate its practitioners from the mainstream 
in the future - or conversely become the mainstream - is difficult to determine, 
given that simplistic models and trends are difficult to justify. Changing 
decision-making processes, or increased application of interpretations of idjtihäd 
(and related practices) will not - in the medium term - radically alter the diversity 
of practice and interpretation for the majority of Muslims in Britain. Specific 
social and interpretative groups are more susceptible towards integrating new 
decision-making processes into their Islamic frameworks, or discarding practices 
deemed as (detrimental) innovations or 'bida' by others. Despite external or 
'alternate' interpretative pressures, seeking to change existing practices, the 
dominance of 'tradition' - however defined - remains an 
integral component in 
Islamic decision-making processes in U. K. contexts. 
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrates that ijtihäd, and related concepts, can provide 
important reference points within aspects of 'Islamic decision-making', in 
different Islamic contexts and 'environments'. The term i tihäd, and its varying 
definitions, exists not only as a theoretical concept - but is applied "in practice" 
to deal with specific circumstances and issues, within certain Islamic 
environments. Idjtihäd as a reference point on occasions transcends the 'barriers' 
of nationality, and is shared between groups globally, with similar ideological 
reference points. It is not possible to determine 'national' characteristics of 
Islamic decision-making, e. g. 'Pakistani Islamic' or 'Malaysian Islamic'. Instead, 
the processes of decision-making often represent aspects of the Islamic spectrum 
of diversity. 
There are dangers in making generalisations about i tihäd, or other forms 
of Islamic decision-making: each decision has a contextual reference point, linked 
to the subject, people, and environments. `New' iLtihäd may be specific to certain 
individuals in a certain context (i. e. historical-geographical-political-cultural. 
However, idjtihäd itself does not possess a fixed definition, and the fieldwork 
represents some of the varied definitions and applications of the term. It is not 
the place of the researcher to determine which is 'right' or 'wrong' - although 
certain interviewees sought to stress that their definition(s) and interpretations of 
Islam were 'superior' to others, some going so far as to state that anyone who did 
not follow their line of reasoning was a'käjIr' or representative of'fähiliyya. ' 
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Locating consensus amongst interviewees regarding icatihäd - and its utility 
(or not) - was never the intention of the researcher. Obtaining agreement about 
Islamic interpretation was also difficult, given the varied frames of reference 
contextually applied by interviewees. These ranged from: maintaining a fixed, 
possibly `urf- centred understanding; maintaining a fixed, possibly fikhl madhhab 
understanding; through to making 'new' interpretations based on varied sources, 
to pragmatically respond to contemporary situations and circumstances. 
However, some parties that describe themselves as 'progressive' or 'modernist' in 
outlook are described to the contrary by others. Some interviewees felt that the 
best way to deal with contemporary situations was to follow `urf. Individuals 
described as 'non-progressive' by others were found to be using computers, fax 
machines, and other technology in their interpretations. The question arises of 
what is meant by 'modernity' or 'progress', within the field of Islamic 
interpretations? ' 
Fieldwork demonstrated that different contexts had different priorities. The 
ideal of the 'ummah articulated by some is contrasted with recognition by others 
that there can be no homogeneity of belief; fieldwork suggests some "common 
threads" 2 of understanding are recognised between and within different contexts 
(albeit often interpreted in different ways). The creation of a single statement 
regarding the practical validity of i tihäd - or common trends in Islamic decision- 
making - therefore raises clear logical 
difficulties, except perhaps in the more 
abstract, theoretical sense. Some interviewees see a danger' of breaking-up the 
single text of the Kur'an into "shreds", in order to promote specific viewpoints. 
' 
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Reactions towards the common issues, explored during fieldwork, often 
demonstrate a polarity of opinion. There is no reason why this should be 
'surprising', or indeed be a'negative characteristic' of interpretation. The history 
of Islam, even during the time of the Prophet, demonstrate that there were 
conflicts of opinion in interpreting Islam: 
"The differences in my community are a sign of God's grace. " 4 
The nature of Islamic decision-making can involve challenging the existing 
norm, and determining its validity. This may raise the issue of to what extent it 
represents a challenge to the primary Islamic source of the Kur'an; and to varied 
interpretations of the meaning of the Kur'än and other 'Islamic sources' e. g. 
Hadith, Sunna, Fikh, and Sari 'a (which can have different priorities and levels 
of 'authenticity' within diverse contexts). The will, freedom, knowledge and/or 
desire to explore the diversities of interpretation also vary. Again it may be issue- 
specific: perhaps the difference between definitions of 'makrüh' and 'halal', or 
staying within the defined boundaries and frames of reference of hudi d and 
hukm. Aspects of some Islamic environments in which fieldwork was undertaken 
did not encourage challenges to the status quo in interpretative matters. Critics 
indicate their belief that, in certain cases, they felt the status quo was 'un-Islamic', 
perpetuating an incorrect interpretation or a'false' belief - perhaps for'un-Islamic' 
reasons. In this respect, this may represent an historical continuity of the 
dialogues attempting to determine the 'correct' interpretative viewpoint - and what 
is meant by 'Islam'. 
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In endeavouring to determine the 'correct' understanding, fieldwork indicates 
that a number of Muslims - at all levels within Islamic environments - are 
attempting to come to terms with contemporary situations and issues, and 
attempting to deal with them 'Islamically'. This often demands that many 
questions and challenges are made - although there was a fear that too many 
questions made Islam more 'regulative' and 'restrictive'. ' This was reflected within 
a Hadth: 6 
"Narrated Anas: The people started asking the Prophet too many 
questions importunately. So one day he ascended the pulpit and said, 'You 
will not ask me any question but I will explain it to you. ' I looked right 
and left, and behold, every man was covering his head with his garment 
and weeping. Then got a man up who, whenever quarrelling with 
somebody, used to be accused of not being the son of his father. He said, 
'0 Allah's Messenger! Who is my father? ' The Prophet replied, 'Your 
father is Hudhaifa. ' Then 'Umar got up and said, 'We accept Allah as our 
Lord, Islam as our religion and Muhammad as our messenger and we seek 
refuge with Allah from the evil of afflictions. ' The Prophet said, 'I have 
never seen the good and bad like on this day. No doubt, Paradise and Hell 
was displayed in front of me till I saw them in front of that wall. ' Qatada 
said: This Hadith used to be mentioned as an explanation for this Verse: - 
"'0 you who believe! Ask not questions about things which, if made plain 
to you, may cause you trouble. "" 
This may support the fear amongst some interviewees that too much (or any) 
idUtihäd is unnecessary and causes difficulty. Others felt that this was a 
misinterpretation, that was erroneously applied to support the alleged closure of 
the 'Gates' of idjtihäd: 
"Narrated Sad bin Abi Waqqas: The Prophet said, 'The most sinful person 
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among the Muslims is the one who asked about something which had not been prohibited, but was prohibited because of his asking. "' 
Certain interviewees expressed concern as to what the 'appropriate' questions to 
raise were, and whether asking a question promoted 'freedom' or 'restriction'. 
Clearly, this again is contextually related, and is reflected within the Prophet 
Muhammad's lifetime, 9 where sources demonstrate how decision-paradigms were 
altered and adapted to fit specific circumstances. Fieldwork demonstrated the 
(perhaps inevitable) numerous differences emerging during 'Islamic' decision- 
making processes. 10 However, there was also a stress on the possibility of 
Rewards for undertaking Islamic decision-making, if certain criteria were 
satisfied - even if the decision was 'wrong'. " 
According to one Hadith, Muhammad himself stressed that his personal 
id, tihäd possessed limitations, 12 compared with the 'infallibility' of the Kur'än, '3 
and that there was potential for 'error' in his judgement: 
"Narrated Um Salama: Allah's Messenger said, 'I am only a human being, 
and you people (opponents) come to me with your cases; and it may be 
that one of you can present his case eloquently in a more convincing way 
than the other, and I give my verdict according to what I hear. So if ever 
I judge (by error) and give the right of a brother to his other (brother) then 
he (the latter) should not take it, for I am giving him only a piece of 
Fire. "' 14 
The fear of making 'errors' or 'asking too many questions' continues to 
influence contemporary Islamic decision-making contexts explored during 
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fieldwork, and in some cases inhibit 'idjtihäd (within its varying definitions). The 
mechanism(s) of'idjtihäd, on a personal level, were also considered responsible 
for aspects of Islamic interpretation deemed as'bida' - although clearly according 
to some interviewees not every innovation had negative connotations. Again, the 
qualification of bid a is circumstantial: one person's bk/ a is another person's 
i tihäd. This was particularly evident in discussions regarding In Vitro 
Fertilisation (LV. F. ) and its 'Islamic' implications in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Pakistan. " Not only is it a question of determining where to draw the line 
between haräm and halal activities, but to continually re-evaluate the historical 
'movement' of the line between these polarity points. In Singapore, the re- 
evaluation of kidney transplants is evidence of such a process of re-evaluation - 
although contextually the scale of such processes varies within and between 
Islamic environments. 16 
The time-scale of such processes of alteration is often difficult to measure, 
requiring correlation between different spheres of. personal interpretation; local 
contexts and 'authorities'; non-government institutions and 'authorities'; and/or 
national decision-making frameworks. On some issues, the lack of cohesion and 
consensus is evident. Whether the possession of a national decision-making 
framework or authority is a benefit or a hindrance is also contextual: certain 
'threads' within Islamic communities in the U. I. do not wish to be governed or 
pressurised by a central (self-proclaimed) authority, and see positive benefits 
in 
relative autonomy in aspects of decision-making. " An intrusive system, which 
does not promote what certain individuals or groups require 
(especially around 
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certain core issues), is naturally negatively received by these groups. 
In Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore, national government-linked 'Islamic' 
institutions were criticised by opponents to varying degrees. Where a decision 
seen as 'negative' or 'un-Islamic' by some parties is forbidden within the 
legislative framework, opposition to it in the form of action is tantamount to 
breaking the law (and vice versa) This is not just in the case of 'secularised' 
'Muslims' interviewed, but also the case of'religious' 'Muslims'. Islamic decision- 
making in some cases becomes apolitical football', when associated with specific 
ideological stances. It is applied to press for certain specific interpretations and 
understandings, which may not be a 'priority' for the majority population. The 
term iijtihäd can be utilised to promote political platforms, and aid cohesion, 
even though there can be some distance between the theoretical articulation and 
the practical application of i tihäd. Questions can be raised as to whether those 
promoting 'pragmatic interpretation' have a clear idea of what they are seeking, 
and why they need to construct the paradigmatic model of icatihäd as a solution 
for problems and a wide-range of issues. Political views may be represented as 
the 'definitive' Islamic interpretation, the implication being that refusal to support 
a specific stance is the equivalent to being 'anti-Islamic'. Fieldwork demonstrated 
two such views by established political parties, in Malaysia (P. A. S. )' 
8 and 
Pakistan (Jamdat-e Islami)'9 (although these were not the only parties to hold 
such a view). This `division' is also represented in various dialogues regarding so- 
called "urf -centred interpretations, and other parties or groupings representing 
themselves within non-'traditional' frameworks (even though there may 
be 
312 
elements of'`ur, f within their interpretations too). 
The majority of interviewees believed that they were on the 'right path'; not 
all of them believed that there was more than one path, 2° or that all their 
contemporaries were on the 'right path. ''-' Whether this diversity is contained 
within a single 'ummah - or not - is clearly a question of individual interviewees' 
beliefs and consciences (some were more candid than others). Some felt that the 
depiction of an 'ummah as a single entity was the ideal, but that was not matched 
in reality; however, there was also recognition by some interviewees that the 
thesis of disparity within the 'ummah was a paradigm that could be used by'anti- 
Muslims' or opponents of the 'ummah to somehow 'damage' Islam. Some 
interviewees believed defensiveness was the best strategy, when faced by this 
thesis of disparity; other interviewees believed that Islam was strong enough to 
face such criticism, especially when discussing Islamic decision-making contexts. 
These responses would suggest that, whilst Islamic sources are seen as 
important within different decision-making environments and contexts, visions 
of the 'Islamic ideal(s)' vary considerably. On the one hand, readings of Islamic 
history represent certain periods in an idealised light. " Interviewees were not 
able to provide a contemporary example of a 'perfect' model to follow, although 
historical models (especially referring to the so-called 'Golden Age of Madina') 
were often cited. The methodology to achieve these ideals did not necessarily rest 
in human hands: some felt that Divine Interventions would provide the solution; 
23 
some others believed that a combination of human and Divine effort was 
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required. It was interesting that some interviewees saw Pakistan as an 'ideal 
model' of an Islamic society, although these interviewees were generally living 
outside of the 'Islamic Republic. ' Aspects of developments in Sudan, and Iran 
(after 1979), connected with I3lamic decision-making, were also commended by 
some interviewees. Within Malaysia, some interviewees believed that Malay 
Muslim society was developing a paradigm that could be followed by other 
'Islamic countries'; others were emphatic that developments to date were 
inadequate. 24 In Singapore, governmental institutional representatives promoted 
their viewpoints (naturally, largely in support of the government), believing that 
their model could be useful in other Muslim minority contexts. 25 
In the U. K., many interviewees felt that Muslim communities continued to 
be within a state of transition; current 'authorities' were in flux, and several future 
decision-making models were proposed which represented various combinations 
of pragmatism and idealism - ranging from a governmental representative body 
to 'an Islamic state of Britain'. The likelihood of 'Islamic authority' being 
incorporated within state mechanisms - in the medium- or long-term is slight - 
given the lack of parliamentary and institutional representation, and long-standing 
anti-Muslim prejudices - as well as disparate Muslim agendas. Current Muslim 
demands - for example, for Muslim education and personal 
law spheres - are also 
likely to meet continued governmental and parliamentary resistance. Therefore, 
any i jtihäd is likely to remain in the personal sphere (as long as it does not 
contradict British statutes). Within certain parameters, some parties indicate that 
this represents a greater 'freedom of expression', but others are motivated to seek 
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to legislate (and control? ) their contemporaries. This is frequently associated 
with a desire to'maintain identity', or'preserve Islam'. Again, the definitions vary 
as to what this really means. Some Muslims interviewed in Pakistan saw U. K. - 
based Muslims (of Pakistani ancestral origin) as 'straying' from Islam; others saw 
U. K. -based Muslims as 'better Muslims'[! ], who would provide a future key to 
Islamic interpretation in the contemporary world. 26 The researcher recalls a 
discussion within the initial seminar in Lahore, 27 where one participant suggested 
that the U. K. was a'dangerous place' with a'high crime rate' and a'corrupt police 
force', because it was not an 'Islamic country' - unlike Pakistan; the participant 
was reminded by the researcher of the high murder rate in Karachi in 1995, 
caused by different factions (several of which operating under the banner of 
'Islam') and a major police corruption scandal in Pakistan. 28 The tendency for 
individuals, however 'well-educated', to'demonise' The Other in order to promote 
a religious argument has a number of historical precedents. This is often at the 
expense of observing'the back yard'. Similar thoughts were expressed in Malaysia 
and Singapore. 
Conversely, distant places are also 'idealised' as decision-making models. To 
what extent does this idealisation take account of the reality of a particular place 
or period of time? The extent to which historical 'authorities' would (re)interpret 
Kur'än-ic principles could be described as demonstrating considerable 
imagination, and a hint of the divergence prevalent within Islamic societies at an 
early period. 29 Yet many 'authorities' are not challenged or examined closely. 
To 
what extent was their'ijtihäd a specific response to a context, time, and place? 
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How suitable is it for contemporary society? To what extent is it an accepted 
'Islamic' practice? Questions can be raised regarding the nature of decision- 
making and 'authorities', especially those seeking to compel others to follow their 
path. The pressure to follow a certain interpretation is discouraged (within certain 
parameters) within the Kur'än: 
"Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from 
Error: whoever rejects Evil and believes in God hatte grasps the most 
trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And God heareth and 
knoweth all things. " 30 
On certain issues, individuals are encouraged to seek out their own 
understandings - from 'experts' or by their own effort in reading the Kur'än: 
it ... And no question 
do they bring to thee but We reveal to thee the 
j 
truth and the best explanation (thereof). 
"" 
If an avenue of inquiry is available, it is incumbent upon an individual to ask 
questions to that more learned source on matters of i tihäd: 
"If you follow (right) guidance no hurt can come to you, 
from those who 
stray. The goal of you all is to God: it is He that will show you the 
truth 
of all that ye do. ' 32 
Many interviewees during fieldwork raised the problem of determining the 
'right guidance'. The youth in the inner-city Leicester mosque 
felt it had to come 
from someone 'in tune' with their own generation, who would provide 
them with 
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the basis of sound decision-making (not necessarily a 'trained' nnäm). 33 Some 
authorities in Pakistan and Malaysia believed that the 'right guidance' could only 
come from individuals 'properly trained' in a traditional' institution - such as al- 
Azhar. 34 Also in Malaysia, an A. B. I. M. founder recalled the disgust of` ulamä 
confronted by students (including himself) 'making itihäd. '35 
Malaysia provided one illustration of state responses to those 'unofficial' 
decision-makers who transcended the expected society boundaries - such as Dar 
ul-Argam. 36 Singapore was notable for controlling decision-making under the 
auspices of a state body, for example through management of mosque finances 
and specific legislation, and where 'deviation' from expected behaviour was 
severely suppressed. 37 In the U. K., Muslim institutional and local rivalries - 
centred around decision-making issues - have at times divided communities. 
Islamic decision-making processes are clearly shaped by their environments, 
and can - in certain cases - be associated with specific ethnic or national 
identities, in which specific interpretative keys shape 'national' expressions of 
religious understanding. 38 'Traditional' understandings and practices can also be 
maintained through Islamic decision-making processes; 39 the negative attribution 
of adat in Malaysia and turf in Pakistan is an over-simplification, applied in 
specific visions of 'modernising' Islam. This reflects the differing definitions of 
bid a in different Islamic contexts, which can divide communities and nations. 
" 
The treatment of 'transgressors' within these different contexts can also vary, and 
'i tihäd can incorporate decision-making that would seem 'radical' or'un-Islamic' 
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FM 
in other contexts. 4' 
Fieldwork demonstrates that the reconciliation of the dynamics of varied 
Islamic beliefs with life in 'secularised' or 'modernised" societies takes different 
strategies and emphases. Within global, (so-called) 'post-modern' contexts, 
various levels of society are affected in different ways by 'extra-Islamic` socio- 
political and religious interests. These can introduce 'new issues' into the 
decision-making debate. The researcher, during fieldwork, was himself 
responsible for confronting certain decision-makers and 'authorities' in Pakistan 
and Malaysia for the first time with specific issues (i. e. I. V. F. ). Those elements 
with society who travel extensively internationally, or have close international 
contacts, inevitably are often influenced or confronted with different situations 
and perspectives. This may include other Muslim institutions or ideologues - 
presenting specific 'world-views'. Developments in communications - such as the 
Internet and satellite T. V. - already increasingly facilitate the dispersal and 
dialogue (if not consensus) on Islamic decision-making issues. Control of such 
facilities influences decision-making processes. 
Certain interviewees felt threatened by the prospect of 'intrusive' external 
Islamic decision-makers, or a wider dialogue that might negatively influence their 
own status and power. However, others believed such developments 
had their 
positive elements, and offered the paradigm of communications along 
trading 
routes in early Islamic societies. They also felt it would make 
dawa' and 
dissemination of fatwä more effective. Whilst computer access remains 
in the 
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hands of a relative elite in Pakistan and Malaysia, fears were expressed regarding 
the impact on 'Islamic values' of media presenting 'alternative' moral values 
and/or 'anti-Islamic' broadcasts. Reconciling or dealing with the implications of 
these media would appear to be dominant themes, transcending the boundaries 
of all four 'Islamic environments' surveyed. 
Within the post-modern context, the transcending of geographical and 
political frontiers by electronic communications will have a significant impact 
upon Islamic decision-making processes in the next century. Traditional controls 
by 'authorities', through mosques and organisations, will be short-circuited. 
Confidential dialogues and access to a wide-range of opinions and decisions will 
alter the perspectives of the new, computer-literate elite. Whilst education has 
been seen as a traditional key to 'preserving' and 'promoting' Islam, access to 
Information Technology will also be high on decision-makers' agendas. Modem 
technology in itself is not 'un-Islamic'. 42 Control of and access towards 
knowledge provides interpretative power and influence - at low cost. 
" The 
creation of 'networks' exchanging information can be facilitated with ease 
(although getting people to read a specific view is more difficult, given - 
for 
example - the large number of competing opinions on the 
Internet). There is also 
the issue of governments attempting to control or censor electronic 
communications systems they see as damaging. However, 
influential Islamic 
institutions are already exploring the possibilities of these resources. 
44 
During fieldwork, the researcher frequently questioned the validity of 
data 
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received, in interview and other formats. Getting to the 'truth' about specific 
issues raises difficulties, when interviewees seek to promote particular ideological 
or religious lines, and respond with 'what is expected' rather than'what you need 
to know. ' Fieldwork was undertaken with disparate interviewees, with varying 
insights and qualifications. The thesis was never intended to present the 'whole 
picture' regarding Islamic environments, but sought to raise some of the many 
themes and issues concerning Muslims and their decision-making processes. An 
overwhelming trend is that the idea of 'change' in interpretative values is not 
universally sought, and the construction of alternative models (on 'Islamic' lines) 
is frequently resisted or extremely selective. Many interviewees sought 
'successful' models to follow, and were at times desperately searching amongst 
other Islamic environments, and then finding that what they sought could not be 
practically transplanted to their own specific context. 
On their own personal levels, many individuals felt that they fulfilled 'Islamic 
ideals' and performed their own 'decision-making' (with or without guidance from 
authorities); their personal satisfaction with their behaviour was often contrasted 
with dissatisfaction with the wider local, national, or international Islamic 
'community'. Reference was made to the 'universal vision' of Islam, but few felt 
this ideal was matched in reality, and felt that the ideal of the 'ummah was at time 
over-stressed, to the detriment of more practical concerns. Some felt drawn into 
a specific, idealised vision of Islam, promoted by an educated elite - and 
funded 
through publications, educational institutions, and external organisations - which 
often stressed tie 'benefits' of (a specific form of) itihäd. The whole notion of 
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'progress' in interpretation was associated by many with manipulation of religious 
ideals, and distorted readings of sources. 45 
On the other hand, others generally considered dialogue on issues was 
healthy - even if no consensus was reached. Islamic core sources were seen to 
bring Muslims (loosely) together. International institutional links - for example, 
between Pakistan, Malaysia, and/or the U. K. - were interpreted as beneficial. The 
work of individuals, and less publicised events, would also seem to hold 
significance in terms of influencing specific decisions and approaches to 
knowledge. 46 The qualifications and experiences of'authorities' clearly influence 
the processes of decision-making, especially when Islamic Sciences are 
undermined and the status of their practitioners eroded by wider society values. 47 
To an extent, this may be influenced by what some see as the 'ineffective' 
decision-making to date, and the difficulties in achieving consensus: long- 
standing dialogues in Pakistan, for example on 'Islamic' legislative changes, have 
not necessarily enhanced the status of participants to these processes. However, 
legislative changes are tempered by a need to reconcile the requirements of all 
sectors of the population, if 'draconian' measures are not proposed. 
Locating i jtihäd amongst these processes causes difficulties, both for 
Muslims and non-Muslim observers: 48 pragmatic decision-making based on 
Islamic sources takes place, and is called itihäd; other forms of decision-making 
also attract this label, although the classification of itihäd can be disputed by 
others. Within this confusion, perhaps it is understandable that taklld and a 
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reluctance to change (and make a 'mistake') is preferred by many. Autonomy 
amongst the disparate groupings occurs, although the wider (Muslim and non- 
Muslim) society is generally unconcerned with the ramifications of this, unless - 
as in the cases of the Muslim Parliament and Hizb ut-Tahrir - statements deemed 
'controversial' reach a wide national (Muslim and non-Muslim) audience. " These 
statements are often (mis)represented by media and other sources as belonging 
to an Islamic 'mainstream' or representative of every Muslim in the U. K., 
although this arrogation of representation is rejected by many. Matching the 
rhetoric within khutba with the needs of specific communities is also a prevalent 
issue, " reflected in those individuals seeking Muslims to 'work the system' from 
inside (non-'Islamic') institutions rather than outside them. 5' 
The thesis commenced by inquiring whether itihäd is of practical value to 
Muslims in the U. K., and whether Islamic communities in the U. K. could benefit 
from the experience of other Islamic communities elsewhere? In the Islamic 
communities in transition in the U. K., there is no doubt that - amongst many 
Muslims - there is a clear emphasis on the primary Islamic sources, 
but significant 
differences in the way that they are interpreted. To an extent, this is associated 
on the disparate nature of 'authorities', which have different priorities and 
agendas. The application of idttihäd does not necessarily dominate their decision- 
making processes, and some felt that it was definitely a minority preoccupation. 
52 
Decision-making priorities vary locally, nationally, and internationally. 
Idjtihäd 
possesses a reactive nature, responding to specific circumstances and situations, 
rather than the more general fatwä providing opinions 
(perhaps based on 
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idjtihäd). 13 In the U. K. context, fieldwork indicates that family issues and 
personal relationships dominate decision-making agendas. The absence of a state 
legislative basis (centred on Islamic sources) by which decisions can be 
formulated in the U. K. is seen as causing difficulties for some Muslims in the 
U. K. Others would resent the intrusion of a legislated basis for decision-making 
formulas in such areas, preferring to rely upon specific extra-legislative 
interpretations based on (so-called) Shari-'a and/or other sources. 
Whilst some would seek to promote the creation of a 'state agency' to 
determine such personal matters for religious minorities - such as M. U. 1 S. in 
Singapore - coming to a consensus on issues such as divorce is clearly 
problematic. Non-legislative bodies, attempting to determine such issues, have 
had limited success in the U. K. The dynamics of Islamic belief systems are 
clearly influenced by existing within a secularising society, especially for those 
Muslims born and raised in the U. K. Whether this results in an erosion of 
'Islamic' value-systems, or the creation of new models, is open to speculation. 
Fieldwork in the U. I. indicated that there was idealisation of other Islamic 
environments (both past and present), and a reliance on external sources of 
interpretation and information. Questions can be raised as to whether certain 
individuals and groups are 'right' to seek government and/or legal institutional 
recognition and assistance - and to what extent this ideal would diminish 
local 
centres of power and control? Similarly, the quest (in some circles) for a unified 
or cohesive Muslim platform may not be interpreted as'universally beneficial' 
by 
every Muslim in the U. K. To what extent is the concept and 'evolution' of a 
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low- 
'British Muslim' identity actually damaging to the majority, especially in terms of 
decision-making? Can it take account not only of so-called 'secular' influences, 
but the wide range of other influences seeking to promote themselves within the 
U. K. Islamic contexts? 
The current research reinforces the impression of a variety of interpretative 
models in the U. K., albeit containing the "common thread" of basic Islamic 
principles, but not necessarily recognising or acknowledging alternative models 
or approaches. Islamic educational models do not always promote or recognise 
the diversity contained within Islamic environments, in the U. K. or elsewhere. 
The means by which information about Islam is conveyed to future generations 
clearly will influence the balance of decision-making, and the priorities for 
generations seeking to confront the practicalities of living as a minority (religious 
and often racial) within a largely-secularised (and frequently hostile) 
environment. Given the varied options of 'Islamic decision-making processes' 
within different Islamic environments, depending how it is interpreted, id tihäd 
and related concepts may play a role in future decision-making processes of 
(some) Sunni Islamic communities and Muslim individuals in the U. K. Exploring 
the issues associated with ijtihäd also provides a useful key for aiding the 
understanding of issues confronting and concerning diverse Islamic 
environments. 
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